NEMANJA: SMIRENOUMLJE

THE END

UNUTRAŠNJI PLES

PIETA



DARKO DESNICA

Hamm as stated, and Clov as stated, together as stated, nec tecum nec sine te, in such a place, and in such a world, that`s all I can manage, more than I could.

Beckett

Ime mu je Darko Desnica.
U srednjoj školi izrezivao je novinske naslove bombastičnog sadržaja: Desnica prijeti bombama!
Ne kanim početi priču o njemu, zbog onoga što ću kazati na kraju.
U međuvremenu, puštam druge da pričaju, među ostalima i Desnicu: od tri njegove priče, posljednja je prvi put pred čitateljima.

- And so the conversation slips
Among velleities and carefully caught regrets
Through attenuated tones of violins
Mingled with remote cornets
And begins.

T.S.Eliot


Vladimir Novotny

utorak, lipanj 5, 2007

Darko Desnica, Antikvarijat



Postoje jednostavno dani koji prođu, bez ikakvih misli i događaja. Postoje opet sati i minute koje vam se usjeku u pamćenje i čine mozaik sjećanja. Bez obzira što se radi o situacijama koje možda traju samo nekoliko minuta, one u tom mozaiku izgledaju važnije i duže od cijelih dana, mjeseci, godina.

Moje sjećanje je, pogađate, mozaik upravo takvih sitnica. Pohranjivao sam samo skice čudnih događaja, neke trivijalne stvari, a opet za mene esencijalne. Činilo mi se da većinu stvari u životu ne činimo iz vlastitog uvjerenja i težnji već zbog nametnutih klišeja i očekivanja. Živimo tuđe živote i liječimo tuđe frustracije.

Te sam večeri krenuo vlakom u Zagreb. Morao sam pokupiti stvari iz stana i iseliti se. Krenuo sam s planom da prespavam u Zagrebu, obavim neke stvari po gradu, a navečer me je Damir trebao autom vratiti do Cerne. Bilo mi je užasno dosadno bez Interneta u Cerni, pa sam dao zahtjev za dobivanjem telefona i s imenjakom dogovorio prijevoz stvari, među kojima je bio i moj kompjuter.

Noć je bila prava ljetna. Uvalio sam se u udobno sjedalo kupea na potezu Vinkovci – Zagreb, u društvu još jednog tipa koji je čitao dnevne novine i pogledavao na sat. Osjećao sam se recimo, kao neki lik iz Doylovog romana. Volio sam noćnu vožnju vlakom, mjesta uz prugu, crvene kape na željezničarima i onaj zvuk vožnje po tračnicama.

Pomalo filmski i klišej, znam. Međutim, moje odrastanje svodilo se na odlazak u Zagreb, na takva noćna putovanja. Između ostalog, i Sanju sam upoznao u vlaku, što dovoljno govori kakvu su ulogu Hrvatske željeznice igrale u mom životu. Bila je dio uspomena poput recimo, zgrade vinkovačke gimnazije.

Tip preko puta mene odložio je novine, a na licu mu se vidjelo da je spreman za razgovor. Bili smo sami u kupeu, i ja sam probio led i uklizao s klasičnom neobaveznom spikom. Imao je sigurno četrdesetak godina, ali bio je obučen klošarskije od ja. Mislim, sav je bio u đžinsu. Hlače i jakna, a ispod obična pamučna majica. Da nije imao kožnu torbu kakvu je furao moj gimnazijski profać iz hrvatskog, i naočale, mislio bih da je radnik s bauštele. Ovako je bilo nečeg intelektualnog u njegovoj pojavi. Na kraju sam saznao da tip radi u HAZU.

-Vi ste akademik? -pitao sam ga zapanjeno.

Sjetio sam se i one Đoletove; «Ispadoše akademci veći zlotvori nego Nemci». Odmahnuo je glavom. Kako je objasnio, samo je radio u razredu za jezikoslovlje i etminologiju u HAZU. Nije bio akademik, barem ne još. Međutim, verglao je kao struja. Mislim, što je taj tip mogao pričati, nevjerojatno. Rekao je da putuje iz Vinkovaca s predstavljanja svoje knjige, o jeziku naravno. Bio je gost i na radiju, spomenuo je.

Tip je bio, kasnije sam ga zagoglao na Internetu, dr. Alemko Gluhak. Gluhak je valjda jedini lik u ovoj državi koji je diplomirao matematiku, a doktorirao jezik. Imao je svoju stranicu u sklopu HAZU-a. Bila je tu i fotka, original faca iz kupea, to je doista bio on. Neka pamučna majica, naočale i okružen s knjigama. Nemoš fulat.

Međutim, te noći na relaciji Vinkovci-Zagreb, poznatoj pruzi iz romana Orijent Express, sve sam uzimao s predostrožnošću. Nekako mi se doktorska titula nije uklapala uz isprane farmerke i tenisice. Iako je iz njega izbijala neka pozitivna vibra, djelovao mi je nestvarno. Kao noćno priviđenje. Uz sve to, lik me je rasturao svojim pričama. Još nikad nisam pričao s nekim poput njega. Onaj Mirko Miočić iz Milijunaša prava je kišna glista za Alemka Gluhaka.

Ne znam, stvarno se ne sjećam kako, ali došli smo na razgovor o registarskim tablicama za auto. Gluhak je razvezao svoju teoriju koja je zvučala poput Moorovog Faranheita 9/11. Pričao je o tome od Lužana do Kutine, mislim.

Pitao sam ga potom zašto nije išao autom u Vinkovce. Odgovorio je, zbog kune po kilometru. Naime, po jednom kilometru na putu Zagreb-Vinkovci uštedio je kunu zato što je putovao vlakom. Kilometre je pomnožio s litrama benzina, pa s cijenom litre, pa od sume oduzeo cijenu karte za vlak, pa razliku podijelio sa kilometražom, i dobio je kunu po kilometru, rekao je. Kad smo bili već na toj temi pitao sam ga koliko mu auto troši.

Ovako -objasnio mi je -ukupna potrošnja, od 1978. do sada je 7 i pol litara, prvih godina kad smo ga kupili trošio je 7 litara, a sada već troši 7,8 litara na 100 kilometara. Alemko je s ocem 1978. godine kupio Škodu, i od onda su vodili evidenciju potrošnje. Od 1978. do sada, njih su dvojica kod svakog tankanja auta zapisivali kilometražu, datum tankanja i količinu goriva. Vodili su tako evidenciju nekih 17 godina. Nevjerojatno, ha. Mene je to rasturalo, ta spika s dr. Gluhakom. Ne znam kako, ali uopće mu nisam govorio vi. Odmah smo prešli na ti, onako kao poznanici s iste godine faksa.

Kasnije sam, kao što sam rekao, na Internetu vidio da je on zapravo diplomirao matematiku, a tek kasnije doktorirao jezikoslovlje. Te noći sam ga još trpao u varijantu Filozofskog fakulteta, ruska književnost i hrvatski jezik varijanta. Zato sam ga zapitkivao što misli o Kavicama Andreja Puplina.

Priznao mi je, s pola glasa, onako prijateljski, da se razočarao u svoje poznavanje književnosti. Pitao me jesam li čitao Darka Desnicu. Ne Vladana, nego Darka. Tip je bio nešto mlađi od njega -od Alemka, ne od Vladana- tu šezdeseto godište, rekao je. Napisao je zbirku kratkih priča «Antikvarijat». Vrlo, vrlo kratke priče, po pola kartice čak. Sve na temu svjetske književnosti. Tip radi u antikvarijatu. Mušterije dolaze i traže knjige, a on, opisujući kupce, autore i djela, stvara male humoristične crtice. Nešto genijalno, tvrdio je Gluhak.

-Pa gdje je onda zajeb? - nisam mogao ne upitati.

Gluhaka je uništavalo to što se od 92 priče on nasmijao samo na njih 37. Ostalo je bilo, kako je on zaključio, nepoznavanje svjetske književnosti. Opće, klasične književnosti, ništa posebno. Zato je posuđivao knjige po redu prema pričama iz «Antikvarijata». Što je najgore, poklonio je tu knjižicu sestričninoj maloj, koja studira na Filozofskom. Obišao je kasnije sve knjižare u Zagrebu, ali više nije pronašao ni jedan primjerak «Antikvarijata». Probao je čak i u samim antikvarijatima, ali ništa. Bez uspjeha. Objavljena je samo jedna naklada, 2000. godine i potom muk. Ni glasa od Desnice, možda je čak umro, tko zna. Pokušao je Gluhak doći do njega, ali uzalud. Čovjeka nema. Ni njegove zbirke priča, koje su Gluhaku nabile komplekse.

Žao mu je, priznaje, što nije stigao pogledati po vinkovačkim knjižarama, možda se zagubila poneka. U Zagrebu ih više nema, čak ni putem Interneta. Ima ponuda, ima cijena, ali nema knjiga.

Nikada brže nisam stigao do Zagreba kao te večeri s Alemkom Gluhakom. Izišli smo na Glavnom kolodvoru, a pred ulazom u Immportane još je bilo dosta ljudi. Živost metropole odudarala je od pospane i usnule provincije iz koje smo putovali. Rastali smo se na brzaka, on je otišao na tramvaj, a ja pješke prema Vlaškoj. Nisam imao torbe ni ikakve prtljage, pa sam htio prošetati. Razmišljao sam o Gluhaku i «Antikvarijatu».

Posudio je kako kaže, ponovno od nećakinje «Antikvarijat», prepisao teme priča, i sada po tom popisu posuđuje knjige i čita. Kad sve pročita s popisa, opet će pročitati «Antikvarijat» da vidi dokle je stigao. Uz to, naravno, i dalje luta knjižarama i antikvarijatima, u potrazi za «Antikvarijatom».

Nakon nekog vremena, kad sam se raspitao o Gluhaku i par puta ga vidio na TV-u, te pročitao poneki njegov članak u novinama - i sam sam počeo tragati za «Antikvarijatom». Tražio sam ga po knjižarama u Korčuli, Dubrovniku, Vinkovcima, Osijeku, Virovitici, Požegi... Čak sam se htio učlaniti u neku knjižnicu i posuditi «Antikvarijat» i više ga nikada ne vratiti. Međutim, gdje god sam pitao, nisu imali tu knjigu. Jednom sam se prilikom namjerio u «Moderna vremena», antikvarijat u kojem je i sam Darko Desnica svojedobno radio, i od kuda je i potekla ta njegova famozna zbirka priča «Antikvarijat».

Slučajno sam u izlogu «Modernih vremena» vidio neku staru zbirku E. A. Poa «Ukradeno pismo», izdanu u GZH. iz 1983. u tzv. Babilonskoj biblioteci. Koštala je 80 kuna i ja sam, bez obzira na besparicu, skrenuo unutra. Ušao sam u antikvarijat kao i junaci Desničinih priča. Zvonce je cimnulo prodavačicu za pultom. Rekao sam joj što želim, i ona je iz izloga izvadila «Ukradeno pismo». Vrag mi nije dao mira, pa sam je pitao imaju li slučajno «Antikvarijat» Darka Desnice. Podigla je obrve, utipkala ime u komp i kratko odgovorila da imaju.

-Nevjerojatno-izustio sam.

Tražio sam da mi je da. Naslovnica je bila kao s Interneta, okrenuo sam zadnju stranu, nije bilo sumnje. Faust Vrančić, 2000. prvo izdanje. Na pitanje od kuda se sada stvorila, jer je prije nije bilo, ženska je samo nonšalantno slegnula ramenima.

To je iz zaliha, posljednje dvije, koliko vidim -rekla je.

Odložio sam E. A. Poa i na njeno čudo na pult istresao 245 kuna. Sve što sam tada imao u džepovima. «Antikvarijat» je koštao 70 kuna, a ja sam kupio oba. Jednog za sebe, jednog za Alemka Gluhaka. Ostalih 95 kuna sam pospremio, a Poa odlučio ostaviti za bolja vremena. Ženska je u nevjerici stavila u vrećicu dva «Antikvarijata» i nastavila čitati neki časopis.

Napustio sam antikvarijat s punom vrećicom «Antikvarijata». Osjećao sam poznatu prazninu u sebi. Potraga za Svetim Gralom bila je završena. Taj osjećaj praznine me rasturao. Nestalo je draži traganja i potrage. Tada sam se sjetio Gluhaka i činjenice da će mi sada trebati još toliko vremena i truda da njega pronađem. To me malo razvedrilo, jer sam znao da je draž u traganju, a ne u nađenom.



Darko Desnica rođen je 24. siječnja 1963. u Zagrebu. Na Filozofskom fakultetu u Zagrebu diplomirao je filozofiju i komparativnu književnost. Antikvarijat je njegova prva zbirka priča.

... Pripustimo li si antikvarijat kao živo biće u kojem svaka natisnuta knjiga na polici diše i ima svoje mjesto, obuzet će nas potraga za logikom struktura.
Jednako tako, nizanjem vrlo kratkih i pročišćenih priča, ovaj 'Antikvarijat' izaziva ponovno postavljanje stvari na svoje mjesto. Odmičući kroz knjigu čitatelj naslućuje sve kompleksniji, slojevitiji i sveobuhvatniji svijet kojeg tvore ove epizode.
Naslanjajući se na alephovski, ali i na harmsovski suvremeni svijet kulture i znanosti, 'Antikvarijat' se otvara kao prostor izazova - pulsirajućeg sabiranja i rasapa.

(Katarina Mažuran Jurešić, iz bilješke o knjizi)


Savonarola

Ovako su morali izgledati stanovnici Pompeja u prvom stoljeću nove ere: lagane sandale s kožnim vrpcama, neobavezni bež haljetak, pahuljaste kovrče... Čak mu i podočnjaci nalikuju fotografskim negativima Vezuva...
- Dobar dan.
- Dobar dan.
- Gdje vam stoji povijest umjetnosti?
- Prva polica desno.
- A, tu je... Pogledao bih literaturu o talijanskoj Renesansi, ako nije problem...
- Samo izvolite.
- Ustvari, tražim neku monografiju o firentinskoj sceni - zanima me druga polovina petnaestog stoljeća...
- Ako se ne varam, jedina knjiga s tom tematikom nalazi se prekoputa, pod poviješću...
- A-ha. Možete mi reći o čemu se radi?
- O usponu i padu Girolama Savonarole.
- Savonarole?
- Da; znate na koga mislim: utjecajni dominikanski propovjednik - praktično je vladao Firencom devedesetih godina petnaestog stoljeća...
Oprezno popravlja frizuru, zauzima pozu razočaranog ljubavnika...
- Moram vam reći, imate stvarno kontroverzan pristup.
- Kako to?
- Pa, ja vas pitam za Versaceov boutique, a vi me šaljete u Caritas!


Rogerova verzija

Neke me stvari oduvijek zagonetno smiruju: veliki brodovi, zvuk saksofona, djevojka s rupcem u kosi... I moj današnji gost ima jedan od tih darova: par snažnih, koščatih ruku, s izraženim žilama na nadlanici.
- Dobar dan.
- Dobar dan.
- Imate nešto Updikeovo - osim Parova?
- Imamo Rogerovu verziju.
- Je li to dobro?
- Nije loše.
- O čemu se radi?
- U jednu riječ: mladi prirodnjak postdiplomant dolazi sredovječnom profesoru teologije s molbom da mu teološki fakultet stipendira istraživanje kojim bi dokazao postojanje Boga na kompjutoru.
- Uh, heavy. I kako si to dečko zamišlja?
- Ne zna ni sam; za početak, pokušao bi nahraniti kompjutor podacima o temeljnim fizičkim zakonima i konstantama, u nadi da će mu stroj izbaciti neki magični Makroobrazac, Šifru, sažetu sliku Plana Stvaranja...
- Logos s početka Evanđelja po Ivanu...
- Recimo...
- I što kaže teolog na to?
- Teologu to ide na jetra; kaže da Bog čije bi se postojanje moglo dokazati na taj način ne bi bio vrijedan svoga imena.
- Dobar je. Luteran?
- Evangelik, Barthovac.
- Oženjen?
- Oženjen, s djetetom.
- A-ha. Pustite me sada da pogađam rasplet...
Kucka noktom po bradi: gotovo ga mogu čuti kako misli...
- ...Znači, budući da od početka nema nikakve šanse s projektom, dečko prvo gubi stipendiju, a onda, s vremenom,
i vjeru...
- Otprilike...
- ...Ali zato dobiva kompenzaciju na drugoj strani. Poznavajući Updikea, to bi moglo biti nešto u naturi...
- Toplo, toplo...
- Čekajte... Nemojte mi reći da kompjutoraš u krizi pojebe teologovu ženu!
- Bingo!
- Uh, heavy. Idemo dalje... Sada teolog ima problem: budući da je izgubio ženu, mora to nečim kompenzirati... Vjerom ne može, jer je vjeru imao i prije... Što mu preostaje?
- Poznavajući Updikea...
- ...Ispada da i teolog mora nekog pojebati!
- Bingo!
- Samo koga? Nemojte mi još reći da teolog u nastupu očaja pojebe kompjutor!
- Ni u ludilu... Nema smisla da vam sve kažem, pokvarit ću vam čitanje...
- Dobro, dajte mi to, brzo...




IŠČEZNUĆE DARKA D.

Igor Blažević, direktor filmskog festivala Jedan svijet, Prag, Češka

Subota, 8. novembra 2003 – Petak, 14. novembar 2003

Sasvim slučajno stiže vijest o izgubljenom prijatelju Darku Desnici. Prije mjesec i pol je nestao. Naprosto tako. Nestao. Bez traga. Nema ga. Ispario. Izgubio se. Iščezao. Javila je to, onako usput, zajednička prijateljica. Kaže, prije par tjedana u nekim novinama je objavljena Darkova slika. Traži se. Mentalno rastrojeni. Ili psihički poremećeni. Nešto u tom stilu. Možda luta zagrebačkim Borongajem. Ako ga neko vidi, može javiti … Ne pamti šta je tačno pisalo. Samo je letimice proletjela tekstom. Bilo joj je strašno o tom i misliti, pa se nije udubljivala.
Prvo šta mi pada na pamet – ko je uopće mogao dati u novine taj oglas? Postajem svjestan samoće koju je oko sebe stvorio. Znao sam da je već duže vrijeme posve sam. Ali još nikada mi se ta njegova samoća nije otvorila pred očima kao bezdan. Sada sam, za trenutak, u njega virnuo i odmah ustuknuo. Da li ću uopće imati volje udubljivat se?
Svojevremeno smo, tokom studija, živjeli u jednom stanu. Kao likovi iz romana Fjodora Mihailoviča, proveli smo previše vremena u jednoj košari, posve blizu jedan drugome, tako blizu da smo se na kraju i razišli. Na nekoliko godina posve smo se udaljili. Potom smo se opet sreli. On je u medjuvremenu bio u rovovima. Još prije rata se razveo. Nakon rata se vratio u svoj borongajski stan. Umro mu je otac. Majku je izgubio mnogo ranije. Radio je u antikvarijatu. Objavio dvije zbirke kratkih priča. Prva mi se jako svidjela. Pukao je i liječio se. Bio je na lijekovima i skidao sa ljekova. Bezuspješno i uspešno. Pa opet bezuspešno.
Ja sam u medjuvremenu bio u Pragu, pa u Bosni, pa ponovo u Pragu, pa u Čečeniji, u Hong Kongu, u Kambodži, u Pragu, jednom čak i u Beogradu, pa u Burmi, na Istočnom Timoru, sve rjedje u Bosni, sve češće u Pragu. Ponovo smo jedan drugome imali šta reći. Nikada se nismo nazvali telefonom. Vidjali smo se samo kada bih prolazio kroz Zagreb. Jednom godišnje. A potom jednom u dvije godine. Dobio sam od njega samo jedan e-mail. Par dana prije nego što je nestao poslao mi je priču o meni i pitao da li ju može objaviti u svojoj novoj knjizi. Moj odgovor vjerojatno više nije stigao do njega. U medjuvremenu je netragom nestao.
Pokušavam odgonetnuti šta se moglo desiti. Darko nikamo vjerojatno nije mogao otići. Bio je posve bez novaca. A nije ni bio ni putnik. Ranije je, kao i svi, išao ljeti na more, možda još dvaput u Italiju, jednom u Austriju. Potom je bio odveden u rat. Još jedamput, nedavno, bio je četiri dana u Parizu. Sve ostalo vrijeme na Borongaju.
Kako ne znam kao bih mu ušao u trag, nastojim nazvati bilo koga. Bivše djevojke, nekoga od zajedničkih prijatelja sa studuja, ljude sa kojima je u medjuvremenu mogao biti u vezi. Nisam previše uspješan. Nekolicina prijatelja se etablirala, ali do njih ne uspijevam doći. Sekretarice kažu, ostavite poruku, oni će vam se javiti. Ne javljaju se. Ostali su neizvjesni. Gotovo cijela generacija. Nekamo iščezli kao i Darko.
Njegov nestanak me odjedamput zaokuplja mnogo više nego njegova prethodna osamljenička prisutnost. Nije to ni malo neuobičajeno, mada je okrutno. Prisutne uglavnom previdjame, ali njihov odlazak nas uznemirava. Koliko će to trajati?
Pitam se, da li smo, takvi kakvi smo i kako živimo, uopće spremni pomoći? Zaustaviti sve i početi tražiti. Priznajmo si – nismo. Da li smo spremni primiti u svoj dom daleku rodjaku što bježi od muža koji je mlati kad pije? Zapravo nismo. Kada nama život krene nizbrdo, gdje ćemo naci utočište? Vjerojatno nećemo. Da li smo to zaslužili? Jesmo. Da li je moguće izbjeći pad? Vjerojatno nije.
Jednostavno rečeno. Ne umijemo živjeti. I začudo, niko nas nikada to nije ni pokušao naučiti. Ni u djetinstvu, ni u školi. Roditelji su bili dobronamjerni, strogi, uplašeni i zabrinuti. U školi, pa poslije na faksu, toliko su toga od nas zahtijevali. Samo to osnovno, najtemeljnije niko nas nije ni pokušao naučiti. Jednostavno umijeće koje bi nas pripremilo razumno živjeti. I umjeti se radovati. Ne poludjeti. Ne izgubiti se. Ne odlutati netragom.




Tijelo godinu dana ležalo na sudskoj medicini, a inspektor zaboravio na spis

Policiji je trebalo godinu dana da poveže slučaj nestalog muškarca s tijelom pronađenim na željezničkoj pruzi

ZAGREB – Zagrebačkoj policiji »potkrao« se nedopustiv propust povezan sa slučajem nestanka i smrti Darka Desnice koji je više od godinu dana »ležao« u ladici nemarnog inspektora, dok je čitavo vrijeme navodno bio u »intenzivnoj policijskoj istrazi«.
Desničino mrtvo tijelo ležalo na Zavodu za sudsku medicinu i kriminalistiku i godinu dana čekalo na identifikaciju. Policija je u ovom naoko vrlo jednostavnom slučaju, naime, trebala samo »povezati konce«, usporediti prikupljene podatke i uzimanjem otisaka razriješiti misterij Desničinog nestanka i mrtvog tijela, koje je ležalo na Šalati, a za koje je tek nakon godinu dana otkriveno kako je ono Desničino.
Četrdesetogodišnji književnik Desnica, koji je živio sam u stanu na Volovčici, netragom je nestao 19. listopada prošle godine te se nikome nije javljao, što je bilo sumnjivo njegovim prijateljima i sestri Kseniji Knežević, kojima se inače redovito javljao. Desničina sestra o nestanku brata obavijestila je policiju koja je obila vrata njegovog stana, no književnika u stanu nije bilo. Tri dana kasnije, Desnicu je, navodno, vidjela susjeda, no on se i dalje nije javljao.
Na Zavod za sudsku medicinu i kriminalistiku tjedan dana prije nego što je prijavljen nestanak Darka Desnice dovezeno je tijelo nepoznatog muškarca kojeg je pogazio vlak. Obducenti su u Zavodu, kao i članovi ekipe za očevide, uzeli otiske prstiju poginulog muškarca, no kako je cijeli slučaj bio otvoren godinu dana u Zavodu su odlučili ostatke tijela nepoznatog muškarca pokopati u zajedničku grobnicu.
No, tad se inspektoru koji je radio na slučaju Desničinog nestanka »upalila žaruljica« pa je povezao kako bi mrtvo tijelo koje je godinu dana ležalo u hladnjači Zavoda moglo biti njegovo.
Inspektor je zatim uputio na vještačenje otisak kažiprsta izuzet tijekom očevida na pruzi i usporedio ga s otiskom s Desničinog kartona osobne iskaznice. Usporedba je, naravno, pokazala kako pogaženi muškarac upravo Darko Desnica. Ovaj skandalozni slučaj razotkrio je nemar (ili lijenost) inspektora u slučaju koji je zapravo obuhvaćen s dvije kriminalističke obrade, jedna koja se odnosila na Desničin nestanak, a druga koja se odnosila na smrt tad još nepoznatog muškarca na pruzi. Svi spisi, naime, dolaze pomoćniku zapovjednika za kriminalističku policiju nadležne policijske postaje koji zatim spis proslijeđuje inspektorima za krvne delikte, no u ovom slučaju niti jedna obrada nije provedena kako valja i na vrijeme.

Vanja Majetić, četvrtak, 2. prosinca 2004

KOŠTANA

Svetlosti nesta, prestadoh da čitam i tuga me obli: opet živim



Dolje nize je pismeni zadatak jednog beogradskog gimnazijalca!

Zaslužuje da se pažljivo pročita do kraja...

*Napomena pošiljaoca pre nego počnete da čitate ovaj pismeni zadatak
Vladimira Ševe (pisan 12.10.1997.) - teme na pismenom su bile:

- "Koštana"

- "Svetlosti nesta, prestadoh da čitam i tuga me obli: opet živim"

Ševa je izabrao ovu drugu...



Gledam, al' oči su mi sklopljene.
Osećam miris sveže lakiranog drveta.Pomislih kako je moj mrtvački Sanduk prilično dobar za pare koje sam dao.
Da, konačno sam umro.
Slusam popa koji nariče i decu koja se deru: "Kuku! Strikooo!" Odlučih da se malo prošetam, da vidim je l' mi baba Bosa došla na sahranu. Začudio sam se kad sam shvatio koliko se lako krećem. Moram priznati da sam zadovoljan.
Sahrana je prilično dobro uradjena. Mile, prvi gučevački trubač sa
svojim bleh orkestrom dobro je obavljao posao. Svinja se okretala na ražnju, dok se moj pijani zet valjao u blatu. Baba Stana je sa dedom Milojicom zamišljeno gledala u moj grob i uzdisala.
Počeh da vičem: "Šta kukaš stara, nije Omoljica mrtav, opet živim",
ali se setih da ne može da me čuje. Pogledah jos jednom moje sirote unučiće i pomislih:
"E deco, deco, ko je vas poznavao ni pakao mu neće teško pasti."
Osetih u tom trenutku kako me nešto vuče na gore: "E pa dodje vreme da
se rastajemo". Putovao sam, mogu vam reći, dobrih pet sati. Na vratima
raja stajao je Sveti Petar. "Zdravo Petre, pa dodje vreme da se i mi
ispričamo".
Petar me je mrko gledao, ali konačno prozbori: "Ne piše ti se dobro,
Omoljice, puno si grešio. Bog te čeka." Priznajem, malo sam se
uplasio, jer ovo mi je, znate, bio prvi susret sa Bogom, a to nije mala stvar.
Ćutim ja, ćuti on. I tako ćutimo mi jedno pola sata i konačno se odvažih pa rekoh:
"Dobar dan, Bože!".
Opet ćutimo, a mene već počele i noge da izdaju. Znate, ne umire čovek svaki dan. Konacno Bog popravi kravatu, promeškolji se malo na svom oblaku i rece: "Kazi Omoljice."
Ovaj govor sam prilicno dugo spremao pa sam rešio da mu kažem sve od prve do posledje reči: "O Boze, vladaru carstva nebeskog, Ti koji nebom hodaš, Tvorcu mog psa Marka, sinova Mirka i Žuje, baba Bose i deda Radovana, mog kuma Spasoja i izvinjavam se ako sam nekoga u svoj brzopletosti zaboravio da spomenem..."
Tu stadoh i primetih da se zbunio. Zamislite - Bog tako veliki, ja
tako mali, pa se zbunio preda mnom. Medjutim, našao je nekako prave reci, pa rece:
- Jesi li ti Omoljice pročitao "Koštanu"?
- Nisam - velim ja.
- A jesi li, Omoljice, primetio da svetlosti nesta?
- Nisam - opet ću ja zbunjeno.
- Da li te tuga obli, Omoljice?
- Ne Gospode - rekoh - a zašto?
- Zato što je to, Omoljice, tema ovog pismenog zadatka, i bojim se da
si promašio temu.
Bog je moćan - pomislih u sebi...

zapisi u dokolici

TSUREZUREGUSA

Tsurezurenaru mama ni, hikurashi, suzuri ni mukaite, kokoro ni utsuriyuku yoshinashigoto wo, sokowakatonaku kakitsukureba, ayashu koso monoguruoshikere.



Pero Panonski

Genijaln je Zizek, samo je mogao razraditi prvo to sto je Descartes najbolji ucenik Aurelija Augustina (preradio samo malo Augustinovo "Sumnjam, dakle jesam), jednostavno mogao je ubaciti ravnu crtu koju povijesti, koji je opet uveo Augustin kada spominje od "Plato to Nato", pa da je Ahmadinezhad sijit, a ne vecinski suni, te opcenito da na teologiju gleda s cisto katolickih pozicija (mozes ti pobjeci iz katolicizma, ali nece katolicizam iz tebe, a Slovenija je turbokatolicka po mentalitetu), zanemarujuci sasvim reformacijsku teologiju (koja pak opet nema neko zajednicko misljenje), pa npr. Chesterton je gorljivi katolik. Ratzinger jos uvijek pati od PTSP-a od 1968. :) On bi bil najsretniji da je rodjen malo ranije.
Inace, fucking genijalac. Kapa do poda. Samo kaj nikad ne bu skuzil Krista :)) Osjecam se tako neobrazovano nakon ovih sat i kusur. Ako ga prije ne pojedu zeleni.

NEMANJA

Meni je on, dragi moj Pero, jako zabavan: kad shvatiš kako vrti te svoje motive i modele mišljenja, onda ga je naročito zabavno promatrati kako misli, in flagranti, baš kao što su studenti obožavali gledati Wittgensteina dok predaje, jer je taj također mislio u trenutku priopćavanja svojim misli: nije samo referirao već pripremljeno, gotovo znanje, nego je ad hoc smišljao ono što predaje, budući da nikako nije mogao biti slobodan od misli. To mi je zabavno na Žižeku, ta njegova posvemašnja predanost mišljenju - fascinantno, nije li?! Što se tiče ovih tema koje nabacuješ, ne vjerujem da bi se Augustin - doduše, suočen s konzekvencama svoje filozofije teško da bi na njih pristao i Descartes - složio s modernim subjektivitetom kao posljedicom samoizvjesnosti, ili u Descartesa samosvijesti, o kojima govoriš. No, možda si previdio, ali Žižek tu ipak odaje prizanje tradiciji na koju aludiraš: on jasno veli, i to ne uzgred, nego na tome gradi argument, da je za Descartesa čak i 1+1=2 ne zato jer je to matematički neporecivo i neminovno, nego stoga jer je to božja volja! Imaš ti donekle pravo, iako bi se i sam složio da se svijet moderniteta, u našem površnom smislu, razlikuje od svega što Aurelije ima pred očima, osim naravno u njegovoj nihilističkoj tendenci, koja je za Augustina ono prvo za nas što u svijetu susrećemo: svijet je, mislim, to me on, ne-biće, i tu bi se, cum grano salis, moglo povlačiti zanimljive paralele Augustin i njegovo doba - Descartes i mi, moderni. Između nas govoreći, nikada nisam previše cijenio Augustina: mislim da nikada zapravo nije konvertirao, da je naprosto genijalni učitelj retorike koji je čak i Ispovijesti napisao kao retoričku vježbu.
From Plato to Nato otac je moga prijatelja davnih dana izgovarao kao: Od majmuna do AVNOJ-a! To me je uvijek bacalo sa stolice. Nego, neki vele da je Žižek protestant (iako je zanimljivo kako se ateist katolik razlikuje od protestantskog ateista!): "Zizek is against Eastern Orthodox view of theosis and its attempt at union with God. How could an atheist ever buy into that? But he is also against Catholicism because of it “symbolic exchange”. That’s what he said and I have no idea what he means by this. He says that Protestantism expresses what Christianity always was." I tak...

Pero Panonski

Sasvim neplanirano sam si uzeo tih sat i kusur. E sad, krscanstvo bas i nije nikad cisto s filozofijom. Ja sam jos jadnicak mlad, filozofski bi se izjasnio kao priprosti sokratovac/platonist koji neki vrag nazire, ali sve je to tako malo.
Filozofija je ide korak uz krscanstvo/teologiju, samo bi se obje strane radije upucale, nego priznali da si medjusobno duboko ulaze u podrucje. Na neki nacin pravoslavlje je uzelo najprostiji oblik platonizma po principu onoga elementarnoga "znanja", znaci krsten sam - automatski znam Boga, u glavi mi je Bog, pa sam automatski spasen, pa sto god da pravoslavac radio, to je nevazno, jer "znam" Boga i sad omanji pokolj civila nista ne znaci. Katolicanstvo se pak nakon pocetnoga sretnoga braka s platonizmom upustilo u gorljivu ljubavnu vezu s aristotelizmom, pa su si umetnuli jadni praxis u cijelu, pa uz "znanje" Boga, sad najedamput i cinidba postaje vazan faktor, djelovanje je postalo stvar spasenja covjeka, a da ne govorimo kako je Aristotel ipak bio najveci zenomrzac u povijesti krscanstva, pa Rimokatolicka crkva ima negativan stav spram zene tek od kada su srednjevjekovni mudrijasi Filozofa htjeli napraviti krscaninom. A kako je Martin Luther jadnicak bio filozof i jos tome redovnik augustinac i strucnjak za Aurelija Augustina, koji je sasvim slucajno zalutao u kler, sve je otislo u vrazju mater, jer Aristotel i krscanstvo su nespojevi. Na neki nacin Martin Luther je bio najveci katolik u Europi i Reformacija je pokusaj vracanje na prijasnje stanje, prije Aristotela, slicno kao sto Punk je brijao na prvu polovicu sezdesetih (jebo ja Hudelista s onom proserotinom o Punku u predproslom Globusu). Martin Luther je filozofski/teoloski punker Novoga vijeka :)))) Nema sto covjek sam sebi odredjivati spasenje i postici ga pomocu svojih djela, spasenje ide u domenu spomenute Bozje volje. Luther je proveo besane noci u samostanu, drapeci se i gladujuci, pokusavajuci postici "sveti zivot" (theosis recept ), pa je vidio da je i dalje gresan jednako tako kao kad se prezderavao i oblokovao. Sveti zivot je jedna velika iluzija jer covjek gresan, a Crkva zajednica gresnika kao sto je uvijek bila. Jedini moment koji moze nadjaci grijeh je vjera, ali praviti se da si bezgrasan je kurac od ovce. Ovo je sve pomalo grubo.

Kako Reformacija ima tisucu i jedni pravac, vecina protestanata misli da je filozofija cisto zlo i sotonsko orudje u bilo kojem obliku /zato lijepo hrvatski prijevod NZ-a lijepo koristi rijec mudrovanje kod Pavlovih poslanica, jer to ovaj opiceni Zidov zaista mislio/. Osobno sam misljenja da jedino Luther imao smislenu Reformaciju, ja se osobno vec jezim od kalvinisticke strogoce, a pogotovo svega vise od toga.



NEMANJA

+ HEC FONS NEMPE SVMIT INFIRFOS VT REDDAT ILLVMINATOS. Znaš odakle je ovo? S Višeslavove krstionice. E, sad, ako ne pretpostavimo da su je podigli Iluminati, nego da je krstionica fotisterion, to jest »mjesto prosvjetljenja«, onda se mirno možemo posvetiti čitanju Katekizma: 1216 "Ova se kupelj zove prosvjetljenjem, jer oni koji prihvaćaju (katehetsku) pouku imaju prosvijetljen duh". Primivši u krštenju Riječ, "Svjetlo istinsko koje prosvjetljuje svakog čovjeka" (Iv 1,9), krštenik tako prosvijetljen (Heb 10,32) postaje "sinom svjetlosti" (1 Sol 5,5), i sam "svjetlost" (Ef 5,8): krštenje je medju Božjim darovima najljepši i najdivniji (...). Čemu sve ovo? Kažeš:"pravoslavlje je uzelo najprostiji oblik platonizma po principu onoga elementarnoga "znanja", znaci kršten sam - automatski znam Boga, u glavi mi je Bog, pa sam automatski spasen, pa sto god da pravoslavac radio, to je nevazno...", a čini se - kažem: naoko je tako, čini se - da i katoličanstvo ima podjednaku soteriologiju. Vidim da aklamiraš za reformiranu teoriju spasa: za svoj spas ne možemo ništa učiniti, možemo se samo nadati milosti Božjoj! Čuj, a što je sa Židovima? I oni imaju nekakav nazor na ovozemaljska djela i djelovanje, a nisu pod utjecajem Aristotela! Konačno, zar se ne bi našlo dovoljno Isusovih riječi i čitavih parabola koje bi čovjeka nukale na ovozemaljsko plodno stvaralaštvo (čak i u smislu skrbnog raspolaganja svjetovnim dobrima!) kao pretpostavku ulaska u Kraljevsko Nebesko? Namjerno ovo navodim, unatoč opomeni o ušici igle, jer to je taj židovski moment koji nedostaje. Pored i osim toga, ne vidim da je to tako jednostavno: mi smo grješni, samo čin vjere nadilazi grijeh, Bog ima diskreciono pravo spašavati, i u međuvremenu strepite i drhtite jer niti što možete učiniti, niti se kakvo dobročinstvo broji, niti je ikakvo ljudsko djelovanje, pa čak ni praksis koji bi bio mimeza Kristova djelovanja, svrsishodno! Okrutne li teologije! Mislim da je platonizam zaista 'podesniji za uporabu' od aristotelova nasljeđa, kad je riječ o kršćanstvu, ako ni zbog čega drugoga a ono zbog načela prefiguracije: kretanja od manje očitog do nedvosmislenog oblika jednog te istog: na kraju je, ispunjeno, ono što je pribivalo već na početku, i svo je znanje samo prisjećanje, a cijela povijest miruje kao vaservaga. A opet, što bi kršćanstvo bez Aristotelovog razlikovanja stvarnog i zbiljskog, bez pojma energeie? Ako pak misliš da je kršćanstvo, kao vjera, bilo autentičnije prije Sigerta od Brabanta, Alberta Magnusa i Tome Akvinca jer je vjera oznanstvljena, jer je, zahvaljujući i teoriji dvije istine, one uma i onoj vjere, teologija mogla biti znanost (episteme) poput filozofije - dapače sestrinska, jer je jedna najopćenitije motrenje (theorija) bića kao bića u njegovoj vječnoj biti, dok se druga bavi zrenjem najopćenitijega bića - mogao bih to shvatiti, ali onda, čini mi se, nekako aklamiraš za pravoslavni koncept istinske, izvorne vjere (prave slave) koja je prepuna onoga od čega se navodno otklanjaš: osobnog obožanstvljenja. Svakako, teme koje je gotovo bezeobrazno stavljati u komentar. Živ mi bio i veseli me kad se javiš,

Pero Panonski

Lagano cu. Slobodne asocijacije. Kazem, studentski mozak, misli da svasta zna, a puno toga ne zna. Mogu samo izbaciti skicu onoga sto mislim i nesto cu zaboraviti.
Uvijek nekako svi vezu prosvjetiteljstvo i masonstvo, a svi su prosvjetitelji/masoni ispali iz jezuitskog skuta i svi su obrazovani u rimokatolickim obrazovnim ustanovama, ukljucujuci i naseg domacega najvecega antiklerikalnoga mrguda Starcevica. Svaka slicnost je namjerna.

Sto se tice pravoslavlja, godine su napravile svoje. Opcenito za krscanstvo su godine napravile svoje. Ja sam nekako uvjerenja da je Crkva zivila autohtonim zivotom samo do Milanskoga edikta. Brak drzave i crkve unistava nekako religiju, uostalom u Hrvatskoj je jedino postojalo iskreno krscanstvo od 1945. do 1990. To je jedini period u povijesti Hrvatske kada se moze govoriti da su Hrvati bili krscanski narod, pogotovo iza II. vatikanskoga koncila, cije Dokumente Kaptol, kroz KS, odbija stampati. Hrvatska je zemlja vulgarnog ateizma. Nije to nikakav intelektualni ateizam. Mozda zvuci cudno, ali meni se cini da slavenstvo ne moze percipirati Boga, osim ako od boga ima nekakve koristi, odnosno bog je pokrice za opce sranje, kao u vicu "It's the will of the Allah".

Sto se tice Zidova, njihov nacin razmisljanja, opcenito seminitskih nacin razmisljanja, neuklapa se u tu nasu jadnu indoeuropsko-grcku glavurdu, jezik ima sasvim drugo znacenje, Stari Zavjet je prakticki neprevodiv. To je i prigovor dosta protestanata (uglavnom americkih) da smo mi tu pokvareni Europljani sa svojom smrdljivom filozofijom pokvarili izvorno krscanstvo i da ti svi cudnovati filozofski pojmovi nemaju veze s Kristom. Ali kako sam ja skuzio Zidove oni u biti nemaju pakla. Prije ili kasnije, neovisno o djelima zavrse u raju. Zato jer su Zidovi, izabrani narod, pa nece izabrani narod valjda propast :).Dio ih je fakat uvjeren da smo mi svi goji jedna hrpa smeca koja nece uzivati i nece vidjeti Boga pocevsi od toga da nismo obrezani, pa nadalje. Samo Pavao (ako je Luther bio najveci katolik, onda je ovaj najveci Zidov u povijesti judaizma ) u Rimljanima lijepo razlaze da ce svi Zidovi spasiti (jednom lijepo ce i oni postati svi krscani), htjeli to mi ili ne. Zato toliko i ludi americki protestanti briju na Izrael.
Da se razumijemo, nemam nihilisticki stav "it's all fucked up", pa sto ne bi onda i ja bio zajeban lik, ali smatram da djelovanje covjeka nema udjela u spasu duse. Eventualno u negativnome smislu, u suprotnome smjeru. Ako se zoves vjernikom i radis sranja, onda je to vlastiti izbor odlaska u pakao. Ako je netko krscanin, ako zove se krscaninom, odnosno smatra se u nekim nasim lokalnim uvjetom katolikom onda bi valjda trebao i krscanski zivjeti. Ako prihvacas ajmo reci Bibliju, Krista, etc. onda se imas nekakvu odgovornost spram toga Boga, kad-tad ces doci do toga Boga i treba stati pred njega. Da budem iskren, onako lijepo hereticki, izgleda da vece sanse za spas ima nekrscanin nego krscanin. Barem iz nekakve dosljedne katolicke pozicije. Katolici se svi onda kure u paklu. Da se malo vratim, nisam misljenja da se jednostavno moze prekopirati biblijski model prvobitne krscanske zajednice i brijati da je 2000 godina bila mirno i da se nista nije dogodilo. Nemam pojma, vjernicki se osjecam da sam nigdje. Katolik vise nisam, protestantima bi bio cudan s tamo nekakvom Atenom ... Bas zgodno.



NEMANJA

Paše mi ova spikica već i zbog ležernog tona ali i zbog ove slobodne asocijativnosti prispodobive recimo konceptu Tsurezuregusa; namjerno kažem konceptu, ne zbirci, pa da objasnim - evo prve udaljene, dalekoistočne asocijacije! - na što mislim.
Tsurezuregusa je zbirka tekstova Yoshida Kenkoa, nastala, tvrdi se, između 1330 i 1332 godine. Sadržaj je tih tekstova sasvim irelevantan za moju reminiscenciju, no ne i naslov koji zapise objedinjuje: evo dakle što on znači:

Tsurezurenaru mama ni, hikurashi, suzuri ni mukaite, kokoro ni utsuriyuku yoshinashigoto wo, sokowakatonaku kakitsukureba, ayashu koso monoguruoshikere.

In Keene's translation:

What a strange, demented feeling it gives me when I realise I have spent whole days before this inkstone, with nothing better to do, jotting down at random whatever nonsensical thoughts that have entered my head.
where (tsurezure) means “having nothing to do.”

For comparison, Sansom’s translation:

To while away the idle hours, seated the livelong day before the inkslab, by jotting down without order or purpose whatever trifling thoughts pass through my mind, truly this is a queer and crazy thing to do!

Mislim da je Devide to preveo: Sjedim u dokolici i zapisujem sve što mi pada na pamet...

Zapisi u dokolici, s jedne strane, a s druge zapisi koji bi mogli započeti: Lagano ću. Slobodne asocijacije! Dakle, razumiješ me: sjediš, kiša škropi vrt, gledaš negdje neodređeno, otprilike na petaestak metara ispred sebe, zapravo u sebe, i pratiš jednu pa drugu misao kako iskrsavaju, zastanu i polako ustupe mjesto novoj misli. To što nam nešto pada na pamet međutim još uvijek nije dokaz da išta mislimo, ali, ništa zato: ovdje nije presudno misliti, nego pratiti svoje misli. Svjedočiti im, gotovo kao u kriya-yogi, biti im svjedok, sakšin, ako se to tako kaže. Kako god, neka ova razmišljanja, i moja i tvoje, budu jednostavno Tsurezuregusa; lagano časkanje, u dokolici, dok padaju prve jesenje kiše.
Ti takle misliš da su svi prosvjetitelji, koji su za tebe masoni, djeca Sv. Ignacija Lojole? Ne bih rekao. Možda će te začuditi tip argumenta, ali zbog nepreglednosti povijesnih činjenica, koje bi mogle zaist poslužiti u svakakve svrhe, navodim jedan lokalni, gotovo folklorni primjer: "Prema nekim izvještajima, sadašnji je Park Zrinjevac, kako u razgovoru za Ignacijev put ističe Mijo Nikić, poglavar isusovačke zajednice u Palmotićevoj ulici, trebao biti ispred bazilike Srca Isusova. Ali nekome to nije odgovaralo. Razlog je, čini se, protivljenje masona da pred bazilikom bude velebni trg, tako da je od početka gradnje ovo nacionalno svetište i spomenik kulture skriven između zagrebačkih zgrada i jedva se primjećuje." To protivljenje masona značajnijoj pristunosti Isusovac u Zagrebu 19. i početka 20. stoljeća poznata je stvar. Što čemu sad s tom činjenicom? Jednako tako, mogao bih stvar postaviti naglavačke: a što ako su svi ti konspirativci, kao i Francuska revolocija kao njihov krunski, da budem ironičan, ali i inicijalni povijesti uspjeh zapravo posljedak svih onih gibavnja u židovskoj zajednici XVII stoljeća - da ne govorim o Lurijinoj kabalističkoideološkoj pripravi tih gibanja - napose u antinomističkim pokretima primicanja skandala i počišćenja transgresijom, kakav je svakako onaj nosivi Sabbatai Zevi-Shatza, ili ekstravagantniji izdanak njegova nastavaljača Jakoba Franka. Zanimljiv je tu odnos Revolucije i Boga: Frank je recimo učio da nas vodi do takvog dna i revolucionarnog ponora, da nas odozdo može uzdići još jedino i samo Bog - svojim snagama ne možemo se podići! To je revolucija, u pravom smislu te riječi, dapače Revolucija dokazana Bogom, baš kao što sama dokazuje Boga: s jedne strane uspostavlja godinu nultu, dokida vrijeme, s druge impostira kracionizam, kao pretpostavku te godine nulte: tko bješe ništa, bit će sve! Da stvar bude zanimljivija, Revolucija je kozmička, ne samo povijesna kategorija: ona iz temelja rekreira sve zemaljsko, ali i Nebesko, jer iscjeljuje prvobitan nesklad "razbijanja posude", ako pravilno prenosim kabalistička tumačenja, koja su, izgleda, kao sva mistička neprevediva. Ipak, osnovni je smisao jedan: postoje uvjerljiva tumačenja da su svi ti revolucionarni pokreti koji zahvaćaju Europu od Francuske revolucije (postoje i prethodnin nagovještaji, kao u ukrajinskim pobunama seljaka etc.) naovamo pripipravljeni židovskim mističkim i političkim gibanjima prethodnih stoljeća. Ne govorim ovdje o nekakvoj jeftinoj konspiraciji suprotivu Vatikanu i Monarhijama - svetom rimskom carstvu ali i Romanovima - kako to već biva, kao ni (samo) o socijalističkom eksperimentu Oktobra. Govorim naprosto o drugoj strani te Iluminacijske medalje (inače, na krovu doma Ante Starčevića, zamisli!, nalazi se anđeo s bakljom u rucu, lučonoša: lucis, ferre, svjetlonoša, Iluminator!). Spomenuti Frank, da dovršim, odbacuje temeljne židovske dogme, kopirlira Zohar i Otajstvo Svetoga Trojstva, i pokazuje kako Ubi Lurija Ibi Jerusalem!
Pravoslavlje ne samo da nije lišeno tog duha izvornosti, nego njime odiše; prvo što mi pada na pamet jest uputitit te na hesizazam i moj post Molitva srca, s početka Vaseljene. Da ne ponavljam te teze, skrolaj na Izvor: moja je poanta - autentično kršćanstvo, ako omphalopsihe možemo tako shvatiti, itekako ima svoju živu i neprekinutu tradiciju u ortodoksiji.



Pero, ja sam ne samo poznavao velikog i dobrog čovjeka Josipa Turčinovića, nego sam s njime dvije godine najtješnje surađivao, što je urodilo i prvim prijenosom polnoćke s Kaptola, Jeruzalema i iz Vatikana. Stoga ti jamčim da stvari s dokumentima 2.Vatikanskog koncila stoje stubokom različito, ne samo zbog sljedećeg:"Tu je i hrvatski prijevod Biblije i velik broj biblijskih izdanja, te posebno važni Dokumenti Drugog vatikanskog koncila"! Naime, ako postoji riječ koja sažima poruku tog koncila, onda je to dijalog, otvorenost za razgovor sa svijetom. Vidiš, Turčinović je bio čovjek dijaloga. Recimo, pratio sam ga na razgovor, npr., jednom sličnom čovjeku, Ševku Omerbašiću, koji je pak sa svoje strane dobio posebnu papinu dozvolu da na bogoslovnom fakultetu studira teologiju! Očito, bilo je tu itekako pamentih ljudi spremnih za najiskreniji razgovor.
Za razliku od tebe ja mislim da Slaveni kongenijalno prevode Ivanov Proslov, da samo metonimijski pokažem već početno, izvorno razumjevanje Logosa: Iskoni be slovo. Slovo, koje je Slava, slovo koje je Riječ, iskonska riječ, slovo koje be od iskona, možda i sretnije izriče otajstvo trojedinog boga no formulacija: en arhe en ho logos. Slaveni nisu vozači autobusa koji krunicu vješaju kao zečju šapu o retrovizor, tj. preciničan si i mladenački prerigorozan već u izboru vrijednih uzoraka stvarnosti o kojoj govoriš, a kamoli u epitetima koje joj pridjevaš. Kazati da Rusi, Poljaci, Srbi ili Hrvati nisu sposobni za kršćanstvo zapravo je začudno: ta, kome to govoriš? Narodima Zosime i monaha koji gorljivo bdiju kao blijede svijeće pred svetim ikonama; Slavenima Ivana Pavla II ili Hrvatima čija je ukupna povijesna sudina od Agatona do Stepinca i današnjih dana u bitnom određena katoličanstvom, bez obzira na ovu neznatnu pardesetljetnu epizodu koja je, vjerojatno, i ne tako nesretan period sabiranja i svojevrsnog duhovno pročišćenja; ili Srbima zadužbina, Srbima Atosa, Srbima jednog, u konačnici, Amfilohija Radovića (ne šalim se, nimalo se ne šalim); Slavenima Ćirila i Metoda, ukratko, zaista nije nesvojstvena ta vjera koja se samo površnom pogledu nadaje kao neshvatljiva i nepodesna vjera bliskoistočnih ratara, mada je kršćanstvo, kao što ćeš odmah vidjeti, upravo sušta suprotnost izvedenicama i atavizmima religija i kultova prirodnog cilusa rađanja, umiranja i preporađanja, otjelovljenim u dijalektici zrnevlja i klica, poljodjelskih kultura i najrazličitije zemaljske i zemljane plodnosti. Evo pasusa jednog mog briljantog prijatelja, koji mi je baš nedavno pisao o toj temi:
"Kristova neposredna (svjetovna) uloga bila je da bude kralj, da izbavi Židove iz ropstva, da uspostavi svjetovno kraljevstvo. Ta je uloga doživjela neuspjeh. Treba, međutim, dobro shvatiti u čemu se taj neuspjeh sastoji. Krist je rekao, "Moje kraljevstvo nije od ovoga svijeta." (Ivan 18:36) Kraljevstva koja su "od ovoga svijeta" su kraljevstva zasnovana na sili i rodu, Kristovo se dakle kraljevstvo ne zasniva na sili, što je jedan prirodni način vezivanja ljudi (vanjski autoritet), niti na rodu, već na ideji, koja je onostrana, natprirodna, a samim tim i kozmopolitska (sloboda nije prirodno svojstvo pojedinaca, već duhovna supstancija čovjeka). Ideja ne veže prirodno (vanjska prisila ili nužnost) već neprirodno (unutarnja nužnost ili sloboda). To je ljubav. Platon je ovu ljubav odredio kao EROS, a ova MANIA ili ENTUZIJAZAM nije ljubav prema nečemu u ovom svijetu, već ljubav prema onostranoj (duhovnoj) ideji. Ona je neprirodna, jer nas smješta izvan (eks-stazis) prirodnog ciklusa svakodnevnog života. Zato kršćanstvo nije, kako se zna reći, još jedna religija koja oslikava prirodni ciklus umiranja i ponovnog rađanja, izmjene godišnjih doba, ili prelazak vlasti u rodu s oca na sina, već upravo suprotno, kršćanstvo je religija koja nas iz tog ciklusa izbavljuje, tako da nas veže za ideju (koja je apsolutni rod). Po tome je zapravo kršćanstvo jedina religija, jer jedino ona veže. "Filozofi", kaže Platon, "nisu nikada ništa drugo ni željeli no da umru i da budu mrtvi." Ovu smrt treba shvatiti kao smrt za svjetovno, smrt za prirodne odnose sile, a smrt je ponovno rođenje u ljubavi spram ideje. (Ono o čemu ovdje govorimo je odnos Erosa i Thanatosa, gdje se smrt ljubavi preobražava u ljubav prema smrti. Oboje, i Eros i Thanatos se udvostručavaju, dvije ljubavi i dvije smrti. Krist je tjelesno mrtav, a duhovno još uvijek živ – uzvišena prikaza – , Lucifer je duhovno mrtav, a tjelesno još uvijek živ – odvratni otpadak, otpadnik. Kristova neposredna (svjetovna) uloga bila je da bude kralj, da izbavi židove iz ropstva, da uspostavi svjetovno kraljevstvo. Ta je uloga doživjela neuspjeh. Treba, međutim, dobro shvatiti u čemu se taj neuspjeh sastoji. Krist je rekao, "Moje kraljevstvo nije od ovoga svijeta." (Ivan 18:36) Kraljevstva koja su "od ovoga svijeta" su kraljevstva zasnovana na sili i rodu, Kristovo se dakle kraljevstvo ne zasniva na sili, što je jedan prirodni način vezivanja ljudi (vanjski autoritet), niti na rodu, već na ideji, koja je onostrana, natprirodna, a samim tim i kozmopolitska (sloboda nije prirodno svojstvo pojedinaca, već duhovna supstancija čovjeka). Ideja ne veže prirodno (vanjska prisila ili nužnost) već neprirodno (unutarnja nužnost ili sloboda). To je ljubav. Platon je ovu ljubav odredio kao EROS, a ova MANIA ili ENTUZIJAZAM nije ljubav prema nečemu u ovom svijetu, već ljubav prema onostranoj (duhovnoj) ideji. Ona je neprirodna, jer nas smješta izvan (eks-stazis) prirodnog ciklusa svakodnevnog života. Zato kršćanstvo nije, kako se zna reći, još jedna religija koja oslikava prirodni ciklus umiranja i ponovnog rađanja, izmjene godišnjih doba, ili prelazak vlasti u Zato je đavo u stalnom stanju tjelesnog raspadanja.) Objava se sastoji u tome da je ideja prešla u ovostranost, postala je djelatna (zbiljska, aktualna) time što su vjernici postali sluge ideji. Ideja je postala egzoterična. Ezoteričnost i egzoteričnost više nisu odijeljeni, jer ideja nije stvar, pa se ne može skrivati. Također, ideja je onostrana, što znači da nije stvar, pa se ne može posjedovati. Filozof, kaže Hegel, nije u posjedu ideje, već ideja posjeduje njega, on je u njenoj vlasti. "Kada se filozofi izjašnjavaju o filozofskim predmetima, oni se onda moraju ravnati po svojim idejama; oni ih ne mogu zadržati u džepu." Možda na taj način valja shvatiti kršćanski pojam ljubavi kao CARITAS: "lako" je davati stvari, ono što je doista teško je prenijeti ideju. Duh sveti je sjećanje na Krista u zajednici vjernika. Vjernici su oni koji su vjerni uspomeni na Krista. Spoznaja je sjećanje, rekao je Platon. Hegel dodaje da njemačka riječ ERINNERUNG, koja znači sjećanje, doslovno i etimološki znači pounutarnjenje, ulaženje u unutrašnjost. Ideja nas progoni u duhovnom smislu (salijeće nas), dok nas vanjska sila progoni u prirodnom smislu." Na početku Schelerova "Položaja čovjeka u kozmosu" govori se, između ostaloga, o judeokršćanskom nazoru na čovjekov ekscepcionelni položaj u hijerarhiji bića: čovjek je kruna stvaranja. Ne vidim da bi semitsko iskustvo bilo bila kakava tekškoća čak suvremenom Zapadnjaku! Što je to neprevedivo? Tohu va bohu? Pa taj kaos, ta tama koja se sterala nad bezdanom, ta suptilana teologija stvaraja, degeneracije i regeneracija ne samo da je prevediva i lako shvatiljiva, već u svom racionalnom ruhu ima čudovišne emfaze u teološkim sustavima skolastike, dočim je kao izvor nekakve mističke meditacije itkako bliska i poznata, recimo, jednom Ivanu od Križa. Što bi bilo neprevedivo? Dabar? Ruah? Ili se Markavu ne smije izučavati sam? Možda, možda, ali ako ćemo tako olaku u gematriju i notarikon, onda dopusti i porugu Talmudskog gospodina: da, i Ezekijel opisuje kralja, ali kao seljak koji je vidio kralja, ne kao građanin koji ga vidi svakodnevno. Mislim da bi jednako Branko Despot mogao kazati da je Heraklit neprevediv na bilo koji jezik osim, jasno, zagorskog, ali, to su već idiosinkrazije. Konačno, uvijek ti ostaje da u tim mladim godinama, a ionako se nema kaj raditi, odvojiš dvije, tri godine za hebrejski, koji i nije tako težak, pa, nema problema, kaj ne? Ili misliš da čak ni poznvavanje hebrejskog i aramejskog ne pomaže? E, jebigaonda. Onda ti ostaje biokozmizam. O tom, potom.
TO pak što Židovi misle da smo mi Barbari, čuj, misle to i Japanci, pokadšto ne bez prava, o svima nama ostalima, uključujući i Izabran narod, čiju posebnu povijesnu misiju u okviru božjega plana spasenja priznaje i Papa Razzi. I Hrvati misle da imaju tisućgodišnju kulturu i da su Bosanci primitivci; recimo, kad sam u hrvatskoj fazi, to mislim i ja, nekih 8 sekundi in continuo. Srbi misle da su kao i Židovi nebeski narod, u večnim Seobama k nebeskoj paradigmatskoj Srbiji, Večnoj Otadžbini. Naravno da jesu, ali, ne smijemo im dati za pravo. Ne znam zapravo tko to ne misli za sebe, i tu nema nikakvih problema: jedino, narod svećenika zaista ima nekih dobrih razloga govoriti o svojim prednostima; meni recimo, kao filosemitu, Židovi strašno imponiraju. O tome stalno govorim. Rashbi, na prvom mjestu, Rabbi Shimeon Bar Yochai. Velik frajer, da me nitko ne čuje, možda ravan Isusu. Kao čovjek. Priču za danas zaključujem opaskom o našim djelovanjima, dobročinstvima i Raju kao nagradi, tj. misterioznosti i arbitranosti spasenja: dobročinstvo je samosvršno: ljudsko djelovanje, činidba, za razliku od tvorbe, svhru ima u samome sebi. Svrha, kao ono što s vrha biva vodiljom nekog djelovanja, imanentno je činidbi: dobro je činiti dobro, bumo rekli.Tvorba, tehne, ima transeutnu svrhu: svrha se nalazi izvan tvorenja: stolar ne djeluje zato da bi tek bio zadovoljan, sretan i ispunjen u aktu stvaranja stolice (tu bi sad mogli piliti po proizvodnji, ali, ostavimo je se zasad), baš kao što je umjetničko stvaralaštvo okarakterizirano jednakom svrhovitošću djela izvan djelovanja: svhra je slikanja slika, a ta nije sam slikarski gest, zar ne?
Dakle, to što ja čini dobra djela, dobročinstva, samo je po sebi dobro, i, dakle, nagrada. Točnije, nema nikakve nagrade ponad samog dobročinstva: ponavljam, dobro je činiti dobro, i to s nekim drugim svijetom i životom s onu stranu nema nikakve veze! Otkud to da bi se čineči dobro mi mogli kvalificirati za Ligu Prvaka, kako većina Hrvata zamišlja Raj!? Platon je sjajno pojednostavnio tu spikicu s Dobrim: samo onaj liječnik koji je liječi svoje pacijente, tek dakle DOBAR liječnik, jest liječni: odgovara ideji liječnika! Onaj koji ne odgovara toj ideji, koji ih ne liječi dobro, i nije liječnik! Dakle, dobro je imanentno svakoj biti, pa bi se odatle moglo shvatiti što kaže Hegel kad veli da je bit istina bitka: tek kad na takav istinski način nešto jesi, onda uopće jesi: ono što, a to je određenje biti, tek je tako istina onoga da nešto jest, što je određenje bitka. Da jesam liječnik određuje upravo to što zbilja i uistinu liječim ljude. U tom smislu dobro uvijek prisustvuje čak i ovozemaljskoj tzv. autonomiji realnosti, pa ako me se i optuži za platonizam (parusija), ili nasuprot za usiljeni aristotelijanizam razlikovanja zbiljskog (liječnika) od stvarnog (privida liječenja, lišenog izlječenja kao pacijentova dobra i biti liječenja kao cause finalis), to ipak mislim da dostatno pokazujem kako Raj kao nagradu za nekakvo dobro ne treba očekivati čak ni ako ste - katolik!
Tri su ljubavi za Grke: eros, ljubav suprotnih; filija, ljubav jednakih; agape, ljubam stvoritelja za stvorenja. Morus piše englesksom prevoditelju Biblije s latinskoga: jest svaka ljubav milost, dragi moj gospodine, ali nije svaka milost ljubav! Što je caritas, to govore i Papina enciklika Deus caritas est, i pobudnica Sacramentum caritatis (Benedikt XVI.) Kako dakle stoji s milošću Boga spram čovjeka, to je do Boga. Ono što mi možemo učiniti, dapače trebamo, jest ljubiti bližnjega kao samoga sebe. To je sav zakon, jer je punina zakona. Tko tako čini, čini mi se, već je u Raju.
U pogledu judaizma i njegova odnosa spram raja, da ne pametujem, pitat ćemo Rabija a odgovor dati u Dodatku. Sorry na rasijanosti. Tsurezuregusa.



Dodatak

The afterlife is a fundamental of Jewish belief! The creation of man testifies to the eternal life of the soul. The Torah says, "And the Almighty formed the man of dust from the ground, and He blew into his nostrils the SOUL of life" (Genesis 2:7). On this verse, the Zohar states that "one who blows, blows from within himself," indicating that the soul is actually part of G-d's essence. Since G-d's essence is completely spiritual and non-physical, it is impossible that the soul should die. (The commentator Chizkuni says this why the verse calls it "soul of LIFE.") That's what King Solomon meant when he wrote, "The dust will return to the ground as it was, and the spirit will return to G-d who gave it." (Ecclesiastes 12:17) For anyone who believes in a just and caring G-d, the existence of an afterlife makes logical sense. Could it be this world is just a playground without consequences? Did Hitler get away with killing 6,000,000 Jews? No. There is obviously a place where good people receive reward and bad people get punished. (see Maimonides' 13 Principles of Faith) The question of "why do bad things happen to good people" has a lot to do with how we look at existence. The way we usually perceive things is like this: A "good life" means that I make a comfortable living, I enjoy good health, and then I die peacefully at age 80. That's a good life. Anything else is "bad." In a limited sense, that's true. But if we have a soul and there is such a thing as eternity, then that changes the picture entirely. Eighty years in the face of eternity is not such a big deal. From Judaism's perspective, our eternal soul is as real as our thumb. This is the world of doing, and the "world to come" is where we experience the eternal reality of whatever we've become. Do you think after being responsible for the torture and deaths of millions of people, that Hitler could really "end it all" by just swallowing some poison? No. Ultimate justice is found in another dimension. But the concept goes much deeper. From an eternal view, if the ultimate pleasure we're going after is transcendence - the eternal relationship with the Almighty Himself, then who would be luckier: Someone who lives an easy life with little connection to G-d, or someone who is born handicapped, and despite the challenges, develops a connection with G-d. Who would be "luckier" in terms of eternal existence? All I'm trying to point out is that the rules of life start to look different from the point of view of eternity, as opposed to just the 70 or 80 years we have on earth.
So what is the afterlife exactly?
When a person dies and goes to heaven, the judgment is not arbitrary and externally imposed. Rather, the soul is shown two videotapes. The first video is called "This is Your Life!" Every decision and every thought, all the good deeds, and the embarrassing things a person did in private is all replayed without any embellishments. It's fully bared for all to see. That's why the next world is called Olam HaEmet - "the World of Truth," because there we clearly recognize our personal strengths and shortcomings, and the true purpose of life. In short, Hell is not the Devil with a pitchfork stoking the fires. The second video depicts how a person's life "could have been..." if the right choices had been made, if the opportunities were seized, if the potential was actualized. This video - the pain of squandered potential - is much more difficult to bear. But at the same time it purifies the soul as well. The pain creates regret which removes the barriers and enables the soul to completely connect to G-d. Not all souls merit Gehenom. It is for people who have done good but need to be purified. A handful of people are too evil for Gehenom, and they are punished eternally. Pharaoh is one example.
So what about "heaven?"
Heaven is where the soul experiences the greatest possible pleasure - the feeling of closeness to G-d. Of course not all souls experience that to the same degree. It's like going to a symphony concert. Some tickets are front-row center; others are back in the bleachers. Where your seat is located is based on the merit of your good deeds - e.g. giving charity, caring for others, prayer.
A second factor in heaven is your understanding of the environment. Just like at the concert, a person can have great seats but no appreciation of what's going on. If a person spends their lifetime elevating the soul and becoming sensitive to spiritual realities (through Torah study), then that will translate into unimaginable pleasure in heaven. On the other hand, if
life was all about pizza and football, well, that can get pretty boring for eternity.
The existence of the afterlife is not stated explicitly in the Torah itself, because as human beings we have to focus on our task in this world. Though awareness of an eternal reward can also be an effective motivator.

The Residents, 'Gingerbread Man'

SUČELJE

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Al Jeezero



Zapravo, imam i drugi prijedlog za Eurosong 2112:

DORA

Nakon što nam je EPH neke godine objasnio da Bregović i Severina moraju predstavljati Hrvatsku na Eurosongu, evo mog prijedloga za ovu godinu - ne znam kako se umjetnica zove, ali Kusto je obećao napraviti spot, pa eto.

HORROR!

NAORUŽAN I OPASAN!



NE PRESKAKATI INTRO!

VRPCA KOJA OTKRIVA LAŽ

OLD SCHOOL



U subotu, 22. rujna, objavio sam post pod naslovom: I Spy With My Little Eye, POŽELEĆE DRUMOVI MILANA.
U postu je pisalo:
"Ozna sve dozna. Budući da sam ja ipak završio i trinaestu, Old School, ekskluzivno najvaljujem Sumrak bogova: kreće kampanja i kreće na Bandića."

Ovo nije reklama za "Globus", nego za Vaseljenu: kupite "Globus", pročitajte tekst "Vrpca koja otkriva laž", i from here to eternity vjerujte kad vam ja nekaj velim.
Old School.

Harrison Wintergreen

Carcinoma Angels



Norman Spinrad

At the age of nine Harrison Wintergreen first discovered that the world was his oyster when he looked at it sidewise. That was the year when baseball cards were in. The kid with the biggest collection of baseball cards was it. Harry Wintergreen decided to become it.
Harry saved up a dollar and bought one hundred random baseball cards. He was in luck—one of them was the very rare Yogi Berra. In three separate transactions, he traded his other ninety-nine cards for the only other three Yogi Berras in the neighborhood. Harry had reduced his holdings to four cards, but he had cornered the market in Yogi Berra. He forced the price of Yogi Berra up to an exorbitant eighty cards. With the slush fund thus accumulated, he successively cornered the market in Mickey Mantle, Willy Mays and Pee Wee Reese and became the J. P. Morgan of baseball cards.
Harry breezed through high school by the simple expedient of mastering only one subject—the art of taking tests. By his senior year, he could outthink any test writer with his gypsheet tied behind his back and won seven scholarships with foolish ease.
In college Harry discovered girls. Being reasonably good-looking and reasonably facile, he no doubt would've garnered his fair share of conquests in the normal course of events. But this was not the way the mind of Harrison Wintergreen worked.
Harry carefully cultivated a stutter, which he could turn on or off at will. Few girls could resist the lure of a good-looking, well-adjusted guy with a slick line who nevertheless carried with him some secret inner hurt that made him stutter. Many were the girls who tried to delve Harry's secret, while Harry delved them.
In his sophomore year Harry grew bored with college and reasoned that the thing to do was to become Filthy Rich. He assiduously studied sex novels for one month, wrote three of them in the next two which he immediately sold at $1,000 a throw.
With the $3,000 thus garnered, he bought a shiny new convertible. He drove the new car to the Mexican border and across into a notorious border town. He immediately contacted a disreputable shoeshine boy and bought a pound of marijuana. The shoeshine boy of course tipped off the border guards, and when Harry attempted to walk across the bridge to the States they stripped him naked. They found nothing and Harry crossed the border. He had smuggled nothing out of Mexico, and in fact had thrown the marijuana away as soon as he bought it.
However, he had taken advantage of the Mexican embargo on American cars and illegally sold the convertible in Mexico for $15,000.
Harry took his $15,000 to Las Vegas and spent the next six weeks buying people drinks, lending broke gamblers money, acting in general like a fuzzy-cheeked Santa Claus, gaining the confidence of the right drunks and blowing $5,000.
At the end of six weeks he had three hot market tips which turned his remaining $10,000 into $40,000 in the next two months.
Harry bought four hundred crated government surplus jeeps in four one-hundred-jeep lots of $10,000 a lot and immediately sold them to a highly disreputable Central American government for $100,000.
He took the $100,000 and bought a tiny island in the Pacific, so worthless that no government had ever bothered to claim it. He set himself up as an independent government with no taxes and sold twenty one-acre plots to twenty millionaires seeking a tax haven at $100,000 a plot. He unloaded the last plot three weeks before the United States, with UN backing, claimed the island and brought it under the sway of the Internal Revenue Office.
Harry invested a small part of his $2,000,000 and rented a large computer for twelve hours. The computer constructed a betting scheme by which Harry parlayed his $2,000,000 into $20,000,000 by taking various British soccer pools to the tune of $18,000,000.
For $5,000,000 he bought a monstrous chunk of useless desert from an impoverished Arabian sultanate. With another $2,000,000 he created a huge rumor campaign to the effect that this patch of desert was literally floating on oil. With another $3,000,000 he set up a dummy corporation which made like a big oil company and publicly offered to buy this desert for $75,000,000. After some spirited bargaining, a large American oil company was allowed to outbid the dummy and bought a thousand square miles of sand for $100,000,000.
Harrison Wintergreen was, at the age of twenty-five, Filthy Rich by his own standards. He lost his interest in money.
He now decided that he wanted to Do Good. He Did Good. He toppled seven unpleasant Latin American governments and replaced them with six Social Democracies and a Benevolent Dictatorship. He converted a tribe of Borneo headhunters to Rosicrucianism. He set up twelve rest homes for overage whores and organized a birth control program which sterilized twelve million fecund Indian women. He contrived to make another $100,000,000 on the above enterprises.
At the age of thirty Harrison Wintergreen had had it with Do-Gooding. He decided to Leave His Footprints in the Sands of Time. He Left His Footprints in the Sands of Time. He wrote an internationally acclaimed novel about King Farouk. He invented the Wintergreen Filter, a membrane through which fresh water passed freely, but which barred salts. Once set up, a Wintergreen Desalinization Plant could desalinate an unlimited supply of water at a per-gallon cost approaching absolute zero. He painted one painting and was instantly offered $200,000 for it. He donated it to the Museum of Modern Art, gratis. He developed a mutated virus which destroyed syphilis bacteria. Like syphilis, it spread by sexual contact. It was a mild aphrodisiac. Syphilis was wiped out in eighteen months. He bought an island off the coast of California, a five-hundred-foot crag jutting out of the Pacific. He caused it to be carved into a five-hundred-foot statue of Harrison Wintergreen.
At the age of thirty-eight Harrison Wintergreen had Left sufficient Footprints in the Sands of Time. He was bored. He looked around greedily for new worlds to conquer.
This, then, was the man who, at the age of forty, was informed that he had an advanced, well-spread and incurable case of cancer and that he had one year to live.

• • • • •


Wintergreen spent the first month of his last year searching for an existing cure for terminal cancer. He visited laboratories, medical schools, hospitals, clinics, Great Doctors, quacks, people who had miraculously recovered from cancer, faith healers and Little Old Ladies in Tennis Shoes. There was no known cure for terminal cancer, reputable or otherwise. It was as he suspected, as he more or less even hoped. He would have to do it himself.
He proceeded to spend the next month setting things up to do it himself. He caused to be erected in the middle of the Arizona desert an air-conditioned walled villa. The villa had a completely automatic kitchen and enough food for a year. It had a $5,000,000 biological and biochemical laboratory. It had a $3,000,000 microfilmed library which contained every word ever written on the subject of cancer. It had the to end all pharmacies: a literal supply of quite literally every drug that existed—poisons, painkillers, hallucinogens, dandricides, antiseptics, antibiotics, vericides, headache remedies, heroin, quinine, curare, snake oil—everything. The cost $20,000,000.
The villa also contained a one-way radiotelephone, a large stock of basic chemicals, including radioactives, copies of the Koran, the Bible, the Torah, the Book of the Dead, Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures, the I Ching, and the complete works of Wilhelm Reich and Aldous Huxley. It also contained a very large and ultra-expensive computer. By the time the villa was ready, Wintergreen's petty cash fund was nearly exhausted.
With ten months to do that which the medical world considered impossible, Harrison Wintergreen entered his citadel.
During the first two months he devoured the library, sleeping three hours out of each twenty-four, and dosing himself regularly with Benzedrine. The library offered nothing but data. He digested the data and went on to the .
During the next month he tried aureomycin, bacitracin, stannous flouride, hexylresorcinol, cortisone, penicillin, hexachlorophene, shark-liver extract, and 7,312 assorted other miracles of modern medical science, all to no avail. He began to feel pain, which he immediately blotted out and continued to blot out with morphine. Morphine addiction was merely an annoyance.
He tried chemicals, radioactives, vericides, Christian Science, yoga, prayer, enemas, patent medicines, herb tea, witchcraft, and yogurt diets. This consumed another month, during which Wintergreen continued to waste away, sleeping less and less and taking more Benzedrine and morphine. Nothing worked. He had six months left.
He was on the verge of becoming desperate. He tried a different tack. He sat in a comfortable chair and contemplated his navel for forty-eight consecutive hours.
His meditations produced a severe case of eyestrain and two significant words: "spontaneous remission."
In his two months of research, Wintergreen had come upon numbers of cases where a terminal cancer abruptly reversed itself and the patient, for whom all hope had been abandoned, had been cured. No one ever knew how or why. It could not be predicted, it could not be artificially produced, but it happened nevertheless. For want of an explanation, they call it spontaneous remission. "Remission," meaning cure. "Spontaneous," meaning no one knew what caused it.
Which was not to say that it did not have a cause.
Wintergreen was buoyed: he was even ebullient. He knew that some terminal cancer patients had been cured. Therefore terminal cancer could be cured. Therefore the problem was removed from the realm of the impossible and was now merely the domain of the highly improbable.
And doing the highly improbable was Wintergreen's specialty.
With six months of estimated life left, Wintergreen set jubilantly to work. From his complete cancer library he culled every known case of spontaneous remission. He coded every one of them into the computer—data on the medical histories of the patients, on the treatments employed, on their ages, sexes, religions, races, creeds, colors, national origins, temperaments, marital status, Dun and Bradstreet ratings, neuroses, psychoses, and favorite beers. Complete profiles of every human being ever known to have survived terminal cancer were fed into Harrison Wintergreen's computer.
Wintergreen programed the computer to run a complete series of correlations between ten thousand separate and distinct factors and spontaneous remission. If even one factor—age, credit rating, favorite food—anything correlated with spontaneous remission, the spontaneity factor would be removed.
Wintergreen had shelled out $100,000,000 for the computer. It was the best damn computer in the world. In two minutes and 7.894 seconds it had performed its task. In one succinct word it gave Wintergreen his answer:
"Negative."
Spontaneous remission did not correlate with any external factor. It was still spontaneous; the cause was unknown.
A lesser man would've been crushed. A more conventional man would've been dumbfounded. Harrison Wintergreen was elated.
He had eliminated the entire external universe as a factor in spontaneous remission in one fell swoop. Therefore, in some mysterious way, the human body and/or psyche was capable of curing itself.
Wintergreen set out to explore and conquer his own internal universe. He repaired to the and prepared a formidable potation. Into his largest syringe he decanted the following: Novocain; morphine, curare; vlut, a rare Central Asian poison which induced temporary blindness; olfactorcain, a top-secret smell-deadener used by skunk farmers; tympanoline, a drug which temporarily deadened the auditory nerves (used primarily by filibustering senators); a large dose of Benzedrine; lysergic acid; psilocybin; mescaline; peyote extract; seven other highly experimental and most illegal halluncinogens; eye of newt and toe of dog.
Wintergreen laid himself out on his most comfortable couch. He swabbed the vein in the pit of his left elbow with alcohol and injected himself with the witch's brew.
His heart pumped. His blood surged, carrying the arcane chemicals to every part of his body. The Novocain blanked out every sensory nerve in his body. The morphine eliminated all sensations of pain. The vlut blacked out his vision. The olfactorcain cut off all sense of smell. The tympanoline made him deaf as a traffic court judge. The curare paralyzed him.
Wintergreen was alone in his own body. No external stimuli reached him. He was in a state of total sensory deprivation. The urge to lapse into blessed unconsciousness was irresistible. Wintergreen, strong-willed though he was, could not have remained conscious unaided. But the massive dose of Benzedrine would not let him sleep.
He was awake, aware, alone in the universe of his own body with no external stimuli to occupy himself with.
Then, one and two, and then in combinations like the fists of a good fast heavyweight, the hallucinogens hit.
Wintergreen's sensory organs were blanked out, but the brain centers which received sensory data were still active. It was on these cerebral centers that the tremendous charge of assorted hallucinogens acted. He began to see phantom colors, shapes, things without name or form. He heard eldritch symphonies, ghost echoes, mad howling noises. A million impossible smells roiled through his brain. A thousand false pains and pressures tore at him, as if his whole body had been amputated. The sensory centers of Wintergreen's brain were like a mighty radio receiver tuned to an empty band—filled with meaningless visual, auditory, olfactory and sensual static.
The drugs kept his senses blank. The Benzedrine kept him conscious. Forty years of being Harrison Wintergreen kept him cold and sane.
For an indeterminate period of time he rolled with the punches, groping for the feel of this strange new non-environment. Then gradually, hesitantly at first but with ever growing confidence, Wintergreen reached for control. His mind constructed untrue but useful analogies for actions that were not actions, states of being that were not states of being, sensory data unlike any sensory data received by the human brain. The analogies, constructed in a kind of calculated madness by his subconscious for the brute task of making the incomprehensible palpable, also enabled him to deal with his non-environment as if it were an environment, translating mental changes into analogs of action.
He reached out an analogical hand and tuned a figurative radio, inward, away from the blank wave band of the outside universe and towards the as yet unused wave band of his own body, the internal universe that was his mind's only possible escape from chaos.
He tuned, adjusted, forced, struggled, felt his mind pressing against an atom-thin interface. He battered against the interface, an analogical translucent membrane between his mind and his internal universe, a membrane that stretched, flexed, bulged inward, thinned . . . and finally broke. Like Alice through the Looking Glass, his analogical body stepped through and stood on the other side.
Harrison Wintergreen was inside his own body.
It was a world of wonder and loathsomeness, of the majestic and the ludicrous. Wintergreen's point of view, which his mind analogized as a body within his true body, was inside a vast network of pulsing arteries, like some monstrous freeway system. The analogy crystallized. It was a freeway, and Wintergreen was driving down it. Bloated sacs dumped things into the teeming traffic: hormones, wastes, nutrients. White blood cells careened by him like mad taxicabs. Red corpuscles drove steadily along like stolid burghers. The traffic ebbed and congested like a crosstown rush hour. Wintergreen drove on, searching, searching.
He made a left, cut across three lanes and made a right down toward a lymph node. And then he saw it—a pile of white cells like a twelve-car collision, and speeding towards him a leering motorcyclist.
Black the cycle. Black the riding leathers. Black, dull black, the face of the rider save for two glowing blood-red eyes. And emblazoned across the front and back of the black motorcycle jacket in shining scarlet studs the legend: "Carcinoma Angels."
With a savage whoop, Wintergreen gunned his analogical car down the hypothetical freeway straight for the imaginary cyclist, the cancer cell.
Splat! Pop! Crush! Wintergreen's car smashed the cycle and the rider exploded in a cloud of fine black dust.
Up and down the freeways of his circulatory system Wintergreen ranged, barreling along arteries, careening down veins, inching through narrow capillaries, seeking the black-clad cyclists, the Carcinoma Angels, grinding them to dust beneath his wheels.…
And he found himself in the dark moist wood of his lungs, riding a snow-white analogical horse, an imaginary lance of pure light in his hand. Savage black dragons with blood-red eyes and flickering red tongues slithered from behind the gnarled bolls of great air-sac trees. St. Wintergreen spurred his horse, lowered his lance and impaled monster after hissing monster till at last the holy lungwood was free of dragons.…
He was flying in some vast moist cavern, above him the vague bulks of gigantic organs, below a limitless expanse of shining slimy peritoneal plain.
From behind the cover of his huge beating heart a formation of black fighter planes, bearing the insignia of a scarlet "C" on their wings and fusilages, roared down at him.
Wintergreen gunned his engine and rose to the fray, flying up and over the bandits, blasting them with his machine guns, and one by one and then in bunches they crashed in flames to the peritoneum below.…
In a thousand shapes and guises, the black and red things attacked. Black, the color of oblivion, red, the color of blood. Dragons, cyclists, planes, sea things, soldiers, tanks and tigers in blood vessels and lungs and spleen and thorax and bladder—Carcinoma Angels, all.
And Wintergreen fought his analogical battles in an equal number of incarnations, as driver, knight, pilot, diver, soldier, mahout, with a grim and savage glee, littering the battlefields of his body with the black dust of the fallen Carcinoma Angels.
Fought and fought and killed and killed and finally.…
Finally found himself knee-deep in the sea of his digestive juices lapping against the walls of the dank, moist cave that was his stomach. And scuttling towards him on chitinous legs, a monstrous black crab with blood-red eyes, gross, squat, primeval.
Clicking, chittering, the crab scurried across his stomach towards him. Wintergreen paused, grinned wolfishly, and leaped high in the air, landing with both feet squarely on the hard black carapace.
Like a sun-dried gourd, brittle, dry, hollow, the crab crunched beneath his weight and splintered into a million dusty fragments.
And Wintergreen was alone, at last alone and victorious, the first and last of the Carcinoma Angels now banished and gone and finally defeated.
Harrison Wintergreen, alone in his own body, victorious and once again looking for new worlds to conquer, waiting for the drugs to wear off, waiting to return to the world that always was his oyster.
Waiting and waiting and waiting.…

• • • • •


Go to the finest sanitarium in the world, and there you will find Harrison Wintergreen, who made himself Filthy Rich, Harrison Wintergreen, who Did Good, Harrison Wintergreen, who Left His Footprints in the Sands of Time, Harrison Wintergreen, who stepped inside his own body to do battle with Carcinoma's Angels, and won.
And can't get out.

The End

rat man

'BEM TI MIŠA!



Hidden Prohibitions and the Pleasure Principle

Slavoj Žižek and Josefina Ayerza

(...)

SZ: Yes, although the paradox I like here is that this kind of consumer society ideology illustrates nicely what Freud already knew were the paradoxes of the pleasure principle. You have a society which is ostensibly oriented toward pure pleasure, but you pay for it through a whole series of "you can't." The hidden prohibitions: eat whatever you want, but beware of fat and cholesterol; smoke, but beware of nicotine; sex, but safe sex. Yet the ultimate consequence of this pleasure principle is that everything is prohibited in a way; you can't smoke: there's nicotine; you can't eat: there's fat; you can't have sex: you'll get sick. So this is a kind of everyday confirmation of the Lacanian paradox. We all know how Lacan reversed Dostoyevsky by saying "If God does not exist, everything is prohibited," not ''everything is permitted." I think this is perfectly epitomized by today's society of consumption. If God in the traditional sense as a universal model does not exist, then everything is allowed. You can get whatever you want but with the substance removed: coffee without caffeine, cigarettes without nicotine. I like the dirty story that was in all the magazines about Richard Gere. This widely known scandal, for me, is the ultimate example of all this. This is the story: Gere was hospitalized because he realized — with one of the latest practices in Hollywood, the latest in sexual perversion — the fantasy of Freud's Rat Man. You take a gerbil — not a rat but a gerbil — and a vet cuts off its teeth and nails. You put it in a bag, you attach a piece of string to its tail, and you put it in your anus. The animal suffocates of course and this is "it": the pleasure. Finally it is up to you to pull the dead animal out. The problem with Richard Gere, allegedly, was that he pulled it out too quickly and was left only with the tail; the dead animal remained inside. It's the same paradox: the Rat Man fantasy, you get it, but without claws, without teeth, it is all cut off by a veterinarian. For me this is the ultimate of this same logic. Nothing is prohibited you can even realize the Rat Man fantasy but in a reduced version: the vet takes care of it, cuts off the claws, etc. Again what is crucial here is the contemporary computer with its universal dimension — a kind of a Spinozist machine. We all know Lacan defines the lady in courtly love as a non-human partner. This is computers today.

JA: Is the computer a lady?

SZ: Yes, it takes the place of the lady. Thinking the innermost of your being is in a way externalized. The machine thinks for you: just by observing it you can enjoy how the other does it for you — again this is the ultimate Spinozist vision, passive immersion. Lacan falsely attributes this experience to Hegel, to Hegelian absolute knowledge, but I think it is far more Spinozist: the reduction to a pure bare observer. This kind of universal symbolic machine functioning by itself totally relieves you of your responsibility.

(...)

world wide world

POSTOJI LI SVIJET ANTIGLOBALIZMA?



Prijevod: Boris Buden

Stefan Nowotny

"... la mondialisation du monde (tako ja kazem francuski the worldisation, the worldwidisation of the world) ..."
Jacques Derrida

"Svijet je upravo to gdje ima mjesta za citav svijet: ali zbiljskoga mjesta, mjesta, koje zbiljski dopusta da postoji jedno mjesto na kojem se moze biti tu ( u tom svijetu). U suprotnome, to nije ‘svijet’: to je ‘globus’ ili ‘glomus’, ‘mjesto progonstva’ i ‘dolina suza’".
Jean-Luc Nancy

"Sans-Papiers je paria, on nigdje nije kod kuce. On veoma jasno pokazuje koliko je nedostatna nasa koncepcija gradjanstva u kojoj se putevi inkluzije ukrstavaju s putevima ekskluzije. Oni koji stupe u taj prijelaz, utemeljuju jedan zajednicki svijet."
Iz Deklaracije Univerzalne ambasade

1. "Un autre monde est possible" ("Drugaciji svijet je moguc") - tako je svibnja godine 1998., glasio naslov urednickog uvodnika Ignaçia Ramoneta, glavnog urednika politickog mjesecnika Le monde diplomatique. Otada se ta recenica pretvorila u cesto rabljeni borbeni i mobilizacijski slogan, prije svega u deklaracijama ATTAC-a, mreze kriticara globalizacije (koja se svibnja 1998., potaknuta ranijim Ramonetovim clankom nalazila upravo u fazi formiranja) kao i World Social Foruma, osnovanog 2001., u brazilskom Porto Alegreu.
Tekst koji slijedi u osnovi ne pokusava nista drugo nego uzeti doslovno te rijeci i odgonetnuti njihov moguci smisao. Pritom je rijec manje o raspravljanju kataloga konkretnih mjera (uvodjenju Tobinovog poreza, ponistenju dugova najzaduzenijih zemalja, itd.) koje su predlozene da bi oblikovale "jedan drugaciji svijet", no o pitanju, kako se govor o jednom svijetu, jednom mogucem drugom i drugacijem svijetu odnosi prema kritici onoga sto nazivamo globalizacijom. U osnovi tog pitanja istodobno lezi pretpostavka, da je recenca "drugaciji svijet je moguc" od velikog znacenja za antiglobalizacijski pokret u cjelini - i to vec zbog toga sto teme, a tako i organizacijske forme tog pokreta, ocigledno ipak zahtijevaju jednu dimenziju svijeta, ili bolje: jednu dimenziju rasprostranjenosti svijetom koja se ne poklapa bez ostatka s dimenzijom globalnoga, s takozvanim globaliziranim svijetom ili svijetom u globalizaciji.
Ostaje nam dakle priupitati se, na koji pojam, na koji smisao odnosno na koju simbolizaciju svijeta se taj pokret zapravo odnosi?

2. U francuskome postoje dvije rijeci za pojam "globalizacije": globalisation (od latinskoga globus = kugla) i mondialisation (od latinskoga mundus = svijet). Obje rijeci uobicajeno se primjenjuju kao sinonimi (pri cemu je mondialisation daleko rasprostranjenija). Moguce je medjutim ipak da razlika izmedju tih dviju rijeci, usprkos uobicajene jezicne uporabe, upucuje na pojmovnu razliku, odnosno da se kao jedna takva pojmovna razlika u svakom slucaju moze plodno iskoristiti. O toj se pojmovnoj razlici dakako - ako zanemarimo rijetke izuzetke - jedva i razmisljalo. Ona medjutim sa svoje strane upucuje, i to je moja teza, na kompleksnu povijest u kojoj su ideje i stvarnosti "svijeta" i "globalnoga" bile doduse gotovo u potpunosti isprepletene, a da ipak nikada nisu postale identicne. Tu je rijec prije svega o jos uvijek suvremenoj povijesti moderne, moderne koja mora biti shvacena kao problemski naslov ovoga clanka. U tekstu ce biti skicirani neki elementi te povijesti moderne.
Jedan prigovor izgleda kao da se namece sam od sebe: upustiti se u promisljanje pojma svijeta, ne znaci li to, posvetiti se jednom odvec velikom, odvec opcenitom pojmu, suhoparnoj apstrakciji konkretnih politickih problema i konkretnih politickih borbi? Na taj prigovor zelim izravno odgovoriti samo ovoliko: klasicna filozofska odredjenja (kao "sadrzaj svih pojava", itd.) koja bi mogla pothraniti jedno takvo nepovjerenje, ne samo da namecu razumijevanje pojma svijeta kao neke vrste opcenitosti u posljednjoj instanci, nego ga vecinom dovode i u odnos s nekim poretkom objekata. Spomenuta odredjenja time ujedno prikrivaju jednu "drugu" povijest modernog misljenja o svijetu koja se odnosi na pitanja intersubjektivnosti i drustvenosti i koja je dakle takodjer, i to u odlucujucem smislu - premda je to rijetko tematizirano - politicka povijest i kao takva zasluzuje da bude reflektirana. Uglavnom povrsno razglabanje o "svjetskom drustvu" i "svjetskoj javnosti", o "svjetskom miru" i "svjetskom poretku" svjedoci jednako rjecito o toj povijesti, kao sto se i ocigledna kriza pojmova kao sto su "svjetsko gradjanstvo" ili jednostavno "svjetska javnost" moze razumjeti kao upozorenje da se politickim perspektivama koje su formulirane u tim pojmovima, mozda i na temelju spomenutog prikrivanja, obecava veoma malo buducnosti.
Moguce je ipak da se problem "lose opcenitosti" manje odnosi na ideju svijeta, a vise na ideju "globalnoga" koja nam je danas postala tako samorazumljiva - a mozda cak i na stanovite ideje i prakse "kritike globalizacije". Pokret protesta i inicijative protiv suvremene globalizacije koji (takodjer i upravo u skladu sa svojim samorazumijevanjem) djeluje u citavom svijetu, u svakom slucaju tesko moze zaobici temeljitu diskusiju o izricitoj dimenziji svoga angazmana. Jedna od poanta izreke "Un autre monde est possible", kolikogod se to cinilo banalnim i kolikogod to sama formulacija prikriva, je naime u tome da se ona u modernom razumijevanju vise ne moze dovesti u vezu - kao u krscanskom pojmu svijeta - s nekakvim izlazom iz ovoga svijeta u neki drugi svijet, kako ne u religioznom tako ne ni u "svjetovnom" smislu - a niti u smislu misaone konstrukcije nekog "alternativnog svjetskog poretka". Moderni pojam svijeta, shvacen u svakom slucaju kao politicki pojam, oznacuje jednu radikalnu imanenciju: nemoguce je "uteci" iz ovoga svijeta, postoji samo - Marx je u svojoj slavnoj 11. tezi o Feuerbachu izvukao iz toga revolucionarne konzekvence - mogucnost i nuznost njegove promjene.

3. U medjuvremenu izgleda da uopce jos ne postoji dostatna jasnoca o tome sto znaci ta globalizacija o kojoj se posvuda toliko pripovijeda, odnosno jasnoäa o tome kako se protestni pokret zapravo odnosi prema njoj. Ocigledno je da se protest usmjerava protiv jedne sasvim odredjene, neoliberalne politike globalizacije - no nisu li i informacijske odnosno komunikacijske mreze "koje obuhvacaju citav svijet" i u kojima se organizira taj protest takodjer dio globalizacije? Dakle: jesu li demonstrantkinje i demonstranti zapravo protiv globalizacije ili ipak za nju? Ako su oni za globalizaciju - u svakom slucaju za jednu takvu globalizaciju koja bi mogla zadovoljiti odredjene socijalne zahtjeve - koja je to globalizacija koju oni zastupaju? I koja je to globalizacija s druge strane protiv koje se demonstrantkinje i demonstranti, aktivistkinje i aktivisti bune? Bi li recimo bilo dovoljno da se nametnu odredjeni socijalni, politicki i ekoloski (minimalni) standardi koji bi prigusili "negativne ucinke" jedne globalizacije koja je inace po sebi i dalje pozeljna; ili u temelju toga sto zovemo globalizacijom lezi jedan princip koji takve efekte u pravilu tek proizvodi - i to takodjer na taj nacin da postojece standarde neprestano zaobilazi, pronalazi rupe u njima odnosno dislocira njihove svrhe? Napokon: je li to sto oznacuje ime "globalizacija" uopce nesto, u odnosu na sto se moze zauzeti pozicija za ili protiv , ili to ime oznacuje prije neku vrstu historijske zakonitosti kojoj nuzno podlijezemo, takoreci naizbjeznu historijsku istinu svijeta u kojem smo situirani?
Nesigurnost u pogledu tih pitanja je zajednicka: ona ne pogadja samo sudionike i sudionice samoga protesta, nego i one predstavnice i predstavnike politike i gospodarstva koji na svojim sastancima na vrhu promicu tu globalizaciju, kao üto pogadja i javnosti mnogih zemalja koje prate tu konfrontaciju. Ona se na koncu konca izrazava i u slabljenju jednog niza pojmova uz pomoc kojih protestni pokret opisuje samoga sebe, odnosno kojima ga oznacavaju drugi: dok se jos pred dvije tri godine govorilo uglavnom o "antiglobalizacijskom pokretu" i o "protivnicama i protivnicima globalizacije", potonji su se preobrazili sve vise i vise u "kriticarke i kriticare globalizacije"; sljedstveno tomu zacuo se naposljetku zov za jednom "drugom globalizacijom" dok se inicijative kao sto je primjerice ATTAC u stampi na francuskom jeziku odavno prezentiraju pod etiketom "alter-mondialistes" ("alternativni globalisti").
Od jos veceg znacenja je da u toj nesigurnosti globalizacija lako postaje himerom koja u heterogenosti protesta daje jedan varljivi privid jedinstvenosti. Pojave kao sto su razdvajanje razlicitih kolona demonstranata (vec prema politickom uvjerenju odnosno ciljevima) i prije svega neuspjeh u pokusaju da se pronadju zajednicke platforme za diskusiju pokazuju da "heterogenost" takodjer moze biti eufemizam za dugo njegovane resentimane i nepremostive politicke razlike, pa cak i jos vise od toga: za ponavljanje dominantnih oblika iskljucivanja odredjenih politickih stajalista i interesa (koji navodno nastupaju u ime istih ciljeva). To je primjerice redovito slucaj kada se prije svega od strane sindikata spas pred negativnim socijalnim efektima globalizacije trazi u zastitnim i kontrolnim funkcijama historijskog modela nacionalne drzave, a da se pritom potpuno ignorira cinjenica da upravo taj model nacionalne drzave u konstitutivnom smislu politicki-pravno iskljucuje migrantice i migrante, odnosno da se ne izvuku nikakve konzekvence iz toga da oni oblici izrabljivanja radne snage (bilo u zemljama takozvanog treceg svijeta, bilo u evropskim zemljama) koji izazivaju suvremena migracijska kretanja, pod uvjetima globalizacije jos uvijek dovoljno cesto odgovaraju politici "nacionalnih itneresa".

4. Francuski filozof Etienne Tassin je u jednom clanku naslovljenom "Globalisation ou mondialisation?" klasicnoj figuri podrijetla ekonomskog, naime pojmu kucanstva (grcki oîkos), odlucno suprotstavio dimenziju svijeta:
"(…)nas svijet nije jedan svijet, a niti nas zajednicki svijet, vec samim tim sto postoji jedno zajednicko upravljanje sistemom potreba (proizvodnja, razmjena, potrosnja), a jos manje samo na osnovi identicnog potrosackog ponasanja. Javni je prostor upravo u onoj mjeri politicki, u kojoj nije ekonomski. Politika pocinje uspostavom nekog odnosa prema onomu koji se nalazi izvan kucanstva, prema strancu koji ne stupa ni u kakav ekonomski odnos s nama. Tek s njim se naime zapocinje razvijati jedan svijet - umjesto jedne kuce, pa bila ona i nasa zajednicka kuca."
Neoliberalna dinamika privatizacije provodi naprotiv "sistematsku eliminaciju javnih sluzbi (…) koje garantiraju aktivnosti koje su razlicite od proizvodnje i potrosnje", a time i "nestajanje jednog zajednickog svijeta". (Ovomu valja pridodati da tu eliminaciju javnih sluzbi koje sluze
"uspostavi zajednickih veza medju ljudima", ujedno prati izgradnja aparata sigurnosti zajedno s njihovom vlastitom interpretacijom "javnosti".)
Historijsko lociranje onog specificno "globalnog" ipak ne upucuje na grcki oîkos, nego prije svega na razdoblje iz druge polovine osamnaestog stoljeca, a time i na fazu formiranja politicke moderne: na pozadini sve vece izobrazbe javnosti kroz stampu, na pozadini politicke teorije koja najkasnije s Kantom eksplicitno razvija jednu svjetsku perspektivu, ali i na pozadini istrazivackih putovanja Cooka i Bougainvillea istocnom obalom Australije i Oceanije, s kojima je oko tisucu sedamsto sedamdesete globus napokon do kraja istrazen, poprimaju u to vrijeme kako pojam svijeta tako i pojam globalnog svoj konkretni, modeni lik. I to nuzno tako da dolazi do kategorijalnog mijesanja obaju pojmova: tako primjerice moze Kant "pravo svjetskoga gradjanstva ("Weltbürgerrecht") na opce gostoprimstvo" obrazloziti pravom na "zajednicko posjedovanje povrsine zemlje na kojoj se, buduci je rijec o povrsini kugle, oni /ljudi/ ne mogu na sve strane siriti do u beskonacnost, nego se naposljetku nuzno moraju jedan pored drugoga medjusobno trpjeti". Hegel ce sa slicnom argumentacijom jos u dvadesetim godinama devetnaestog stoljeca moci pisati da je sjeverna Amerika za njegovu filozofiju svjetske povijesti s tog razloga bez ikakva znacenja jer je njoj "opcija kolonizacije jos u velikoj mjeri otvorena" te stoga (jos) nema nikakvu "potrebu za cvrstim zajednistvom" zbog cega ondje takodjer ne postoji ni nikakva "zbiljska drzava".
U oba slucaja je upravo konacnost zemaljske povrsine (kao moguceg teritorija) - utoliko sto ona iziskuje jedno u sebe potisnuto drzavno odnosno svjetskogradjansko drustvo - to sto otvara i ujedno uvjetuje pravnu odnosno povijesnu dimenziju svijeta; globus predstavlja naposljetku sadrzaj jedne konacnosti unutar koje se problem jednog (zajednickog) svijeta uopce tek postavlja u svojoj najvecoj ostrini. Obrnuto, zbiljnost globalnoga u jednom zajednickom svijetu morala bi se, govoreci Hegelovim pojmovima, "ukinuti" ("aufheben").

5. Jean-Luc Nancy je u svojoj knjizi "La création du monde ou la mondialisation" upozorio na konotacije "nakupljanja", inherentne pojmu "globalnog", koje su u modernim jezicima u velikoj mjeri potisnute, premda ipak i dalje zive u pojmovnom dvojniku "globusa" (= kugla, gruda, hrpa), naime u "glomusu" (= klupko, cvor, grumen, nateklina), kao i prije svega u rijeci "aglomeracija" (= nagomilavanje). I doista, tesko je u pogledu tih znacenja ne misliti na problematiku globalizacije:
Vec novovjekovni projekt globalne kolonizacije, shvacen kao politicki projekt, nije bio samo i ne u prvom redu "izlaz" (Hegel) za one koji se medjusobno nisu htjeli "trpjeti" (Kant), nego prije svega projekt dominacije i osvajanja, cija je temeljna motivacija bila nagomilavanje bogatstava i ciju je zbiljnost tvorilo iskoristavanje prirodnih resursa i ljudske radne snage. Historijski konkretno iskustvo globalnosti otuda se ne moze svesti jedino na konacnost zemaljske povrsine, nego mora biti ujedno shvaceno kao izraz i smisleni oblik jednog projekta moci koji se nastavlja usprkos i u iskustvu konacnosti globusa. On se nastavlja u toj mjeri u kojoj mu to iskustvo konacnosti ostaje izvanjsko, jer je on sam, odgovarajuci logici nagomilavanja, "kapitalizacije", u bitnome bez kraja i u tom smislu beskonacan. Pritom je ovdje bez sumnje ipak rijec, govoreci jos jednom s Hegelom, o jednoj losoj ili negativnoj beskonacnosti, sto znaci: o jednoj do u beskonacnost nastavljenoj negaciji konacnosti "koja medjutim takodjer iznova nastaje", sto znaci: o neprestanom zaplitanju u jedno proturjecje.
Tako shvacena globalnost predstavlja centralni problem za politicku modernu; problem doduse s kojim se ona vise muci, no sto ga je u stanju rijesiti. Danasnja rijec "globalizacija" daje tom problemu mozda odgovarajuci izraz: gesta obecanja ("svi cemo od toga profitirati"), s kojom ona nastupa tim je ispraznija sto se vise trudi da prikrije golu cinjenicu da upravo ona globalizacija koja navodno "sirom svijeta" promice rast, razvoj i blagostanje upravo potencira, upravo proizvodi socijalne nejednakosti, nove odnose izrabljivanja kao i ovisnost takozvanih zemalja u razvoju. Kao sto proizvodi i znamenja svoje egzistencije i efikasnosti koje ista ta globalizacija posvuda s ponosom pokazuje: napredak u tehnickim znanostima, izgradnja komunikacijske tehnologije, informacijske mreze koje obuhvacaju citav svijet - ta znamenja gledano za sebe izrazavaju sa svoje strane neodredjenu logiku kapitalizacije (dobara, instrumenata, slika, informacije) cija je drustvena vrijednost tim dvojbenija, cim vise se upravo ta podrucja danas dozivljavaju kao sve vise i vise odredjena besprimjernim nagomilavanjima i koncentracijama moci koje potkopavaju kako pravednu raspodjelu tako i "uravnotezenost" informacije.
To su ta proturjecja koja suvremenu globalizaciju razotkrivaju kao "losu beskonacnost". I upravo u smislu te lose beskonacnosti vazi, da variramo poznatu Kantovu formulaciju: Mi ne zivimo u jednom globaliziranom dobu, nego, naprotiv, u jednom razdoblju globalizacije.

6. "To sto nazivamo ‚mondialisation’ moze voditi nastanku jednoga svijeta, ili medjutim vodi njegovoj suprotnosti?", pita Jean-Luc Nancy na pocetku svoje knjige. Nije li artikulacija protesta koji organiziraju kriticari globalizacije manifestni politicki izraz tog pitanja, manifestni politicki izraz jedne uznemirenosti koja mozda ima svoj razlog u tome sto se dinamika globalizacije i politicko djelovanje onih koji o njoj donose odluke upravo ne odvijaju u horizontu toga pitanja? Sto bi medjutim u suprotnome bile perspektive jedne "mundijalizacije" koju bi doista vodio interes za jednim zajednickim svijetom? Ili drugacije, u odnosu na protest: postoji li svijet antiglobalizma?
Najprije je nuzno tocnije odrediti govor o jednome "svijetu". U tome slijedim tri opce karakterizacije kako ih je dao Jean-Luc Nancy:
a) To sto mi zovemo "svijetom" ne pripada poretku objektivnosti: "Svijet nikada nije nesto sto je ispred mene, odnosno, ako jest ispred mene, onda je to medjutim neki drugi svijet od onoga moga. Ali ako je on apsolutno drugaciji, onda ja uopce ne znam, ili jedva da znam, da postoji jedan svijet. (…) Cim mi se neki svijet pojavljuje kao svijet, ja imam vec nekakvoga udjela u njemu." Nancy otuda odredjuje svijet kao prostor rezonance, kao pojavni prostor koji se ne proteze preda mnom, nego kao prostor u kojem se, naprotiv, ja sam pojavljujem, u kojem uzimam udjela i ciji elementi u jednom odredjenom tonalitetu medjusobno upucuju jedni na druge i modaliziraju se.
b) Upravo u tom smislu svijet je obiljezen time da je nastanjen: "Stanovati, to nuzno znaci: nastavati jedan svijet, sto znaci, ondje imati mnogo vise od svoga boravista: naime svoje mjesto (lieu) u jakom smislu toga pojma, mjesto koje omogucuje da se nesto, stogod to bilo, zbiva u navlastitom smislu (ait lieu)." Svijet je otuda, rijecima Nancyja, "zajednicko mjesto jednog ansambla mjesta."
c) Svijet - u svakom slucaju u postkrscanskom razumijevanju svijeta - je jedna sveza smisla koja ne upucuje ni na sta, a to znaci: ni na koji smisao izvan svijeta: "(…) u dimenziji jednoga svijeta smisao ne upucuje ni na sto drugo osim na mogucnost smisla toga svijeta." Da je smisao svijeta na taj nacin radikalno imanentan, ne znaci samo da se on ne moze referirati ni na kakvu posljednju, ujedno zakljucujucu tocku koja bi jamcila jedan utvrdivi lik u kojem se javlja smisao svijeta, nego i to da se on u tom svijetu nigdje i ni u komu dovrsava ili "ispunjava"; smisao, naprotiv, cirkulira izmedju onih koji nastavaju taj svijet i imaju udjela u njemu. U tom cirkuliranju svijet medjutim nije samo mogucnost smisla, nego i iskustvo, i to "iskustvo koje on stvara o samome sebi."
Ta odredjenja drzim iz vise razloga znacajnima: prvo, ona formuliraju - u historijskom razgranicenju od onog krscanskog pojma svijeta koji je svijet kao nesto "ovdje dolje" doveo u vezu s jednim izvansvjetskim smislom - jedan moderan pojam "svijeta"; drugo, omogucuju da taj pojam svijeta postane politicki plodan i to posredstvom teorijskog razgranicenja od onog filozofijsko-znanstvenog pojma svijeta koji "svijet" odredjuje kao sadrzaj onog objektivnog; trece, razgranicuju pojam svijeta kao politicki pojam od sugestivnih oblika objektivacije svijeta koje susrecemo u onom "svjetonazorskom" kao i u svim onim idejama nekog "svjetskog poretka" kojeg valja uspostaviti na temelju objektivnih ekonomskih odnosno takodjer sodijalnih zakonitosti; cetvrto, Nancyjeva odredjenja etabliraju napostljetku jedan pozitivni pojam "svijeta" koji se prije svega odnosi na pitanja "intersubjektivnosti", zajednice, drustvenih odnosa i koji iznova upucuje natrag na povijest politickog pojma svijeta.

7. Taj politicki pojam svijeta poprima svoj lik prije svega u Kantovoj politickoj filozofiji. U Kantovim politickim spisima svijet ne znaci vise samo (kao u "Kritici cistog uma") "sadrzaj svih pojava" odnosno "totalitet njihove /objektivne/ sinteze", nego postaje dimenzijom u kojoj se nastanjuju Kantova razmisljanja, posebice ona koja se odnose na svjetsko gradjanstvo. Svijet u Kanta postaje sferom opceg interesa. Pa ipak, citanje Kanta cini se da nas isprva nece odvesti jako daleko, jer taj politicki pojam svijeta jedva da dospijeva do nekog izricitog odredjenja, nego je prije svega obiljezen upucivanjem na "covjecanstvo" kao rod, na koje se odnose Kantove argumentacije iz filozofije prava i filozofije povijesti. Rodni pojam covjecanstva tako izgleda da doduse implicira "svijet" kao dimenziju politickog, ali kao dimenziju koja je uvijek vec - po prirodi i ujedno posredstvom "moralnog zakona" koji je covjeku kao bicu slobode tekoreci urodjen - unaprijed dana, cime upravo ono ovdje sredisnje pitanje o postajanju te dimenzije biva zamraceno.
Osim toga cini se da je Kantova politicka filozofija u mnogocemu i povijesno nadidjena. Nije rijec samo o tome da njegova predodzba jednog svjetskogradjanskog ustava kao poretka mira medju suverenim drzavama zasnovanog na medjunarodnom pravu djeluje nedostatno ondje gdje se radi o tome da se ispitaju politicka pitanja i konflikti koji nastaju kao posljedica prijenosa suverenosti (primjerice u procesu evropske integracije) ili kao posljedica gubitka suverenosti uvjetovanog globalizacijom; ista ideja jednog na medjunarodno pravo svedenog kozmopolitizma takodjer ne izgleda osobito pogodna da rijesi probleme danasnjih izbjeglica i migranata koje jedna takva ideja prava jednostavno ne obuhvaca i cije sudbine na drastican nacin dovode pred oci politicku nedostatnost historijskih ideja (drzavno)gradjanskog pravnog poretka pa cak i historijsku ideju ljudskih prava samu.
Ta nedostatnost mogla bi ipak i sama biti utemeljena u onoj Kantovskoj gesti koja "svijet" dovodi u vezu s - u osnovi ahistorijskim - rodnim pojmom covjecanstva i taj svijet na taj nacin razumije kao unaprijed danu dimenziju politickog i na tom temelju projicira jedan "vjecni" pravni poredak. Ne treba previdjeti da povijest univerzalnih ideja prava (ne samo one Kantove, nego i ideje prava koja je proizasla iz Francuske revolucije, Americke revolucije ili ideje prava koje su formulirane ili nanovo ozivljene nakon Drugog svjetskog rata) i sama upucuje na jedan svijet u postajanju, u mjeri u kojoj su te ideje prava dozvolile i dozvoljavaju, da budu okrenute protiv "univerzalizma" postojecih pravnih poredaka i to ondje gdje se on pokazuje kao osnovica za iskljucivanja i diskriminacije. Tako primjerice Jacques Derrida s pravom podsjeca na nedovrseno znacenje tih pravnih ideja i shvaca ih - u blagom ali bitnom pretumacenju sveze izmedju "svijeta" i "covjeka" ne propustajuci markirati problematiku medjunarodnog prava - kao juridicke performative koji su neizostavni u suvremenim diskusijama:
"Obnova i reformulacija deklaracije o ‚ljudskim pravima’ (1948.), kao i uvodjenje pravnog pojma ‚zlocina protiv covjecanstva’ (1945.) obiljezavaju danas horizont mondijalizacije i medjunarodnog prava koje treba da bude pozvano da bdije nad njom."
Pa ipak ostaje pitanje, kako svijet kao politicka dimenzija uopce moze nastati, a to znaci: kao dimenzija koja postaje dohvatljiva kao dimenzija politickoga samo na taj nacin da bude konkretno otvorena i premjerena. U Kantovoj filozofiji se odgovor na to pitanje moze naci prije svega ondje gdje on istrazuje mogucnost "jednodusnosti politike s moralom"; ona upucuje u jednom sasvim odredjenom smjeru: funkciji i svojstvu javnosti.

8. Pitanje uskladivosti politike i morala za Kanta se mora postaviti zbog toga sto on moral i politiku uspostavlja kao potpuno razlicite sfere: dok iz morala za Kanta proizilaze nacela pravnog sistema, politika je naprosto "primjenjivanje nauka o pravu" ("ausübende Rechtslehre") u skladu s nacelima drzavne mudrosti (Staatsklugheit). Ovo potonje je za Kanta djelovanje prema svrhama koje u najboljem slucaju sluzi dobru zajednice; moral, naprotiv, zahtijeva djelovanje prema duznosti moralnog zakona uma i to neovisno o bilo kakvoj mogucoj koristi odnosno o ovim ili onim svrhama. Otuda se ipak nadaje mogucnost "nesklada" izmedju morala i politike, naime onda kada se politika ne obazire na moral i kada ga pocinje prilagodjavati svojim trenutnim ciljevima; politika bi, naprotiv, prema Kantu, spomenuta "nacela drzavne mudrosti" morala uzeti tako "da ona mogu opstojati zajedno s moralom". Na razborit nacin mozemo otuda, kako tvrdi Kant, "zamisliti doduse jednog moralnog politicara (…) ali ne i jednog politickog moralistu koji sebi oblikuje takav moral kako to korist drzavnika nalazi probitacnim".
U smislu "ciste ideje uma" otuda je, ponovo naglasava Kant, nuzno, da se, ukoliko se zeli proizvesti jednodusnost politike s moralom, "svaki zakonodavac obveze da on svoje zakone izdaje tako kao da su oni mogli proizici iz ujedinjene volje jednog citavog naroda, kao i da se svakog podanika, ukoliko on zeli biti gradjaninom, prepozna tako kao da je on zajedno sa svima ostalima svojim glasom sudjelovao u stvaranju jedne takve volje." Ta formulacija ipak ostavlja otvorenim pitanje, kako bi se jedna takva obvezatnost mogla stvoriti za zakonodavca, sto znaci: kako se uskladivost politike s moralom moze formulirati ne samo kao ideja uma, nego i kako moze biti integrirana u zbiljnost nekog pravnog sistema.
I upravo je ta uloga zbiljskog posredovanja izmedju politike i morala koju preuzima nacelo javnosti (Publizität) i to kako u negativnoj tako i u pozitivnoj formulaciji. Ona prva glasi: "Sve radnje koje se odnose na pravo drugih ljudi, a cija maksima proturjeci javnosti (Publizität) nisu u skladu s pravom." To nacelo - kao nacelo javnoga prava - objasnjava se iz toga da ne moze biti legitimna ona maksima "iza koje ne mogu javno stati, a da time neizostavno ne potaknem sve na otpor mojoj namjeri". Pozitivna formulacija nacela javnosti (Publizitätsprinzip) glasi: "Sve maksime koje potrebuju javnost (kako ne bi promasile svoju svrhu) slazu se zajedno s pravom i politikom." One maksime naime koje svoju svrhu mogu postici samo posredstvom javnosti nuzno se podudaraju ne samo s pravom nego i "s opcom svrhom publike (blazenosti)"; one dakle odgovaraju u istoj mjeri moralu i politici.

9. Uopce nije nuzno dijeliti s Kantom njegove pretpostavke (pretpostavke opce moralnosti i otuda inspirirane mogucnosti razrjesenja socijalnih antagonizma posredstvom jednog opceg pravnog sistema, odnosno posredstvom jedne politike s kojom svi slazu), da bismo prihvatili poantu njegova pojma javnosti: da je naime s pojmom javnosti ovdje oznacen upravo onaj princip posredstvom kojeg se djelovanja zakonodavne vlasti posreduje sa sferom drustvenih interesa i refleksije. Samo s toga razloga naposljetku je shvatljivo da javnost u Kanta nije samo odredjena kao nacelo javnoga prava, nego takodjer, u njegovom slavnom clanku o prosvjecenosti, kao nacelo prosvjecenosti, a to u kontekstu Kantove filozofije znaci: kao nacelo drustvene i politicke promjene posredstvom javne kritike postojecih odnosa (u Kanta je to ograniceno na kritiku koju netko "kao ucenjak", "kao da je ucenjak" izrazava posredstvom svojih "spisa"). I upravo u tom clanku o prosvjecenosti pada takodjer tvrdnja da "javna upotreba" uma ne znaci nista drugo nego govoriti "onoj navlastitoj publici, naime svijetu". Svijet se pojavljuje ovdje doduse jos jednom kao unaprijed konstituirana sfera, ali je on ipak postavljen u jasan odnos s procesom socijalne konstitucije: naime u odnos d prosvjecenosti kao "izlazom covjeka iz samoskrivljene nepunoljetnosti" - konzekventno kao nacelo nastajanja jednog drustva punoljetnih gradjana ( i gradjanki - predodzba koja Kantu ipak u velikoj mjeri ostaje nepristupacna), cija je posljednja perspektiva moralizacija drzave i drustva u svjetskogradjanskom smislu.
U onoj mjeri dakle u kojoj se cine dvojbenima premise Kantove moralne filozofije, prema kojima svijet predstavlja unaprijed dani horizont intersubjektivnosti odnosno javnosti cija je jedina zadaca ostvarenje moralnih nacela uma, u toj mjeri se i sam problem socijalne konstitucije pomice u srediste pitanja o svezi svijeta i javnosti. Oba se pojma u skladu s tim moraju preforumulirati: slabi pojam svijeta koji taj svijet predstavlja kao puki horizont intersubjektivnosti odnosno drustvenosti valja prosiriti jednim snaznim pojmom koji svijet razumije kao stvarnu dimenziju drustvenih odnosa, djelovanja i trpljenja. Jedan takav snazni pojam svijeta vise se nece moci dovesti u odnos s apstraktnim predodzbama "covjeka" ili "covjecanstva" kao roda; covjekt jest njegov svijet, on ne egzistira izvan politicki-konkretnog svijeta koji je uhvacen u stalnoj konstituciji. Nista ne pokazuje to jasnije od politike humanitarnih gesta koje premda jos u pojedinom slucaju i mogu pomoci, u svemu ostalom ipak se bave time da reproduciraju bijedu.
Ali ni sam pojam javnosti ne ostaje po strani od tih procesa. On sada vise ne oznacuje oblik moguce jednodusnosti politike i morala, nego, da preuzmemo jedan pojam Oskara Negta i Alexandera Klugea, "organizacijsku formu drustvenog iskustva", sto u nasem kontekstu znaci: sa svoje strane socijalna konstitucija drustvenog iskustva svijeta u sporu s odredjenim prisilama normiranja i iskljucivanja. Time je formalnom pojmu javnosti pridodat jedan materijalni element iz kojeg se na koncu konca objasnjava - takodjer formalna - diferencijacija javnosti u pluralne javnosti: element konkretnog drustvenog iskustva (ili iskustava) koje se u toj diferencijaciji artikulira. Pa ipak, te pluralne javnosti - takodjer i upravo u sukobu, u antagonizmu - ne stoje u medjusobnom odnosu ciste izvanjskosti; one su dio konstitucijskog zbivanja, cija je zajednicka dimenzija svijet.

10. Ono sto se danas naziva globalizacijom izgleda da ima malo veze s jednim svijetom u ovdje izvedenom smislu. Naprotiv, "globalizacija" je danas upravo i ime za krizu javnosti i to kako javoga prava tako i javnosti kao sfere pregovaranja i raspravljanja o drustvenim interesima i iskustvima. Otuda i nije slucaj da se protest kriticara globalizacije - kao simptom i obiljezje krize - prazni upravo ondje gdje se vjeruje da je moguce lokalizirati politicko uskracivanje javnosti u tom dvostrukom smislu.
Taj protest medjutim, ukoliko je u njemu rijec o nastanku nekog "drugog", nekog "antiglobalistickog" svijeta, nece se smjeti ograniciti niti na samu artikulaciju protesta, a niti na shematske prijedloge o uspostavi nekog alterativnog svjetskog poretka. Jedna svjetska javnost koja zasluzuje to ime, nece se moci mjeriti na natjecateljskom prodiranju u postojece strukture javnosti, nego prema tome u kojoj mjeri se dade odrediti socijalnim procesima konstitucije i drustvenim iskustvima, odnosno u kojoj mjeri je spremna uzeti udjela u njima - koliko je u stanju stvoriti prostore i vremena u kojima se artikulacije drustvenih iskustava ne odvijaju jedna pored druge, uzajamno se uopce ne doticuci, nego, naprotiv, stupaju u uzajamnu razmjenu i sastaju se u zbiljski novim oblicima solidarizacije.
Cesto je upozoravano na to da su u Kantovu razumijevanju javnosti vec ugradjeni oni mehanizmi iskljucivanja i razgranicenja (izmedju javnog i privatnog, izmedju muskaraca i zena, izmedju vlasnika i najamnih radnika) koji su naposljetku doveli do njegova historijskog osporavanja, odnosno do toga da ga se proglasi gradjanskim (bourgeois) pojmom, ciji zahtjev za opcim vazenjem zapravo koristi partikularnim interesima jos i ondje gdje im ne sluzi neposredno. Danas je ponovo rijec o razotkrivanju specificnih mahanizama iskljucivanja i ragranicavanja koji etabliraju javno pravo i javnu sferu u njihovoj suvremenoj krizi: to razotkrivanje moze se ostvariti samo na temelju iskustava zakinutih drustvenih grupa; ono ce se ovaj puta morati posebice usredotociti na mehanizme iskljucivanja i razgranicavanja prisutne u pojmu javnosti ogranicenom na drzavljanstvo, na temelju iskustava izbjeglica i migrantica odnosno migranata u svijetu koji je izgleda zaboravio da ono sto oznacuje pojam "globalizacije" nije jedino moguce nacelo njegove promjen.

Introduction to THE BOOK OF JOB


by G.K. Chesterton



"Man is most comforted by paradoxes."


The book of Job is among the other Old Testament books both a philosophical riddle and a historical riddle. It is the philosophical riddle that concerns us in such an introduction as this; so we may dismiss first the few words of general explanation or warning which should be said about the historical aspect. Controversy has long raged about which parts of this epic belong to its original scheme and which are interpolations of considerably later date. The doctors disagree, as it is the business of doctors to do; but upon the whole the trend of investigation has always been in the direction of maintaining that the parts interpolated, if any, were the prose prologue and epilogue, and possibly the speech of the young man who comes in with an apology at the end. I do not profess to be competent to decide such questions.
But whatever decision the reader may come to concerning them, there is a general truth to be remembered in this connection. When you deal with any ancient artistic creation, do not suppose that it is anything against it that it grew gradually. The book of Job may have grown gradually just as Westminster Abbey grew gradually. But the people who made the old folk poetry, like the people who made Westminster Abbey, did not attach that importance to the actual date and the actual author, that importance which is entirely the creation of the almost insane individualism of modern times. We may put aside the case of Job, as one complicated with religious difficulties, and take any other, say the case of the Iliad. Many people have maintained the characteristic formula of modern skepticism, that Homer was not written by Homer, but by another person of the same name. Just in the same way many have maintained that Moses was not Moses but another person called Moses. But the thing really to be remembered in the matter of the Iliad is that if other people did interpolate the passages, the thing did not create the same sense of shock as would be created by such proceedings in these individualistic times. The creation of the tribal epic was to some extent regarded as a tribal work, like the building of the tribal temple. Believe then, if you will, that the prologue of Job and the epilogue and the speech of Elihu are things inserted after the original work was composed. But do not suppose that such insertions have that obvious and spurious character which would belong to any insertions in a modern, individualistic book . . .
Without going into questions of unity as understood by the scholars, we may say of the scholarly riddle that the book has unity in the sense that all great traditional creations have unity; in the sense that Canterbury Cathedral has unity. And the same is broadly true of what I have called the philosophical riddle. There is a real sense in which the book of Job stands apart from most of the books included in the canon of the Old Testament. But here again those are wrong who insist on the entire absence of unity. Those are wrong who maintain that the Old Testament is a mere loose library; that it has no consistency or aim. Whether the result was achieved by some supernal sprirtual truth, or by a steady national tradition, or merely by an ingenious selection in aftertimes, the books of the Old Testament have a quite perceptible unity. . .
The central idea of the great part of the Old Testament may be called the idea of the loneliness of God. God is not the only chief character of the Old Testament; God is properly the only character in the Old Testament. Compared with His clearness of purpose, all the other wills are heavy and automatic, like those of animals; compared with His actuality, all the sons of flesh are shadows. Again and again the note is struck, "With whom hath He taken counsel?" (Isa. 40:14). "I have trodden the winepress alone, and of the peoples there was no man with me" (Isa. 63:3). All the patriarchs and prophets are merely His tools or weapons; for the Lord is a man of war. He uses Joshua like an axe or Moses like a measuring rod. For Him, Samson, is only a sword and Isaiah a trumpet. The saints of Christianity are supposed to be like God, to be, as it were, little statuettes of Him. The Old Testament hero is no more supposed to be of the same nature as God than a saw or a hammer is supposed to be of the same shape as the carpenter. This is the main key and characteristic of Hebrew scriptures as a whole. There are, indeed, in those scriptures innumerable instances of the sort of rugged humor, keen emotion, and powerful individuality which is never wanting in great primitive prose and poetry. Nevertheless the main characteristic remains: the sense not merely that God is stronger than man, not merely that God is more secret than man, but that He means more, that He knows better what He is doing, that compared with Him we have something of the vagueness, the unreason, and the vagrancy of the beasts that perish. "It is He that sitteth above the earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers" (Isa.40:22). We might almost put it thus. The book is so intent upon asserting the personality of God that it almost asserts the impersonality of man. Unless this gigantic cosmic brain has conceived a thing, that thing is insecure and void; man has not enough tenacity to ensure its continuance. "Except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain that build it. Except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain" (Ps. 127:1).
Everywhere else, then, the Old Testament positively rejoices in the obliteration of man in comparison with the divine purpose. The book of Job stands definitely alone because the book of Job definitely asks, "But what is the purpose of God? Is it worth the sacrifice even of our miserable humanity? Of course, it is easy enough to wipe out our own paltry wills for the sake of a will that is grander and kinder. But is it grander and kinder? Let God use His tools; let God break His tools. But what is He doing, and what are they being broken for?" It is because of this question that we have to attack as a philosophical riddle the riddle of the book of Job.
The present importance of the book of Job cannot be expressed adequately even by saying that it is the most interesting of ancient books. We may almost say of the book of Job that it is the most interesting of modern books. In truth, of course, neither of the two phrases covers the matter, because fundamental human religion and fundamental human irreligion are both at once old and new; philosophy is either eternal or it is not philosophy. The modern habit of saying"This is my opinion, but I may be wrong" is entirely irrational. If I say that it may be wrong, I say that is not my opinion. The modern habit of saying "Every man has a different philosophy; this is my philosophy and it suits me" - the habit of saying this is mere weak-mindedness. A cosmic philosophy is not constructed to fit a man; a cosmic philosophy is constructed to fit a cosmos. A man can no more possess a private religion than he can possess a private sun and moon.
The first of the intellectual beauties of the book of Job is that it is all concerned with this desire to know the actuality; the desire to know what is, and not merely what seems. If moderns were writing the book, we should probably find that Job and his comforters got on quite well together by the simple operation of referring their differences to what is called the temperament, saying that the comforters were by nature "optimists" and Job by nature a "pessimist." And they would be quite comfortable, as people can often be, for some time at least, by agreeing to say what is obviously untrue. For if the word "pessimist" means anything at all, then emphatically Job is not a pessimist. His case alone is sufficient to refute the modern absurdity of referring everything to physical temperament. Job does not in any sense look at life in a gloomy way. If wishing to be happy and being quite ready to be happy constitutes an optimist, Job is an optimist. He is a perplexed optimist; he is an exasperated optimist; he is an outraged and insulted optimist. He wishes the universe to justify itself, not because he wishes it be caught out, but because he really wishes it be justified. He demands an explanation from God, but he does not do it at all in the spirit in which [John] Hampden might demand an explanation from Charles I. He does it in the spirit in which a wife might demand an explanation from her husband whom she really respected. He remonstrates with his Maker because he is proud of his Maker. He even speaks of the Almighty as his enemy, but he never doubts, at the back of his mind, that his enemy has some kind of a case which he does not understand. In a fine and famous blasphemy he says, "Oh, that mine adversary had written a book!" (31:35). It never really occurs to him that it could possibly be a bad book. He is anxious to be convinced, that is, he thinks that God could convince him. In short, we may say again that if the word optimist means anything (which I doubt), Job is an optimist. He shakes the pillars of the world and strikes insanely at the heavens; he lashes the stars, but it is not to silence them; it is to make them speak.
In the same way we may speak of the official optimists, the comforters of Job. Again, if the word pessimist means anything (which I doubt), the comforters of Job may be called pessimists rather than optimists. All that they really believe is not that God is good but that God is so strong that it is much more judicious to call Him good. It would be the exaggeration of censure to call them evolutionists; but they have something of the vital error of the evolutionary optimist. They will keep on saying that everything in the universe fits into everything else; as if there were anything comforting about a number of nasty things all fitting into each other. We shall see later how God in the great climax of the poem turns this particular argument altogether upside down.
When, at the end of the poem, God enters (somewhat abruptly), is struck the sudden and splendid note which makes the thing as great as it is. All the human beings through the story, and Job especially, have been asking questions of God. A more trivial poet would have made God enter in some sense or other in order to answer the questions. By a touch truly to be called inspired, when God enters, it is to ask a number more question on His own account. In this drama of skepticism God Himself takes up the role of skeptic. He does what all the great voices defending religion have always done. He does, for instance, what Socrates did. He turns rationalism against itself. He seems to say that if it comes to asking questions, He can ask some question which will fling down and flatten out all conceivable human questioners. The poet by an exquisite intuition has made God ironically accept a kind of controversial equality with His accusers. He is willing to regard it as if it were a fair intellectual duel: "Gird up now thy loins like man; for I will demand of thee, and answer thou me" (38:3). The everlasting adopts an enormous and sardonic humility. He is quite willing to be prosecuted. He only asks for the right which every prosecuted person possesses; he asks to be allowed to cross-examine the witness for the prosecution. And He carries yet further the corrections of the legal parallel. For the first question, essentially speaking, which He asks of Job is the question that any criminal accused by Job would be most entitled to ask. He asks Job who he is. And Job, being a man of candid intellect, takes a little time to consider, and comes to the conclusion that he does not know.
This is the first great fact to notice about the speech of God, which is the culmination of the inquiry. It represents all human skeptics routed by a higher skepticism. It is this method, used sometimes by supreme and sometimes by mediocre minds, that has ever since been the logical weapon of the true mystic. Socrates, as I have said, used it when he showed that if you only allowed him enough sophistry he could destroy all sophists. Jesus Christ used it when he reminded the Sadducees, who could not imagine the nature of marriage in heaven, that if it came to that they had not really imagined the nature of marriage at all. In the break up of Christian theology in the eighteenth century, [Joseph] Butler used it, when he pointed out that rationalistic arguments could be used as much against vague religions as against doctrinal religion, as much against rationalist ethics as against Christian ethics. It is the root and reason of the fact that men who have religious faith have also philosophic doubt. These are the small streams of the delta; the book of Job is the first great cataract that creates the river. In dealing with the arrogant asserter of doubt, it is not the right method to tell him to stop doubting. It is rather the right method to tell him to go on doubting , to doubt a little more, to doubt every day newer and wilder things in the universe, until at last, by some strange enlightenment, he may begin to doubt himself.
This, I say, is the first fact touching the speech; the fine inspiration by which God comes in at the end, not to answer riddles, but to propound them. The other great fact which, taken together with this one, makes the whole work religious instead of merely philosophical is that other great surprise which makes Job suddenly satisfied with the mere presentation of something impenetrable. Verbally speaking the enigmas of Jehovah seem darker and more desolate than the enigmas of Job; yet Job was comfortless before the speech of Jehovah and is comforted after it. He has been told nothing, but he feels the terrible and tingling atmosphere of something which is too good to be told. The refusal of God to explain His design is itself a burning hint of His design. The riddles of God are more satisfying than the solutions of man.
Thirdly, of course, it is one of the splendid strokes that God rebukes alike the man who accused and the men who defended Him; that He knocks down pessimists and optimists with the same hammer. And it is in connection with the mechanical and supercilious comforters of Job that there occurs the still deeper and finer inversion of which I have spoken. The mechanical optimist endeavors to justify the universe avowedly upon the ground that it is a rational and consecutive pattern. He points out that the fine thing about the world is that it can all be explained. That is the one point, if I may put it so, on which God, in return, is explicit to the point of violence. God says, in effect, that if there is one fine thing about the world, as far as men are concerned, it is that it cannot be explained. He insists on the inexplicableness of everything. "Hath the rain a father?. . .Out of whose womb came the ice?" (38:28f). He goes farther, and insists on the positive and palpable unreason of things; "Hast thou sent the rain upon the desert where no man is, and upon the wilderness wherein there is no man?" (38:26). God will make man see things, if it is only against the black background of nonentity. God will make Job see a startling universe if He can only do it by making Job see an idiotic universe. To startle man, God becomes for an instant a blasphemer; one might almost say that God becomes for an instant an atheist. He unrolls before Job a long panorama of created things, the horse, the eagle, the raven, the wild ass, the peacock, the ostrich, the crocodile. He so describes each of them that it sounds like a monster walking in the sun. The whole is a sort of psalm or rhapsody of the sense of wonder. The maker of all things is astonished at the things he has Himself made.
This we may call the third point. Job puts forward a note of interrogation; God answers with a note of exclamation. Instead of proving to Job that it is an explicable world, He insists that it is a much stranger world than Job ever thought it was. Lastly, the poet has achieved in this speech, with that unconscious artistic accuracy found in so many of the simpler epics, another and much more delicate thing. Without once relaxing the rigid impenetrability of Jehovah in His deliberate declaration, he has contrived to let fall here and there in the metaphors, in the parenthetical imagery, sudden and splendid suggestions that the secret of God is a bright and not a sad one - semi-accidental suggestions, like light seen for an instant through the crack of a closed door.
It would be difficult to praise too highly, in a purely poetical sense, the instinctive exactitude and ease with which these more optimistic insinuations are let fall in other connections, as if the Almighty Himself were scarcely aware that He was letting them out. For instance, there is that famous passage where Jehovah, with devastating sarcasm, asks Job where he was when the foundations of the world were laid, and then (as if merely fixing a date) mentions the time when the sons of God shouted for joy (38:4-7). One cannot help feeling, even upon this meager information, that they must have had something to shout about. Or again, when God is speaking of snow and hail in the mere catalogue of the physical cosmos, he speaks of them as a treasury that He has laid up against the day of battle - a hint of some huge Armageddon in which evil shall be at last overthrown.
Nothing could be better, artistically speaking, than this optimism breaking though agnosticism like fiery gold round the edges of a black cloud. Those who look superficially at the barbaric origin of the epic may think it fanciful to read so much artistic significance into its casual similes or accidental phrases. But no one who is well acquainted with great examples of semi-barbaric poetry, as in The Song of Roland or the old ballads, will fall into this mistake. No one who knows what primitive poetry is can fail to realize that while its conscious form is simple some of its finer effects are subtle. The Iliad contrives to express the idea that Hector and Sarpedon have a certain tone or tint of sad and chivalrous resignation, not bitter enough to be called pessimism and not jovial enough to be called optimism; Homer could never have said this in elaborate words. But somehow he contrives to say it in simple words. The Song of Roland contrives to express the idea that Christianity imposes upon its heroes a paradox; a paradox of great humility in the matter of their sins combined with great ferocity in the matter of their ideas. Of course The Song of Roland could not say this; but it conveys this. In the same way, the book of Job must be credited with many subtle effects which were in the author's soul without being, perhaps, in the author's mind. And of these by far the most important remains to be stated.
I do not know, and I doubt whether even scholars know, if the book of Job had a great effect or had any effect upon the after development of Jewish thought. But if it did have any effect it may have saved them from an enormous collapse and decay. Here in this book the question is really asked whether God invariably punishes vice with terrestrial punishment and rewards virtue with terrestrial prosperity. If the Jews had answered that question wrongly they might have lost all their after influence in human history. They might have sunk even down to the level of modern well-educated society. For when once people have begun to believe that prosperity is the reward of virtue, their next calamity is obvious. If prosperity is regarded as the reward of virtue it will be regarded as the symptom of virtue. Men will leave off the heavy task of making good men successful. The will adopt the easier task of making out successful men good. This, which has happened throughout modern commerce and journalism, is the ultimate Nemesis of the wicked optimism of the comforters of Job. If the Jews could be saved from it, the book of Job saved them.
The book of Job is chiefly remarkable, as I have insisted throughout, for the fact that it does not end in a way that is conventionally satisfactory. Job is not told that his misfortunes were due to his sins or a part of any plan for his improvement. But in the prologue we see Job tormented not because he was the worst of men, but because he was the best. It is the lesson of the whole work that man is most comforted by paradoxes. Here is the very darkest and strangest of the paradoxes; and it is by all human testimony the most reassuring. I need not suggest what high and strange history awaited this paradox of the best man in the worst fortune. I need not say that in the freest and most philosophical sense there is one Old Testament figure who is truly a type; or say what is prefigured in the wounds of Job.



Why I Am A Catholic

By G. K. Chesterton

The difficulty of explaining "why I am a Catholic" is that there are ten thousand reasons all amounting to one reason: that Catholicism is true. I could fill all my space with separate sentences each beginning with the words, "It is the only thing that . . ." As, for instance, (1) It is the only thing that really prevents a sin from being a secret. (2) It is the only thing in which the superior cannot be superior; in the sense of supercilious. (3) It is the only thing that frees a man from the degrading slavery of being a child of his age. (4) It is the only thing that talks as if it were the truth; as if it were a real messenger refusing to tamper with a real message. (5) It is the only type of Christianity that really contains every type of man; even the respectable man. (6) It is the only large attempt to change the world from the inside; working through wills and not laws; and so on. Or I might treat the matter personally and describe my own conversion; but I happen to have a strong feeling that this method makes the business look much smaller than it really is. Numbers of much better men have been sincerely converted to much worse religions. I would much prefer to attempt to say here of the Catholic Church precisely the things that cannot be said even of its veryrespectable rivals. In short, I would say chiefly of the Catholic Church that it is catholic. I would rather try to suggest that it is not only larger than me, but larger than anything in the world; that it is indeed larger than the world. But since in this short space I can only take a section, I will consider it in its capacity of a guardian of the truth.
The other day a well-known writer, otherwise quite well-informed, said that the Catholic Church is always the enemy of new ideas. It probably did not occur to him that his own remark was not exactly in the nature of a new idea. It is one of the notions that Catholics have to be continually refuting, because it is such a very old idea. Indeed, those who complain that Catholicism cannot say anything new, seldom think it necessary to say anything new about Catholicism. As a matter of fact, a real study of history will show it to be curiously contrary to the fact. In so far as the ideas really are ideas, and in so far as any such ideas can be new, Catholics have continually suffered through supporting them when they were really new; when they were much too new to find any other support. The Catholic was not only first in the field but alone in the field; and there was as yet nobody to understand what he had found there.
Thus, for instance, nearly two hundred years before the Declaration of Independence and the French Revolution, in an age devoted to the pride and praise of princes, Cardinal Bellarmine and Suarez the Spaniard laid down lucidly the whole theory of real democracy. But in that age of Divine Right they only produced the impression of being sophistical and sanguinary Jesuits, creeping about with daggers to effect the murder of kings. So, again, the Casuists of the Catholic schools said all that can really be said for the problem plays and problem novels of our own time, two hundred years before they were written. They said that there really are problems of moral conduct; but they had the misfortune to say it two hundred years too soon. In a time of tub-thumping fanaticism and free and easy vituperation, they merely got themselves called liars and shufflers for being psychologists before psychology was the fashion. It would be easy to give any number of other examples down to the present day, and the case of ideas that are still too new to be understood. There are passages in Pope Leo's [Also known as , released in 1891] which are only now beginning to be used as hints for social movements much newer than socialism. And when Mr. Belloc wrote about the Servile State, he advanced an economic theory so original that hardly anybody has yet realized what it is. A few centuries hence, other people will probably repeat it, and repeat it wrong. And then, if Catholics object, their protest will be easily explained by the well-known fact that Catholics never care for new ideas.
Nevertheless, the man who made that remark about Catholics meant something; and it is only fair to him to understand it rather more clearly than he stated it. What he meant was that, in the modern world, the Catholic Church is in fact the enemy of many influential fashions; most of which still claim to be new, though many of them are beginning to be a little stale. In other words, in so far as he meant that the Church often attacks what the world at any given moment supports, he was perfectly right . The Church does often set herself against the fashion of this world that passes away; and she has experience enough to know how very rapidly it does pass away. But to understand exactly what is involved, it is necessary to take a rather larger view and consider the ultimate nature of the ideas in question, to consider, so to speak, the idea of the idea.
Nine out of ten of what we call new ideas are simply old mistakes. The Catholic Church has for one of her chief duties that of preventing people from making those old mistakes; from making them over and over again forever, as people always do if they are left to themselves. The truth about the Catholic attitude towards heresy, or as some would say, towards liberty, can best be expressed perhaps by the metaphor of a map. The Catholic Church carries a sort of map of the mind which looks like the map of a maze, but which is in fact a guide to the maze. It has been compiled from knowledge which, even considered as human knowledge, is quite without any human parallel.
There is no other case of one continuous intelligent institution that has been thinking about thinking for two thousand years. Its experience naturally covers nearly all experiences; and especially nearly all errors. The result is a map in which all the blind alleys and bad roads are clearly marked, all the ways that have been shown to be worthless by the best of all evidence: the evidence of those who have gone down them.
On this map of the mind the errors are marked as exceptions. The greater part of it consists of playgrounds and happy hunting-fields, where the mind may have as much liberty as it likes; not to mention any number of intellectual battle-fields in which the battle is indefinitely open and undecided. But it does definitely take the responsibility of marking certain roads as leading nowhere or leading to destruction, to a blank wall, or a sheer precipice. By this means, it does prevent men from wasting their time or losing their lives upon paths that have been found futile or disastrous again and again in the past, but which might otherwise entrap travelers again and again in the future. The Church does make herself responsible for warning her people against these; and upon these the real issue of the case depends. She does dogmatically defend humanity from its worst foes, those hoary and horrible and devouring monsters of the old mistakes. Now all these false issues have a way of looking quite fresh, especially to a fresh generation. Their first statement always sounds harmless and plausible. I will give only two examples. It sounds harmless to say, as most modern people have said: "Actions are only wrong if they are bad for society." Follow it out, and sooner or later you will have the inhumanity of a hive or a heathen city, establishing slavery as the cheapest and most certain means of production, torturing the slaves for evidence because the individual is nothing to the State, declaring that an innocent man must die for the people, as did the murderers of Christ. Then, perhaps, you will go back to Catholic definitions, and find that the Church, while she also says it is our duty to work for society, says other things also which forbid individual injustice. Or again, it sounds quite pious to say, "Our moral conflict should end with a victory of the spiritual over the material." Follow it out, and you may end in the madness of the Manicheans, saying that a suicide is good because it is a sacrifice, that a sexual perversion is good because it produces no life, that the devil made the sun and moon because they are material. Then you may begin to guess why Catholicism insists that there are evil spirits as well as good; and that materials also may be sacred, as in the Incarnation or the Mass, in the sacrament of marriage or the resurrection of the body.
Now there is no other corporate mind in the world that is thus on the watch to prevent minds from going wrong. The policeman comes too late, when he tries to prevent men from going wrong. The doctor comes too late, for he only comes to lock up a madman, not to advise a sane man on how not to go mad. And all other sects and schools are inadequate for the purpose. This is not because each of them may not contain a truth, but precisely because each of them does contain a truth; and is content to contain a truth. None of the others really pretends to contain the truth. None of the others, that is, really pretends to be looking out in all directions at once. The Church is not merely armed against the heresies of the past or even of the present, but equally against those of the future, that may be the exact opposite of those of the present. Catholicism is not ritualism; it may in the future be fighting some sort of superstitious and idolatrous exaggeration of ritual. Catholicism is not asceticism; it has again and again in the past repressed fanatical and cruel exaggerations of asceticism. Catholicism is not mere mysticism; it is even now defending human reason against the mere mysticism of the Pragmatists. Thus, when the world went Puritan in the seventeenth century, the Church was charged with pushing charity to the point of sophistry, with making everything easy with the laxity of the confessional. Now that the world is not going Puritan but Pagan, it is the Church that is everywhere protesting against a Pagan laxity in dress or manners. It is doing what the Puritans wanted done when it is really wanted. In all probability, all that is best in Protestantism will only survive in Catholicism; and in that sense all Catholics will still be Puritans when all Puritans are Pagans.
Thus, for instance, Catholicism, in a sense little understood, stands outside a quarrel like that of Darwinism at Dayton. It stands outside it because it stands all around it, as a house stands all around two incongruous pieces of furniture. It is no sectarian boast to say it is before and after and beyond all these things in all directions. It is impartial in a fight between the Fundamentalist and the theory of the Origin of Species, because it goes back to an origin before that Origin; because it is more fundamental than Fundamentalism. It knows where the Bible came from. It also knows where most of the theories of Evolution go to. It knows there were many other Gospel besides the Four Gospels, and that the others were only eliminated by the authority of the Catholic Church. It knows there are many other evolutionary theories besides the Darwinian theory; and that the latter is quite likely to be eliminated by later science. It does not, in the conventional phrase, accept the conclusions of science, for the simple reason that science has not concluded. To conclude is to shut up; and the man of science is not at all likely to shut up. It does not, in the conventional phrase, believe what the Bible says, for the simple reason that the Bible does not say anything. You cannot put a book in the witness-box and ask it what it really means. The Fundamentalist controversy itself destroys Fundamentalism. The Bible by itself cannot be a basis of agreement when it is a cause of disagreement; it cannot be the common ground of Christians when some take it allegorically and some literally. The Catholic refers it to something that can say something, to the living, consistent, and continuous mind of which I have spoken; the highest mind of man guided by God.
Every moment increases for us the moral necessity for such an immortal mind. We must have something that will hold the four corners of the world still, while we make our social experiments or build our Utopias. For instance, we must have a final agreement, if only on the truism of human brotherhood, that will resist some reaction of human brutality. Nothing is more likely just now than that the corruption of representative government will lead to the rich breaking loose altogether, and trampling on all the traditions of equality with mere pagan pride. We must have the truisms everywhere recognized as true. We must prevent mere reaction and the dreary repetition of the old mistakes. We must make the intellectual world safe for democracy. But in the conditions of modern mental anarchy, neither that nor any other ideal is safe. just as Protestants appealed from priests to the Bible, and did not realize that the Bible also could be questioned, so republicans appealed from kings to the people, and did not realize that the people also could be defied. There is no end to the dissolution of ideas, the destruction of all tests of truth, that has become possible since men abandoned the attempt to keep a central and civilized Truth, to contain all truths and trace out and refute all errors. Since then, each group has taken one truth at a time and spent the time in turning it into a falsehood. We have had nothing but movements; or in other words, monomanias. But the Church is not a movement but a meeting-place; the trysting-place of all the truths in the world.

Novi anđeli
O sreći zastupanja komunističkog uvjerenja: mnoštvo u Carstvu



Prijevod: Boris Buden

Katja Diefenbach

"Čak su i prema jednoj talmudskoj legendi stvoreni anđeli - u svakom trenutku novi, u nebrojenim jatima - kako bi, nakon što su pred bogom otpjevali svoju himnu, zamukli i rastvorili se u ništa."
(Walter Benjamin, Najava za časopis Angelus Novus)

Mnostvo je jedan novi andjeo, ili bolje, povratak "andjela povijesti" u jednom krajnje izmijenjenom, pozitivnijem obliku; jedan u potpunosti sekularizirani i subjektivirani andjeo. Jedan krscanski radnik-andjeo koji ne samo da prorokuje nadolazak jedne buduce sretne slobode, nego se, nazadrziv, dao na put u sunce, "u blistavo svjetlo jednoga novog dana" [2]. Andjeo Carstva kojem su Antonio Negri i Michael Hardt dali ime multitude - mnostvo (Veilheit) ili gomila (Menge), kako to u njemackom prijevodu glasi - stoji za jednu teorijsku perspektivu u kojoj ono mesijansko i ono politicko ne upucuju vise u razlicitim smjerovima. Veoma je vjerojatno da to pozitivno stapanje koje proizvodi mesijanski operaizam - multitude je ono dobro i to dobro ce jednog dana nuzno doci - izaziva nelagodu koju osjecamo u vezi s tim konceptom. Kao sto od nas, s druge strane, takodjer zahtjeva respekt cinjenica da su oba autora nasuprot lijevim sluzbenicima tuznih strasti prihvatili rizik da nakon tolikih pobjeda kapitalizma i dalje inzistiraju na mogucnosti komunizma. Knjiga dotice rijetko postavljano pitanje politicke motivacije: zasto ljudi cine sve te gluposti - politicke akcije, demonstracije i beskonacne rasprave? Vjeruju li oni u to sto rade? Zar im nije neugodno da uvijek oni budu ti koji izlaze na scenu s previse toga u rukama, previse uvjerenja, previse rijeci? Cekaju li oni doista na neku radikalnu promjenu? Ili trebaju neko zanimanje, da ih umiri kad se ponovo prepoznaju u vec vidjenome, pa su slucajno odabrali politiku za polje svoga razlikovanja od drugih, svoga discipliniranja i svoje domovine? Na to pitanje se u "Empireu" odgovara s militantnom religioznoscu onih koji vjeruju: mnostvo kao forma u kojoj se javlja buntovna subjektivnost u razvijenom kapitalizmu ima sasvim spontani komunisticki karakter. To mnostvo je svojom produktivnoscu u bijedi postalo sveto, jer "biomoc i komunizam, kooperacija i revolucija ostaju ujedinjeni u ljubavi, jednostavnosti i, takodjer, u nevinosti" [3]. Tim rijecima okoncava "Empire". Wow. Nevjerojatno religiozno, nevjerojatno pateticno.

U Benjamina, koji je opisao najljepse susrete izmedju marksizma i andjela, ono mesijansko, za razliku od politickoga, upucuje u jedan sasvim drugi smjer. U odredjenim trenucima ono politicko se ukrstava sa suprotstavljenim kretanjem mesijanizma koje slijedi mistiku nadolazeceg iskupitelja i zadobiva jednu snagu s kojom se usmjerava na lakocu srece koju u povijesnofilozofijskom smislu nije moguce programirati. [4] Obecanje srece u politickome podsjeca na to da racionalnost napretka, razvoj proizvodnih snaga i disciplinu ne treba pobrkati s emancipacijom. Taj odnos srece u politici, ono mesijansko bez mesijanizma, obecava da bi se usred katastrofalne izvjesnosti da ce sve ostati tako kako jest najednom moglo izlomiti neko drugo vrijeme borbe. "Andjeo povijesti" [5] u Benjamina vjesnik je te aktualnosti. On stoji izmedju katastrofe i napretka, a time takodjer i za spoznaju da izmedju te katastrofe i tog napretka postoji neka sveza koja se sastoji u tuznom triku modernizacije, u uspjesno propalim borbama. Andjeo stoji za to da taj odnos nije nikakav zatvoreni totalitet. On je trag koji upucuje na liniju zidovskog mesijanizma prisutnu u lijevom misljenju, jedan trag koji je primjerice Ágnes Heller najintenzivnije dozivjela 1968.:

"Forma mog citavog zivota, ne samo moja vjera, sastojala se u cekanju. Ici na hasaru [6] ili stupiti u Komunisticku partiju po sebi nije bilo nista mesijansko premda je bilo povezano s mesijanskim predodzbama. Godine 1968., medjutim, nasli smo se pred definitivnim izazovom, da se u nasem vlastitom zivotu, ovdje i sada, ponasamo tako kao da je Mesija vec tu. Iscekivanje kao zivotna forma, ne kao vjera, to je bio istinski mesijanizam." [7]

Tu dugu liniju jednog mesijanskog iscekivanja, koje je prenijeto u sferu politickoga, reprezentiraju u "Empireu" krscanski ucitelji. To je u prvom redu Augustin i njegova ideja bozanske drzave u kojoj stranci nomadi zajedno rade kako bi stvorili jedan zajednicki svijet, ili sveti Franjo Asiski koji se u trinaestom stoljecu, na pocetku ranog, trgovackog kapitalizma odlucio na zivot medju siromasnima. Cinjenica da Negri i Hardt preskacu zidovski trag mesijanskoga bez mesijanizma i nadomjestaju ga krscanskim figurama i slikama kao sto je sekularna svecanost duhova, imanentno hodocasce ili postajanje tijelom mnostva (multitude), zacudjuje tim vise, buduci je u teorijskoj univerzalizaciji zidovskog iskustva u poststrukturalistickom misljenju, na koje se u svojoj distanci prema dijalektici, teleologiji i povijesti filozofije uvijek iznova oslanjaju, rijec o figuri egzodusa. Egzodus je za Negrija i Hardta glavni izrazajni oblik mnostva (multitude): socijalni egzodus iz discipline fordizma i socijalizma, ekonomski egzodus iz pauperiziranih zona svjetskog trzista, antropoloski egzodus iz spolne konstrukcije ljudskoga tijela. O univerzalizaciji egzodusa kao zidovskog iskustva Maurice Blanchot je 1969., pisao:

"Ako je zidovstvo odredjeno za to da ima nekakva smisla za nas, onda se taj smisao nalazi upravo u tome, da nam ono pokazuje kako covjek u svakom trenutku mora biti spreman da se otpravi na put, jer izaci van (ici prema van) predstavlja jedan zahtjev kojeg se ne moze ignorirati ukoliko se zelimo cvrsto drzati mogucnosti postojanja nekog pravednog odnosa. To je zahtjev za rastankom, afirmacija nomadske istine. Svaki puta kada nam zidovski covjek u povijesti dade znak, onda je to znak koji poziva na kretanje." [8]

Premda Negri i Hardt opisuju mnostvo (multitude) sve do bolne granice nomadistickog kica kao ono pokretno, dezertirajuce, ipak su ucinili iz njega jednog krscanskog andjela, andjela koji je u njihovoj viziji dobio tijelo i postao subjekt. Time figura andjela ne izrazava vise virtualnost vremena koje u pogledu katastrofe obecava promjenu, nego virtualnost subjekta. Andjeo je jednoznacno sveden na subjekt proizvodnje. Njegov univerzalni zastupnik na zemlji je postproleterski subaltern, globalizirani siromak koji je napustio tvornicu, izopcenik /Vogelfreie/ [9] imperijalnog kapitalistickog svijeta koji se nasao u prostoru bez prava i zakona.

"Izopcenik je andjeo ili jedan tesko uhvatljivi demon. I ovdje nakon tolikih pokusaja da se od siromasnih naprave proleteri, a od proletera oslobodilacka armija, iznova se u postmoderni, u blistavom svjetlu jednog novog dana, pojavljuje gomila, prosto ime za siromasne. Gomila siromasnih ljudi prozdrala je i probavila gomilu proletera. Zahvaljuci naprosto toj cinjenici siromasni su postali produktivni." [10]

Pozitivacija andjela, ta klasna borba u teoriji andjela, upucuje na temeljni teorijski paradoks u "Empireu". On se sastoji u nacinu na koji se autori u knjizi poduhvacaju zapravo veoma zanimljivog pokusaja da na jednoj sasvim novoj razini spoje marksizam, poststrukturalizam i analizu feministicke ekonomske teorije prema kojoj i takozvane reproduktivne aktivnosti predstavljaju moment drustvene produktivnosti. Negri i Hardt primjenjuju na svim poststrukturalistickim figurama tri temeljne operacije: pozitivaciju, produktivaciju i subjektivaciju - i to s onu stranu njihova razumijevanja pozitivnosti i produktivnosti kao znakova jedne moci koja ne suzbija odnose, nego ih zasniva (Foucault) [11], ili kao obiljezje produktivne zudnje koja izrazava konstituirajucu liniju povijesnoga (Deleuze/Guattari) [12].

Na temeljna pitanja kriticke teorije drustva: sto je konstituirajuce?, kako se nesto dogadja?, kako to da se zbiva povijest?, Negri i Hardt odgovaraju: zato sto se mnostvo /multitude/ bori. To je nasljedje operaizma koji nadkodira njihovu teoriju, stari slogan radnika koji proizvode krizu na koju kapital reagira strategijama modernizacije. Otuda je citava njihova knjiga rascijepljena paradoksom, pokusajem da se u asubjektivno, kontingentno misljenje marksistickog poststrukturalizma, odnosno poststrukturalisticke teorije kapitalizma uvedu ostaci stare koncentracije produktivnih snaga i rad kao i predodzba jedne u gomilu preobrazene i prosirene klase. Pri citanju covjeku se permanentno namece osjecaj da je knjigu potrebno braniti od njezinih autora, posluziti se njome usuprot njezine operaisticke geste i iz nje iznova izbrisati figuru autonomije. Jer, ili je mnostvo /multitude/ singularno, kao sto Negri i Hardt na mnogim mjestima pisu, ili je ono autonomno. Singularno znaci, da se u tom mnostvu materijalizira specificni odnos izmedju stvari i osoba u nekoj drustvenoj situaciji, da se u njemu realizira specificna lancana povezanost izmedju ekonomskog, masinistickog, seksualnog, spolnog i psihickog, povezanost konstituirana kretanjem zudnje u kojem se uspostavlja, institucionalizira i diskurzivira drustvena moc. Potencijal za emancipacijsku promjenu, potencijal koji Negri i Hardt nazivaju proto-komunizmom, akumulira se na nacin tog ulancanog povezivanja, a ne u subjektu. Pristupacnost znanja o nacinu na koji se odvija proizvodnja, samoorganizirano dezertiranje iz dosade jednog standardiziranog zivota, jednako kao i iz isusenih pustinja kapitalistickog svjetskog trzista, zudnja da se iskoci iz tog "ja-drugi" svjetskog poretka kako u makro tako i u mikro smislu, je jedan napredni drustveni odnos koji nema nista zajednicko s autonomijom.

Taj odnos otvoren je za reintegraciju, za funkcionalnu mobilizaciju u jednom kapitalizmu koji se u sebi sve vise ekstremno diferencira i koji eksploatira afekte i osjecaje takodjer kao ljudske resurse, kao produktivnost stila, motivacije, united-colours kulture prezivljavanja. Za Negrija i Hardta medjutim, mnostvo /multitude/ koje se ukazuje u migraciji i nematerijalnom radu je autonomno i time potencijalno moze izbjeci dominaciju. Ono ostaje postedjeno njezinih procedura. Imperijalna moc je samo zbog toga djelotvorna sto nailazi na otpor gomile i "odbijajuci se u tom sudaru biva gurana naprijed i naprijed." [13] To je medjutim operaisticki idealizam koji uznapredovalu subjektivaciju u kapitalizmu zeli ocistiti od moci i koji sanjari o nekoj cistoj, sretnoj, protokomunistickoj subjektivnosti koja se suprotstavlja jednoj njoj izvanjskoj moci koja funkcionira samo negativno i represivno.

Na taj argumentacijski nacin predodzba jedne dijagramaticke ucinkovitosti moci u Foucaulta i Deleuzea usmjerava se u jednom pravcu koji vodi u zabludu. Analiza prema kojoj moc predstavlja jednu dijagramatsku aritmetiku, koja ostaje izvanjska odnosu koji proizvodi, ne znaci da ta moc pred razlicitim oblicima drustvene prakse subjekata, a niti pred njihovom emancipatorskom praksom, ostaje stajati kao pred zatvorenim vratima. Umjesto toga, u toj je analizi rijec o tome da se opise razlika izmedju moci na jednoj i znanja/institucije na drugoj strani. Dijagram moci zasniva vezu izmedju onoga sto je po sebi nepovezano. On povezuje razlicite razvojne linije znanja (medicina, psihologija, kazneno pravo, pedagogikja, itd.) i institucije (klinike, psihijatrije, zatvora, skole, itd.) Moc je ona najapstraktnija linija koja obje druge povezuje u jedan dispozitiv. To je ono sto govore teze koje Negri i Hardt tematiziraju u "Empireu", kao na primjer: moc je jedan cisti strategem koji ostaji izvanjski dispozitivima. Sam dispozitiv medjutim prozima subjektivaciju i sve drustvene forme izrazavanja i konstituira subjekt kao ucinak moci. [14]

Jedna teorija je onoliko dobra koliko je dobro to sto covjek moze uciniti s njom. A s teorijom Empirea moze se veoma mnogo toga uciniti kada joj se oduzmu krscanski impetus, veseli i vedri operaizam, prebacivanje emancipacijske zadace na autonomnu subjektivnost. Tako je koncept mnostva nasuprot primjerice neolenjinizma Slavoja zizeka obiljezen politickom voljom da nikada vise ne padne natrag ispod kritike avangarde, kadra, zastupstva i reprezentacije. S "Empireom" stupamo osim toga u jedan analiticki univerzum koji teoretizira daljnji razvoj kapitalistickog podrustvljenja s onu stranu ekonomizma na jednoj internacionalnoj razini. Taj razvoj je odredjen prosirenjem regulacije posredstvom biomoci, realnom subsumcijom drustava pod kapital-odnos i prijelazom od drustva discipline k drustvu kontrole. S pojmom biomoci [15] pokusava se znanost zivota opisati kao strategija vladanja. Od sedamnaestog stoljeca moc se obraca na dvije razine upravljanja zivotom, na razini tijela stanovnistva (demografije, urbanizma, racunica o odnosu resursa i stanovnistva, tabeliranju bogatstava, itd.) i na razini individualnog tijela koje se u ustanovama humanizma (klinika, skola, vojska, itd.) mobilizira i normira. Taj je razvoj otpocetka koegzistirao s nastankom kapitalizma. U procesu realne subsumcije [16] koji je anticipirao Marx radi se o tomu da kretanje kapitala prodire kroz tijela, afekte, socijalnost drustava i citav teritorij svijeta. Jos je Marx naglasavao tu univerzalizirajucu potenciju oslobodjene proizvodnje roba koja lomi predrasude, probija nacionalne granice i in infinitum siri proizvodne snage i potrebe. Teorija Empirea pokusava opisati internacionalnu formaciju kapitala koja ne poznaje vise nikakvu nekapitalisticku izvanjskost u koju bi mogla isprva kolonijalno, a zatim imperijalisticki ekspandirati. S dosezanjem vanjskih granica fleksibiliziraju se unutarnje granice. Pod dvostrukom navalom revolta i ekonomiziranja pucaju zidovi velikih sistema zatvaranja ljudi od tvornice do obitelji. Drustvo kontrole [17] znaci da se disciplina skole odnosno obiteljskog zivota uputila van u svijet i da subjekti postaju djaci izvan skole, radnice i radnici izvan tvornica i zatvorenici izvan zatvora.

Negri i Hardt dodjeljuju mnostvu u "Empireu" sposobnost da produktivno odgovori na sve te transformacije jer su one u njihovim ocima stvorene borbom subjekata protiv institucija i protiv izrabljivanja - u tom smislu da su pobune protiv tvornicke discipline dovele do rasprostiranja tvornice na citavo polje socijalnoga i na medjunarodni teritorij. Neutemeljene ambicije takozvanog liberalizma postaju kod njih snaga subjektivnosti koja je prisvojila znanje proizvodnje, organiziranja socijalnog, kooperacije zivota i osjecaja.

Time su problem, katastrofu, da drustveno bice tetura od modernizacije do modernizacije mogli utvrditi samo deskriptivno, ali nisu bili u stanju objasniti taj fenomen. Oni ga jednostavno dodaju svom operaistickim optimizmu. Rijec je o dodavanju onoga sto je evidentno. Taj njihov potez teorijskog preskakanja ima svoj izvor u podjeli svijeta na negativnu imperijalnu vladu s jedne i pozitivnu gomilu s druge strane. Njhova mesijanska analiza moguce buducnosti imaterijalnog rada i autonomne migracije odvec lako preskace preko politickog odnosa postfordistickih subjekata koji glasaju za Schilla, FPÖ [18] ili Forzu Italia. Ona premalo uzimlje u obzir dinamiku transformacije s kojom je fordizam u nekadasnjim koloniziranim drzavama dospio u krizu prije nego se je uopce uspio etablirati. Kao da je dovoljno imenovati vlast Empirea, da bi se odmah potom vratili patosu komunisticke gomile. Dok se projekti zakasnjele industrijalizacije, substitucije uvoza, razvoja fordizma pod diktaturom nacionalnih drzava - projekti koje su slijedile drzave realnog socijalizma - integriraju u kapitalisticki Empire, na sjeveru i na jugu, u ogromnim ekonomijama bijede u kucnome radu i u masovnom siromastvu samostalnog poduzetnistva tek rijetko ugleda dan neko protokomunisticko mnostvo (multitude) koje je na produktivan nacin prisvojilo sredstva za rad i znanje kooperativnosti. Time se pokazuje materijalna baza na osnovi koje neoliberalno samostalno poduzetnistvo siromasnih i bogatih moze uci u vezu s rasistickim, politicko religioznim i etnickim ideologijama. To je ono sto se u Empireu ne misli: ne-mnostvo.

Žižek: O materijalizmu i teologiji



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I KNJIGE UBIJAJU, ZAR NE?

DREAM NOIR



Htio sam vam se javiti noćas oko 1.30, u kasan sat, ćuk il' netopir, ali sam odustao, misleći da možda već spite, a onda opet, nisam htio da izjutra pomislite da ste sve to možda samo sanjali.
Idemo in medias res...
Knjige ubijaju. To je klasičan postmoderni topos: oksimoronski topos u smislu postmoderne koja je, kao već-uvijek-dogođena, klasična: hoću reći, bilo je toga i prije, i u vrijeme kad Aleksandar predbacuje Aristotelu da profanira filozofiju zapisujući je, a Klement Aleksandrijski savjetuje:"Najrazborijtije je ne pisati, nego učiti i proučavati živom riječju, jer napisano ostaje" (Stromatesis) - "Sve napisati u knjigu znači staviti mač u ruke djetetu", poentira Klement, tjerajući vodu na moj mlin. Znanje je moć, reklo bi prosvjetiteljstvo dva milenija kasnije, unatoč slutnji da će moderni cinizam tu moć vrlo brzo pervertirati: moć je znanje, ali, to više nije naša neposredna tema, barem prividno nije. Knjige dakle ubijaju, kako u predgovoru Milorada Pavića, tako i po biblioteci Umberta Eca; Pavić će još dodati: "Za druge ne znam, mene su moje knjige zaista ubile!"
Bilo je toga i prije, te svijesti o tome da knjige ubijaju, ali nije bilo svijesti o toj svijesti, rekao bi samosvjestan duh današnjice.
Knjige ubijaju, nema sumnje ni zbora: recimo "Kapital" ili "Komunistički manifest": u ime toga Slova i u tom Duhu pobijeni su milijuni ljudi, baš kao i u Ime "Moje borbe"; sve me je i strah spomenuti Knjigu koja je knjige, ili onu koja nije čak niti to, nego je i više od knjige: jedan od božjih atributa, k tome časni!
Knjige svakako ubijaju!
Marx je, kako primjećuje Žarko Puhovski, silno patio jer je znao da je njegova 11. teza neispunjen, i možda neostvariv desiderat: cijeli Marxov teoretski opus ima jednu jedinu ambiciju koja je podbacila, i zato je (moguće i zato) revolucija izostala - jer Marxov je tekst samo još jedan od i među tekstvima, iako je imao silnu i revolucionarnu ambiciju da bude pretekst revolucije, onu ezoteričnu i bitnu i osobnu Karlovu ambiciju dakle, da bude tekst koji izlazi iz teksta: da izađe u kontekst! Trebalo je ne samo protumačiti, nego revolucionarizirati stvarnost, uostalom i tako da Duh uskrsne iz Slova, da se oslobodi iz Knjige kao iz boce (Goethe Hegelu; Hajam, Jerofejev...) ili da - i tu dolazimo u srce tame! - bude prizvan (mantičkim) činom čitanja Knjige kao magijskog teksta zaziva!
Bojao sam se to kazati, ali i Borges tvrdi da knjige ubijaju, a onda je tome zaista tako: moja je dakle ideja, s kojom se kolege kao što vidite konzilijarno bespogovorno slažu, da se napiše Knjiga koju bi se čitalo sa strahom da se u aktu čitanja ne oslobode Sile, moguće neki Strašni Duh, koje bi se mogle okrenuti i protiv Čitatelja.
Jasno, nismo mi blesavi, znamo mi da je čitanje zapravo rekreacija teksta, čin suptiliniji i smireniji od pisanja, koje je - upravo zato nismo blesavi, kažem, jer to vrlo dobro kao postmoderni znamo - uvijek unaprijed uračunalo ta svoja palimpsestična čitanja/pre-pisivanja: ovdje to znači da je i Pisar (ha, da anticipiram: rezignirana, melankolična spodoba koja je tek jedan od (Infer)notara Duha, zapisničara njegova diktanda koji je Povijest Književnosti), morao za Djelo/Knjigu platiti glavom. Glava, to je valjda ono glavno, ono bitno nas samih kao bića, pa bi to mogla biti duša, naša srž, kad bi je imali i ako je imamo. Možda je ovo pad iz postmodernog u moderno ili čak predmoderno stanje, a možda je povratak srednovijekovnoj kulturi i njenim temama postmoderan motiv kat egzohen, vrag će ga znati, isti onaj Vrag koji nam upravo faustovski kuca na vrata: jedini bi spas mogao biti da smo, s Hegelom, nekako u pravu glede onakovrsno koncipirane slobode, slobode od sebe sama, kao gubitka svoje vlastitosti, navlastite biti: ljubavi, što je ipak teško ne samo za vjerovati, nego i za preživjeti!

Eto, to je moja ovonoćna ideja, možda mora, moja nokturalna hereza (nokturalna, kao bića mraka, hereza, jer je iskrena): Knjiga koju u tom mom NACRTU ROMANA autor piše, Knjiga je koja inducira pojavu nekakvoga Duha! To je moguće sada svakako shvatiti, u rasponu od revolucije pa da zazivanja duha (možda Karla Marxa), ako i Gajo i Cipra nisu i jedan i drugi u pravu i u krivu, pa filozofija (ni)je i jedno i drugo: i jakobinski klub, ali i spiritistička seansa. Da ne otežavam situaciju koja, vidimo, ionako nije nimalo laka: treba napisati tekst koji ima s jedne strane ambiciju izaći u kontekst (svjesno želi biti predmet kulta, revolucionarni manifest, knjiga gatalica itd.: burevjesnik!), dok s druge, jasno, ima i nužnu, uljuđenu i distingviranu svijest o uzaludnosti svoje ambicije - tu svijest najbolje demonstrira samim činom ispisivanja (teksta), jer, baš zato jer ništa drugo nije moguće i jer se stvari ne daju i neće promijeniti, nužno je - ili je barem još jedino moguće - cijelu tu Stvar - zapisati! Pisanje, kao jedini preostali čin civiliziranoga čovjeka! Kao da je Faraon, nakon što mu je Bog napravio sve što je Starozavjetnom dobrom i dragom Bogu bilo na rapsolaganju u svoj njegovoj zluradoj sesildemilovskoj maštovitosti, rezigniran, s pomišlju: "Ha, a kaj sam više mogel napravit', ta, napravil sam sve kaj je bilo u mojoj ljudskoj, pače faraonskoj moći!", moći faraona kao kulturnoga čovjeka sukobljena s jednim vrlo neotesanim i nekulturnim, seljačkim Bogom, kao da takav Faraon, kažem, post festum, kad su svi događajima o kojima će u toj njegovoj ispovijedi biti riječi već odavno prošlost, pa čak možda i ono prošlo (na kraju povijesti, da budemo otvoreni!), taj i takav faraon usred svoje hardboiled i vrlo noir ispovijedi počinje pisati o tome kaj se je to zapravo dogodilo, da za cijelu jednu povijest ostane zapisano - možda da s tim zapisom ta povijest i započne! - kojeg je Boga od njega, kao Vladara ljudi jedne stare, rafinirane i možda već dekadentne civilizacije, taj Bog osobno i osobito htio!

Eto, to bi ja štel!
I mislim da bum to i napravil.
Je li to bogohulno?

I have a dream

SANJARICA



Virtuela je usnula sljedeći san:

I Spy With My Little Eye

POŽELEĆE DRUMOVI MILANA



Ozna sve dozna. Budući da sam ja ipak završio i trinaestu, Old School, ekskluzivno najvaljujem Sumrak bogova: kreće kampanja i kreće na Bandića.
Ovo je moja najdraža slika gradonačelnika Zagreba Milana Bandića: to je on, odlučan, odsutan, očito nezadovoljan onime što vidi! Među ljudima, ali sam, ispred svih gaca po blatu predgrađa, a u 'Kiton' odijelu: Bandić je jedini gradonačelnik u povijesti Grada Zagreba koji Zagreb poznaje bolje od konzilija zagrebačkih taxista!
Zato opominjem: Poželeće drumovi Milana...

Što je više kleveta i laži, hoću reći, Milan nam je miliji i draži.

ZA NINOSLAVA PAVIĆA

"POLET"

Zahvaljujem Peri Kvesiću na ovoj fotografiji.



Zlo je i u nevinom pogledu koji svuda oko sebe vidi zlo., stalno iznova ponavljam i ponavljat ću čuveni Hegelov diktum.
Iz sebičnog razloga salvavi animam meam, htio bih stoga učiniti nešto dvostruko neuobičajeno: htio bih - što se u Hrvatskoj ne pristoji - o nekome kazati nešto dobro, i, pritom, htio bih ja, Car Nemanja, kazati ponešto dobroga o Ninoslavu Paviću.
Nemojmo duljiti s objašnjenjima, jer objašnjenje koje nije traženo dovoljna je optužba: rekao sam svoj motiv: on je sasvim egoističan, jer kakav bih ja to čovjek bio kad ne bih rekao ono što, ako ne kažem ja, o Ninoslavu Paviću u ovoj zemlji nikada nitko neće reći.

Fotografija koju vidite snimljena je koncem sedamdesetih.
Na fotografiji su članovi redakcije tjednika "Polet".
Ja nikada nisam bio član te redakcije - bio sam u "SL-u" - i ništa što ću o Ninoslavu Paviću kazati ne govorim pro domo sua. (Nikada nisam radio ni u jednoj Pavićevoj redakciji ili tvrtki.)
O "Poletu" ne kanim govoriti, govorili su o njemu post, dva niže Kuljiš, Bešker, Bašić, Kvesić...

Ninoslav Pavić, dakle, sjedi iza Slame, drugi slijeva.
U govoru na Velesajmu, u povodu petnaestgodišnjice "Globusa", Pavić je i sam kazao da je sve počelo u "Poletu".
Što je počelo?
Očito, ono što je Nino stvorio do toga govora.
A što je Nino Pavić napravio do te proslave petnaestgodišnjice "Globusa" na Velesajmu?

Prvo, povijest novinstva i novinarstva u Hrvatskoj, pa i na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, dijeli se na doba prije Ninoslava Pavića, na eru Ninoslava Pavića, i ono što će nakon njega uslijediti. Ta je sitna okolnost najviše što čovjek može u svom životu učiniti. Znam da je ovo teško i preteško za priznati, ali, shit happens!

Drugo, do Ninoslava Pavića novinari su živjeli kraće. Nemam pouzdane statističke pokazatelje, ali, znate vi o čemu ja pričam: do Ninoslava Pavića niti jedan hrvatski novinar nije bio vlasnik kuće na Pantovčaku, ni stana na Zrinjevcu. To su iznimke? Jesu li? Trebam li od svih baš ja to kazati?!

Treće, u ovom naraštaju nema niti jednog novinara kojemu Ninoslav Pavić, ako bi ga se zapitalo, nije osobno pomogao. Možda bi se prije ili kasnije s tim istim čovjekom na smrt zavadio - ali, govorim o tom jednom, često presudnom životnom trenutku. I znam što govorim: kad treba, Pavić pomogne.

Četvrto, Ninoslav Pavić, suprotno svim tvrdnjama, vrlo je lojalan čovjek: ne govorim samo o idejama ili idealima, govorim prije o ljudima. Zapravo, ne znam nikoga u Hrvatskoj tko poput Pavića toliko godina dijeli sudbinu s toliko bliskih osoba. Tu i tamo netko otpadne, Bože moj, ali pogledajmo koliko ih je ostalo!

Peto, Ninoslav Pavić (na gornjoj slici drugi slijeva, iza Davora Slamniga) najmoćniji je čovjek Hrvatske. Je li to po sebi dobro? Ne znam, ali on to jest. Moćniji i od predsjednika i od premijera. To je naprosto činjenica. Treba pogledati fotografiju, pa onda toj činjenici u oči, i kazati: Ninoslave Paviću, chapeau!
Ovo zadnje vas ne fascinira? Ne? Bit će da ste budala.


Dobro, dakle u čemu je štos?
Recimo da mi vjerujete, da je sve to istina, ali što sad sljedi, u čemu je štos?
Ni u čemu.
Nema ali...
Ne u ovom postu.
Ima ih prije, bit će ih sigurno poslije, ali u ovom postu nema ničeg zlog: nema predumišljaja, nema laži, nema ali...
Naprosto gledam tu fotografiju i mislim - ja koji sam o Paviću toliko toga kazao da imam na to sva prava ovoga svijeta - da ako ja to ne učinim, nitko to Paviću u ovoj zemlji nikada neće priznati.
Ali zašto bi to netko bilo kome u ovoj zemlji morao priznati?

Zato jer iz ove zemlje može bilo tko otići ili se u nju vratiti a da se to ne primjeti: ovdje se nitko i ništa ne poštuje!
Zato je ova zemlja mala, nesretna zemlja.
Zato treba naučiti lekciju moje razrednice iz VII. gimnazije, dobre i pametne Gordane Valand:
Mi se ne moramo voljeti, ali se moramo poštovati.

U ovoj zavađenoj zemlji, tu bi životnu lekciju mogao ovako preformulirati:

Naučite poštavati svoje protivnike; inače, niste ih dostojni.

Jasno, vrijedi to i za Ninoslava Pavića.

TURBOEKSTRA! SUPERSENZACIONALNO! EKSKLUZIVNOSKROZ!

DR. KURO BAJRAKTARE SAMO NA VASELJENI:



Štovani gospodine Nemanja,

Svojedobno sam u okviru mojih tipoloških istraživanja iz Opće kurologije bio opisao i nalaz tipa Dissidens Vulgaris (duplex). Kako se taj kurološki tip opet učestalije javlja, najčešće kao Cmičak na Pavićevom oku, učinilo mi se prikladnim da na njega i Vama skrenem pažnju...Nalaz je prilično patobloški. Zanima me Vaše cijenjeno mišljenje, možda i mišljenje literarne sekcije odbukcijskog odjela na kurologiji.
Ostajem Vaš,

Dr. Kuro

VESOVIĆ, KULJIŠ, BEŠKER, BAŠIĆ, BABL, BUDALAJ LAMA

POLET: GOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOL!
VESOVIĆEV GOLI ŠAROVIĆ I ISTINA O ZABRANI - 27 GODINA DOCNIJE


"Stoga se opustite i postupajte onako kako nam je davno savjetovao Čedo Prodanović, advokat Čermaka i Petrača, dok je još bio skromni zamjenik okružnog javnog tužioca u komunističkom režimu, pa zabranio “Polet” jer je na naslovnoj stranici objavio fotografiju golog golmana Dinama Milana Šarovića. Kad smo mu pokušali objasniti: 'Znate, mi smo mislili...”, rekao nam je: “Ali sjetite se što kaže Bruce Lee – don’t think, feeeel...' ."

Denis Kuljiš

tao of jeet kune do

DENIS KULJIŠ tj. ČEDO PRODANOVIĆ tj. BRUCE LEE



- Hvala Nesho, sjajna i vrlo primjenljiva kosarica isprepletenih misli, kuda ide Hrvatska? Sjetio si me jednog romana koji sam bila citala kao apsolventica davno, ime mu necu navesti, bilo je kazaliste..samo za ludjake..tamo bi se i sada bilo dobro skloniti., dometnu Cveba.

- ... na televiziji, gdje upravo smjenjuju čelništvo Informativnog, ne mogu zadržati koncentraciju na bilo što osim na balans između HDZ-a i SDP-a, jer ne znaju kome će od njih sutra polagati račune.
Da im olakšam - ma što uradili, dragi kolege, bit ćete krivi! Stoga se opustite i postupajte onako kako nam je davno savjetovao Čedo Prodanović, advokat Čermaka i Petrača, dok je još bio skromni zamjenik okružnog javnog tužioca u komunističkom režimu, pa zabranio “Polet” jer je na naslovnoj stranici objavio fotografiju golog golmana Dinama Milana Šarovića. Kad smo mu pokušali objasniti: “Znate, mi smo mislili...”, rekao nam je: “Ali sjetite se što kaže Bruce Lee – don’t think, feeeel...” Prema tome, dragi kolege, uzmite Puls i njihovo istraživanje, uzmite d’Honta i – don’t think much, feeeel!, odgovori Kuljiš.

Michael Kohlhaas

Presonenkonstellation

Kazalište samo za luđake? Tako nešto bilo je u Stepskom vuku. Nego taj Kohlhaas mi je bio jedno od onih iskustava kad poželiš zadaviti autora i pritom ga našopati blatom ( jer je djelo živi užas.)

Baka 19.09.2007. 20:22

Bako, Bako, stvar je malo složenija, pa evo kako stoje stvari:

HIS DARK MATERIALS

…Into this wilde Abyss,
The Womb of nature and perhaps her Grave,
Of neither Sea, nor Shore, nor Air, nor Fire,
But all these in thir pregnant causes mix't
Confus'dly, and which thus must ever fight,
Unless th' Almighty Maker them ordain
His dark materials to create more Worlds,
Into this wilde Abyss the warie fiend
Stood on the brink of Hell and look'd a while,
Pondering his Voyage...

On The Marionette Theatre

by Heinrich von Kleist



Translated by Idris Parry

One evening in the winter of 1801 I met an old friend in a public park. He had recently been appointed principal dancer at the local theatre and was enjoying immense popularity with the audiences. I told him I had been surprised to see him more than once at the marionette theatre which had been put up in the market-place to entertain the public with dramatic burlesques interspersed with song and dance. He assured me that the mute gestures of these puppets gave him much satisfaction and told me bluntly that any dancer who wished to perfect his art could learn a lot from them.
From the way he said this I could see it wasn't something which had just come into his mind, so I sat down to question him more closely about his reasons for this remarkable assertion.
He asked me if I hadn't in fact found some of the dance movements of the puppets (and particularly of the smaller ones) very graceful. This I couldn't deny. A group of four peasants dancing the rondo in quick time couldn't have been painted more delicately by Teniers.
I inquired about the mechanism of these figures. I wanted to know how it is possible, without having a maze of strings attached to one's fingers, to move the separate limbs and extremities in the rhythm of the dance. His answer was that I must not imagine each limb as being individually positioned and moved by the operator in the various phases of the dance. Each movement, he told me, has its centre of gravity; it is enough to control this within the puppet. The limbs, which are only pendulums, then follow mechanically of their own accord, without further help. He added that this movement is very simple. When the centre of gravity is moved in a straight line, the limbs describe curves. Often shaken in a purely haphazard way, the puppet falls into a kind of rhythmic movement which resembles dance.
This observation seemed to me to throw some light at last on the enjoyment he said he got from the marionette theatre, but I was far from guessing the inferences he would draw from it later.
I asked him if he thought the operator who controls these puppets should himself be a dancer or at least have some idea of beauty in the dance. He replied that if a job is technically easy it doesn't follow that it can be done entirely without sensitivity. The line the centre of gravity has to follow is indeed very simple, and in most cases, he believed, straight. When it is curved, the law of its curvature seems to be at the least of the first and at the most of the second order. Even in the latter case the line is only elliptical, a form of movement natural to the human body because of the joints, so this hardly demands any great skill from the operator. But, seen from another point of view, this line could be something very mysterious. It is nothing other than the path taken by the soul of the dancer. He doubted if this could be found unless the operator can transpose himself into the centre of gravity of the marionette. In other words, the operator dances.
I said the operator's part in the business had been represented to me as something which can be done entirely without feeling - rather like turning the handle of a barrel-organ.
"Not at all", he said. "In fact, there's a subtle relationship between the movements of his fingers and the movements of the puppets attached to them, something like the relationship between numbers and their logarithms or between asymptote and hyperbola." Yet he did believe this last trace of human volition could be removed from the marionettes and their dance transferred entirely to the realm of mechanical forces, even produced, as I had suggested, by turning a handle.
I told him I was astonished at the attention he was paying to this vulgar species of an art form. It wasn't just that he thought it capable of loftier development; he seemed to be working to this end himself.
He smiled. He said he was confident that, if he could get a craftsman to construct a marionette to the specifications he had in mind, he could perform a dance with it which neither he nor any other skilled dancer of his time, not even Madame Vestris herself, could equal.
"Have you heard", he asked, as I looked down in silence, "of those artificial legs made by English craftsmen for people who have been unfortunate enough to lose their own limbs?"
I said I hadn't. I had never seen anything of this kind.
"I'm sorry to hear that", he said, "because when I tell you these people dance with them, I'm almost afraid you won't believe me. What am I saying... dance? The range of their movements is in fact limited, but those they can perform they execute with a certainty and ease and grace which must astound the thoughtful observer."
I said with a laugh that of course he had now found his man. The craftsman who could make such remarkable limbs could surely build a complete marionette for him, to his specifications.
"And what", I asked, as he was looking down in some perplexity, "are the requirements you think of presenting to the ingenuity of this man?"
"Nothing that isn't to be found in these puppets we see here," he replied: "proportion, flexibility, lightness .... but all to a higher degree. And especially a more natural arrangement of the centres of gravity."
"And what is the advantage your puppets would have over living dancers?"
"The advantage? First of all a negative one, my friend: it would never be guilty of affectation. For affectation is seen, as you know, when the soul, or moving force, appears at some point other than the centre of gravity of the movement. Because the operator controls with his wire or thread only this centre, the attached limbs are just what they should be.… lifeless, pure pendulums, governed only by the law of gravity. This is an excellent quality. You'll look for it in vain in most of our dancers."
"Just look at that girl who dances Daphne", he went on. "Pursued by Apollo, she turns to look at him. At this moment her soul appears to be in the small of her back. As she bends, she look as if she's going to break, like a naiad after the school of Bernini. Or take that young fellow who dances Paris when he's standing among the three goddesses and offering the apple to Venus. His soul is in fact located (and it's a frightful thing to see) in his elbow."
" Misconceptions like this are unavoidable," he said, " now that we've eaten of the tree of knowledge. But Paradise is locked and bolted, and the cherubim stands behind us. We have to go on and make the journey round the world to see if it is perhaps open somewhere at the back."
This made me laugh. Certainly, I thought, the human spirit can't be in error when it is non-existent. I could see that he had more to say, so I begged him to go on.
"In addition", he said, "these puppets have the advantage of being for all practical purposes weightless. They are not afflicted with the inertia of matter, the property most resistant to dance. The force which raises them into the air is greater than the one which draws them to the ground. What would our good Miss G. give to be sixty pounds lighter or to have a weight of this size as a counterbalance when she is performing her entrechats and pirouettes? Puppets need the ground only to glance against lightly, like elves, and through this momentary check to renew the swing of their limbs. We humans must have it to rest on, to recover from the effort of the dance. This moment of rest is clearly no part of the dance. The best we can do is make it as inconspicuous as possible..."
My reply was that, no matter how cleverly he might present his paradoxes, he would never make me believe a mechanical puppet can be more graceful than a living human body. He countered this by saying that, where grace is concerned, it is impossible for man to come anywhere near a puppet. Only a god can equal inanimate matter in this respect. This is the point where the two ends of the circular world meet.
I was absolutely astonished. I didn't know what to say to such extraordinary assertions.
It seemed, he said, as he took a pinch of snuff, that I hadn't read the third chapter of the book of Genesis with sufficient attention. If a man wasn't familiar with that initial period of all human development, it would be difficult to have a fruitful discussion with him about later developments and even more difficult to talk about the ultimate situation.
I told him I was well aware how consciousness can disturb natural grace. A young acquaintance of mine had as it were lost his innocence before my very eyes, and all because of a chance remark. He had never found his way back to that Paradise of innocence, in spite of all conceivable efforts. "But what inferences", I added, "can you draw from that?"
He asked me what incident I had in mind.
"About three years ago", I said, "I was at the baths with a young man who was then remarkably graceful. He was about fifteen, and only faintly could one see the first traces of vanity, a product of the favours shown him by women. It happened that we had recently seen in Paris the figure of the boy pulling a thorn out of his foot. The cast of the statue is well known; you see it in most German collections. My friend looked into a tall mirror just as he was lifting his foot to a stool to dry it, and he was reminded of the statue. He smiled and told me of his discovery. As a matter of fact, I'd noticed it too, at the same moment, but... I don't know if it was to test the quality of his apparent grace or to provide a salutary counter to his vanity... I laughed and said he must be imagining things. He blushed. He lifted his foot a second time, to show me, but the effort was a failure, as anybody could have foreseen. He tried it again a third time, a fourth time, he must have lifted his foot ten times, but it was in vain. He was quite unable to reproduce the same movement. What am I saying? The movements he made were so comical that I was hard put to it not to laugh.
From that day, from that very moment, an extraordinary change came over this boy. He began to spend whole days before the mirror. His attractions slipped away from him, one after the other. An invisible and incomprehensible power seemed to settle like a steel net over the free play of his gestures. A year later nothing remained of the lovely grace which had given pleasure to all who looked at him. I can tell you of a man, still alive, who was a witness to this strange and unfortunate event. He can confirm it, word for word, just as I've described it."
"In this connection", said my friend warmly, "I must tell you another story. You'll easily see how it fits in here. When I was on my way to Russia, I spent some time on the estate of a Baltic nobleman whose sons had a passion for fencing. The elder, in particular, who had just come down from the university, thought he was a bit of an expert. One morning, when I was in his room, he offered me a rapier. I accepted his challenge but, as it turned out, I had the better of him. It made him angry, and this increased his confusion. Nearly every thrust I made found its mark. At last his rapier flew into the corner of the room. As he picked it up he said, half in anger and half in jest, that he had met his master but that there is a master for everyone and everything - and now he proposed to lead me to mine. The brothers laughed loudly at this and shouted: "Come on, down to the shed!" They took me by the hand and led me outside to make the acquaintance of a bear which their father was rearing on the farm.
"I was astounded to see the bear standing upright on his hind legs, his back against the post to which he was chained, his right paw raised ready for battle. He looked me straight in the eye. This was his fighting posture. I wasn't sure if I was dreaming, seeing such an opponent. They urged me to attack. "See if you can hit him!" they shouted. As I had now recovered somewhat from my astonishment I fell on him with my rapier. The bear made a slight movement with his paw and parried my thrust. I feinted, to deceive him. The bear did not move. I attacked again, this time with all the skill I could muster. I know I would certainly have thrust my way through to a human breast, but the bear made a slight movement with his paw and parried my thrust. By now I was almost in the same state as the elder brother had been: the bear's utter seriousness robbed me of my composure. Thrusts and feints followed thick and fast, the sweat poured off me, but in vain. It wasn't merely that he parried my thrusts like the finest fencer in the world; when I feinted to deceive him he made no move at all. No human fencer could equal his perception in this respect. He stood upright, his paw raised ready for battle, his eye fixed on mine as if he could read my soul there, and when my thrusts were not meant seriously he did not move. Do you believe this story?"
"Absolutely", I said with joyful approval. "I'd believe it from a stranger, it's so probable. Why shouldn't I believe it from you?"
"Now, my excellent friend," said my companion, "you are in possession of all you need to follow my argument. We see that in the organic world, as thought grows dimmer and weaker, grace emerges more brilliantly and decisively. But just as a section drawn through two lines suddenly reappears on the other side after passing through infinity, or as the image in a concave mirror turns up again right in front of us after dwindling into the distance, so grace itself returns when knowledge has as it were gone through an infinity. Grace appears most purely in that human form which either has no consciousness or an infinite consciousness. That is, in the puppet or in the god."
"Does that mean", I said in some bewilderment, "that we must eat again of the tree of knowledge in order to return to the state of innocence?"
"Of course", he said, "but that's the final chapter in the history of the world."
________________________________________

Heinrich von Kleist (1777-1811) followed family tradition and became an army officer, but left in 1799 to study philosophy and maths. He seems to have been inwardly overwhelmed on discovering Kant's dictum of the ultimate unknowability of truth. Kleist's work was dominated by the tension between his inner certainty of the validity of the human soul life and the apparent impossibility of discovering meaning in outer existence. He Wrote several plays - mainly tragedies - and numerous short stories, including "The Dark Tale of Michael Kohlhaas".
Idris Parry began his introductory essay to the "Marionette Theatre" (from his collection "Hand to Mouth") as follows:
"Heinrich von Kleist wrote his essay 'On the Marionette Theatre' in 1810. The calm statement of this work suggests a man firmly in control. A year later Kleist shot himself. He was thirty-four. On the centenary of his death, the critics agreed he was a hundred years ahead of his time. In 1977 they said he'd come into the world (on 18 October 1777) two hundred years too early....
I think therefore I am. The theme of Kleist's essay could be a continuation of that famous sentence, a continuation which might go like this: I think, therefore I am aware of myself, and if I am aware of myself I must know that I am a separate entity, aware of and therefore apart from my surroundings; but true knowledge must be complete, connected, indivisible; so separation into subject and object, self and surroundings means distance from knowledge, consequently uncertainty and doubt.
Kleist's essay pivots around a reference to the third chapter of the book of Genesis, the story of the Fall of Man, the discovery of that self-consciousness which establishes and perpetuates human isolation. But 'discover' implies a historical event. Kleist shares with Kafka (who once claimed he understood the Fall of Man better than anyone else) the insight that it is only our concept of time which makes us think of the Fall of Man as a historical event in the distant past. It is happening all the time. The biblical story is a mythical representation of constant human awareness of self and therefore of separation...
According to Kleist there is no way back. Humans are now thinking animals, and the material of thought is knowledge. But knowledge, although the source of uncertainty when fragmentary.. is also the vital substance of harmony when complete. So Kleist asserts that our only hope is to go forward to total knowledge."

Hommage a Rétif de la Bretonne

La Douleur Exquise!


Manolo Blahnik Renaissance Project David Dooley

Mani me se, Manolo, black you,
no me gusta calzatura ni shopping ni peglanje,
odmrmorio si ti bre svoje,
ja da ti kažem!
I bogati plaču, Manolo, nema od tebe ni g'o kurac, majke mi!
Pa bogati, gledam: Davée, over-the-top evining boot,
in rich lace
193 reissues, one thousand six hundred dollars!
1600$, oca ti mangupskog!?
Oh, the riches of Northern Italy!
Po sobi idu gore dolje
o Blahniku govore!
Mani me se, Manolo,
i ja sam samo žena,
imam i ja right to shoes!

Curunír Lán

Master Of The Dark Art



Quote: "I would engage in some form of syntax destruction which sounded as though I were answering the question, but in fact, had not."
Alan Greenspan, in an interview with 60 Minutes.
Figure of Speech: skotison (SKO-tih-son), the figure of ultimate darkness. From the Greek, meaning "darken it."
Former Federal Reserve Chairman and Treasury Secretary Alan Greenspan's memoir is causing a minor tsunami in Washington. The self-described "libertarian conservative" ranks Clinton's presidency above George W. Bush's and declares that the Iraq war is "largely about oil." But what's really bouncing Beltway eyebrows is the book's language: it's clear and comprehensible! This is the man who said, only half-kidding, "I've been able to string more words into fewer ideas than anybody I know."
Greenspan didn't invent the technique, of course. The ancient historian Livy described a rhetorician who would tell his students, "Darken it!" The Greek version, skotison, makes a fitting figure for academics and bureaucrats who swap obscurity for erudition. (The figure isn't Figaro's idea. He got it straight from Richard Lanham.)
Greenspan's skotisonical mastery wasn't such a bad thing. Speaking clearly could call international markets to tumble; his impenetrable language gave people confidence that this high priest of monetary policy had a personal relationship with Mammon -- solid proof that the rhetorical dark arts can be used for good.
Snappy Answer: To quote the immortal Homer, "No function beer well without."

Ovaj naslov Dark Art nije bez vraga. Pokušao sam zamisliti oprečnu retoričku situaciju, koja se odmah otela kontroli i nadrasla okvire tradicionalnog građanskog govorništva: nasuprot figuri isprazne perifrastičnosti stajala bi riječ koja bi izražavala maksimum smisla ili ideja, svejedno; jasno, odmah mi je na pamet pao: (Z)AUM! Isti čas s druge strane ovog Čarnoznanstva ukazao se i Curunír Lán, Saruman. Kako je retorika najtješnje povezana s magijom, pa to je za popizdit!

Dave McKean, Optimist

Für Dita von Teese

O erotoposu dirkanja

Nikola Visković



Odlomak iz rukopisa Toposi erotike s događanjem iz ljeta 1969. između splitskog brijega Turska kula i Rive


Hector Zazou & Björk, Vísur Vatnsenda Rósu



“Dobro, moj vrijedni učitelju”, reče Rita kad su krenuli s Turske kule prema gradu, “okončajmo s toposima cunnilungusa i fellatija, a sad reci nešto o onom drugom, osamljeničkom milovanju...” “Zašto samo osamljeničkom?”, odgovori doktorant, “radosti i tuge masturbacije, muške i ženske, prednje i stražnje, mogu biti i samotne i društvene, vlastoručne i drugoručne, heteroseksualne i homoseksualne...” “Imaš pravo... Ali, kako to prednje i stražnje?” “Pod masturbacijom se misli na razne načine nadraživanje spolovila, ali tome možemo s pravom dati jedno šire značenje koje obuhvaća i nadraživanje anusa, koje uzrokuje skoro istovrsni užitak. Strasni sodomist markiz de Sade je iz zatvora godinama tražio i dobivao od svoje supruge precizno opisane navlake (étuis) i flašice (flacons) za svoje analne naslade, o čemu je ostavio savjesno ispisanu evidenciju...”

Dvoznačnost snošaja i njegovih produžetaka

“Imat ćemo u vidu to šire značenje”, složi se ona, “ali sada ipak pričaj o onom užem, uobičajenom maženju...” “To je tema za jednu još nenapisanu knjigu. I opet treba reći da tema ima predmet širi od tog tvog uobičajenog maženja, jer ako se ne držimo čisto etimološkog značenja manustupratio, bluda s rukom, već slijedimo funkcionalno značenje nadraživanja spolovila, onda su i cunnilingus i fellatio također radnje masturbacije – masturbacije ustima!” “Još jedno širenje značenja!”, zapazi Rita, zbunjena tolikim erotološkim redefinicijama. “Da, potrebno je naglasiti bitnu srodnost ta dva načina milovanja s manustupratio radi shvaćanja njihova mjesta u topici erotike. Naime, ako je milovanje ili draganje osnovna čestica erotike, to jest temeljni čin izazivanja spolnog milja i dragosti, i to u vizualnom, verbalnom ili taktilnom odnosu, onda je način milovanja koji nazivamo masturbacija zapravo surogat ili simulakr snošaja. A snošaj, fututio, jest nesumnjivo jedini spolno-biološki cilj, ali ujedno tek najprimitivniji od više ciljeva erotike. Erotika računa sa snošajem, i štoviše upravo ona izmišlja njegove masturbativne simulakre radi produžavanja snošaja preko njegovih bioloških ograničenja, no njoj je važno i nadvladavanje snošajnog užitka radi dostizanja nekih novih naslada mimo seksualno-prokreativnih potreba.” “I ona to postiže”, potvrdi Rita, “biološki nepotrebnim i nemogućim sredstvima fantazije i milovanja pogledima, riječima, poljupc?ma i dodirima!” “Tako je! Zato je važno shvatiti dvoznačnost snošaja i njegovih produžetaka u erotici: njihovu golemu ulogu u erotskom uživanju, pa i ulogu krajnjeg pokretača erotske opsjednutosti, ali i njihovo ugrožavanje tog užitka kad se zbog neukosti i lijenosti povlašćuju i suprotstavljaju drugim i trajnijim milovanjima. Zato erotika štedi i kolikogod može odgađa užitak snošaja i njegovih simulakra, a uzgaja polifoniju milovanja.” “Razumijem. Tako dolazimo i do tvoje redefinicije perverzije kao reduk?ije spolnog užitka na jedan način milovanja, primjerice samo na sadističko nasilje, ili na voajerizam, ili na masturbaciju, ili na snošaj...” “Da, i na snošaj, jer ako zadržimo moralistički kompromitirani izraz perverzija u takvom kulturalističkom značenju, onda treba i jebačku monomaniju, lišenu drugih milovanja, smatrati najprimitivnijom i najraširenijom od svih perverzija i nešto skoro strano erotici – jer svodi spolnost na njezino primarno i najprostije sredstvo užitka.”

Potreba za nadzorom spolnog užitka

Stigli su do mostića nad usjekom željezničke pruge, naslonivši se načas na njegovu ogradu, kad je s tog uvodnog razjašnjenja doktorant pristupio traženom toposu. “Masturbacijsko milovanje ima dvije glavne funkcije: prvo, ono je surogat snošaja kad izaziva biološko rasterećenje žudnje u nedostatku spolnog partnera, i drugo, ono je simulakr snošaja kad izaziva erotsko uživanje s jednim od najžešćih spolnih draženja. Prvo se događa mladima u pubertetu i odraslima koji ne mogu doći do koitusa – samcima, pastirima, vojnicima, bolesnicima, starijima, za S tvorenicima poput Sadea... O dječačkim uživanjima i strahovanjima od dirkanja piše realistično Sir Henry Spencer Ashbee u My secret life, uključujući i onaj sweepstake od pet mladića:

Pet šaka je drkalo što se brže moglo, kurčeve glave od sjajnog crvenila naduvavale su se kao da će prasnuti. Odjednom netko povikne p r v i!,

dok su kapi guste tekućine letjele...

Drugo se događa svakoj osobi, neovisno o tome može li ili ne može tucati, s učestalošću i načinima koji ovise o individualnim naravima, kulturi i prilikama. A jedno i drugo je u civilizaciji, zbog više razloga, uglavnom osuđivano.” “Zašto?” “Prvenstveno zbog potrebe onih koji imaju društvenu moć da nadziru spolni užitak, budući da nekontrolirani užitak lako postaje izvor opasnih sloboda, transgresija tabua i prijetnji uspostavljenim i neupitnim međuspolnim, radnim, porodičnim, vlasničkim i političkim odnosima.” “Postoje li društva gdje masturbacija nije osuđivana?” “Da, neke arhaičke zajednice ne pridaju negativna značenja golotinji, milovanjima i slobodnom snošaju. Još u antičkoj Grčkoj, prenosi Laercije, razbarušeni je Diogen natezao kitu nasred ulice i mudro žalio što ne može istom lakoćom zadovoljiti gladni želudac, a Marcijal je pjevao

Zakuni se, Ligdo, da ćeš doći

u sat i mjesto kad te budem zvao.

Poslije ležanja dugog i čekanja teškog

lijeva ruka dolazi da te zamjeni.

no već tada je masturbacija već bila nedostojan ili smiješan čin. U razvijenijoj civilizaciji postaju sablazan svaka javna golotinja i žešći izrazi spolnih strasti, a uz to se smatra jadnim i smiješnim da čovjek sam sebe spolno zadovoljava zbog toga jer ne može ili ne želi imati spolnog partnera, pa stoga i biološku i erotske funkcije masturbacije i drugih milovanja opterećuju strah, stid i grižnja savjesti. Međutim, važno je znati i to da kad društveni poredak zabranjuje masturbaciju i druge perverzije – analni i oralni seks, homoseksualnost, spolno nasilje i incestuozne odnose, on istovremeno mora, zbog stvarne nemoći da otkrije i kazni te prekršaje, sve to dobrim dijelom ignorirati i tolerirati u nevidljivoj privatnosti muškaraca i žena!” “Pri čemu je, čini se, moralna i pravna represija ženske masturbacije i lezbijskih sklonosti nešto tiša i blaža!” “Istina. U jednome i u drugom žene su slabije terorizirane, sve do toga da moderna pedagogija gotovo ne mari za žensku masturbaciju i da moderna zakonodavstva inkriminiraju samo protuprirodni blud između muškaraca, ali ne između žena! I ne vidim drugog objašnjenja te pojave do niskog socijalnog statusa žene, njezine beznačajnosti u odnosima moći i odgovarajućeg ignoriranja ili podcjenjivanja njezine spolnosti kao nečeg osobito kvarnog, slabog i pasivnog, o čemu se i ne vrijedi društveno brinuti preko granica osiguranja djevičanstva i bračne vjernosti...” “A možda to ignoriranje i podcjenjivanje dolazi i od pogrešnog mišljenja da žene nemaju veće potrebe uživanja i nadraživanja!” “Ne vjerujem. Muški zakonodavci nemaju tako dobro mišljenje o ženi, a i mnogi povijesni dokumenti, vjerski i svjetovni, ističu naprotiv da je slabost žene u njezinoj navodno nerazumnoj senzualnosti i strasnosti.” “Sada mi dolazi na pamet i to”, Rita će, “kako se žene međusobno slobodnije dodiruju, a muškarci međusobno ne idu u tome dalje od rukovanja i tapštanja po ramenu!” “Razumije se, ta je sputanost izraz našeg osobitog društvenog dostojanstva i nedodirljivosti, tako da je svaki međumuški dodir preko toga sumnjiva afektivnost koja dovodi u pitanje virilnost. No iz istog razloga mi možemo bez posljedica tapštati žene po stražnjici i drugdje, a one nama ne to rade, jer bi time tobože dovele u pitanje njihovo žens?vo.” “To će promijeniti androginija i neautoritarnost prema kojima ide čovječanstvo!” “Nadajmo se, draguška, svima nam treba mnogo više dodira i afektivnosti!”

sneaker pimps, six underground



Osuda grešnoga gubitka sjemena

“Ali, idemo dalje”, proslijedi on, dok mu je obla mekoća dojke u hodu uznemirujuće dodirivala nadlakticu, “u zapadnoj civilizaciji spolne represije vrlo rano se ispovijedaju dva osnovna razloga odbijanja masturbacije – moralni i ekonomski razlog zaštite prokreacije i medicinski razlog zaštite zdravlja. Prvi se zacijelo tiče muške masturbacije i sadrži uvjerenje da je sperma toliko dragocjena tvar da je treba štedjeti i izlijevati samo u ženinu utrobu, a da je izlijevanje izvan ove povreda božanskih, društvenih i bračnih ciljeva. Tako već u Postanku stoji da Onan ispušta sjeme na zemlju radi toga da bi izbjegao svojoj leviratskoj obvezi oplodnje bratove udovice, i to uvrijedi Jahvu, pa i njega pogubi; zato je masturbacija nazvana onanija, ali neispravno, jer Onan ne masturbira, nego čini coitus interruptus – ali iz toga bi se po analogiji moglo zaključiti na istu takvu osudu masturbacije. Kršćanstvo, pak, kojemu je masturbacija i poseban problem nevjenčanog svećenstva, muškog i ženskog, osuđuje samomilovanje još i kao izraz grešne pohote, naročito strogo kroz pero Tome Akvinskog, ali se u praksi tokom stoljeća ipak ne okomljuje odviše na tu ljudsku slabost koja tobože prijeti svetoj bračnoj dužnosti prokreacije i duhovnoj čistoći. No, i usred današnje seksualne revolucije vatikanska se Kongregacija za doktrinu i vjeru ponovo nepotrebno upliće u spolne običaje kad krajem 1968. donosi deklaraciju osude grijeha masturbacije, predbračnih odnosa i homoseksualnosti, istina, s dosta negativnim odjekom među vjernicima. A evo kako je još u moderno doba jedna crkvena uputa ispovjednicima, od kubanskog mons. Antonija Marije Clareta i objavljeno u Manuel des Confessions Mauricea Lachętrea iz 1875., opisalo djevojački grijeh dirkanja:

Peccato quae committere sollent puellae in hac materia sunt: 1. Pollutionem faciendes, aspicientes et tangentes seipses...

(Grijesi koje čine djevojke u ovoj materiji su: 1. Prljanje gledanjem i diranjem sebe; 2. Milovanje dlanom gornjeg dijela posude (vas); 3. Dodirivanje prstima klitorisa u posudi; 4) Unošenje prsta u posudu; 5. Unošenje drva ili drugog predmeta sličnog muškom udu u posudu; 6. Oslanjanje spolnih predjela na stol, na zid, ili trljanjem na stolicu, ili na nogu kad se sjedi na podu, ili ukrštanjem bedara s pritiskom, itd.)

Tangendo se turpiter cum una, vel cum aliquibus puellis...

(Dirajući bludno jedna drugu, ili među više djevojaka...)


Osudu grešnog gubitka sjemena iskazuje i Shakespeare u jednom od svojih ranih soneta, kojim poziva mladića da se vjenča i osigura sebi potomstvo:

For having traffic with thyself alone,

Thou of thyself thy sweet self dost deceive.

Then how when nature calls thee to be gone:

What acceptable audit canst thou leave?

Ali time pjesnik nagovještava i ono već izrazito ekonomsko ili utilitarno tumačenje muškog samozadovoljavanja kao nekorisnog i neumjerenog trošenja jednog vrijednog resursa radi nerazumnog osobnog užitka koje će uskoro zavladati u građanskoj ideologiji. Zbog tog utilitarnog razloga se masturbacija sve do naših dana ponekad naziva caresse stérile, kao što se i homoseksualna ljubav naziva amour stérile. Ipak, i buržoazija je sve do 18. stoljeća to rukouživanje samo moralno osuđivala, ne progoneći ga pravno kao što je progonila homofiliju; dobar primjer je ponašanje uglednoga građanina Samuela Pepysa, koji je u 17. stoljeću dnevnički bilježio svoja samomilovanja jednakim mirom kao što će tri stoljeća kasnije činiti filozof Ludwig Wittgenstein u svom vojničkom dnevniku, a Pepysu se savjest uznemirila tek kad se dirkao u crkvi za vrijeme božićne mise promatrajući kraljicu i dvorske dame. Inače, europska književnost sve do renesanse stidno prešućuje to milovanje, napuštajući satiričko ruganje masturbatorima kod Marcijala i Juvenala. Masturbaciju ne spominju ni trubaduri, ni pučkim fabliaux, ni Boccacciove i druge tadašnje škakljive priče. Taj antički erotopos uskrsava tek s nekim djelima renesansne erotike, primjerice s Aretinovim Raggionamenti, gdje se ponovo progovara (nakon davne Lisistrate) i o ženskoj masturbaciji, kao i u pjesmama Hecatelegium od Pacifica Massimija:

Predugo mi kur pičkicu ne vidi,

I predugo mudama ne tucka muško crijevo.

Krut je danju, krut je noću, nikako

Da klone, u svako doba podignute glave.

Zar nema dječaka il djevojke da molitvu čuje?

Nitko da dođe? morat će desnica raditi svoje.



Libertinsko 18. stoljeće

To stanje općeg prešućivanja i izuzetnog imenovanja traje sve do libertinskog 18. stoljeća, kada prvi put u povijesti dolazi do otvorenog i žestokog sukoba neprijatelja i prijatelja užitka drkanja. Tada će književna erotika usvojiti to milovanje kao dragocjeni način usamljeničke i ljubavničke sreće, pa se ono u poemi nepoznatog autora La Masturbomanie iz 1820. čak slavi kao najsamostalniji i najfilozofskiji od svih ljudskih užitaka, ali će istovremeno dotad umjerene osude masturbacije zbog morala i ekonomije prokreacije prerasti u njeno mnogo žešće odbijanje zbog tobože znanstveno-medicinskih razloga.”

Dvoje peripatetika su stigli na Rivu, pod opadajućim kasnoljetnim suncem, i uz more Andrea proslijedi. “Na jednoj, slobodarskoj strani, tu bitku su pobjednički vodili prosvijećeni libertinci. Među prvima, s nekoliko soneta i mnogo humora, Giorgio Baffo, najveći prijapski pjesnik po mišljenju Apollinairea:


Prvo ćemo o užitku

Natezanja dobrog kura:

Kad jebemo Mariettu i Magdalenu

I istog trena svaku drugu pičku.

...

Nema spora da je posao dobar:

Novac ne moraš iskesati

Ni za ženom ludovati.

...

Istina, na taj način ne stvaraš

Ni svece ni doktore Sorbonne,

Ali također meso za stratište sparaš.


Zatim je pjesnik Alexis Piron u svojoj Odi Prijapu pjevao o Diogenesovom užitku:


Vidim tog vrijednog kinika,

Kojeg nitkov neki nazva psom,

Kako svoje koplje drka

U brk građaninu atenskom.


Ipak, u ovoj stvari je najznačajnije d’Argensovo djelo Thérčse philosophe, iz 1748., u kojemu ljubavnici ne samo mirno uživaju u uzajamnom dirkanju nego i razvijaju pravu teorijsku, hedonističku i antinatalitetnu apologiju masturbacije. Grof Boyer d’Argens se družio s Holbachom i Diderotom, za njega Casanova kaže da je čestit i voluptuozan, ljubazan, prijatan, odlučan epikurejac, i Sade ga visoko cijeni, a Pintard ga u Le libertinage érudit svrstava među najistaknutije epikurejce 18. stoljeća. I dok je Sadeova erotika usmjerena sodomitski i mučiteljski, a kod Restifa de la Bretonnea je incestuozna, d’Argensova erotika je izrazito masturbativna, uz zajedničko svojstvo prvoga i trećega da svoje razvratne priče omataju u filozofska i antireligiozna razmatranja.” “Kakva je ta apologija masturbacije gospodina d’Argensa?” “U spomenutom djelu on najprije prikazuje kako u jednom provincijskom mjestu bigotna majka sedmogodišnje Thér_se uspaničeno otkriva da djevojčica u snu miluje svoju macu. Zatim učeni opat T., materijalist i bezbožnik, obrazlaže svojoj ljubavnici, gospođi C., a petnaestogodišnja Thér_se sve to potajno sluša, da je Bog zapravo sveobuhvatna Priroda, da su moral i religija društveno nužni instrumenti moćnika, upravljeni naročito protiv žena, da Priroda ne teži ustezanju nego uživanju, i da je prostitucija potrebna za zdravlje nevjenčanih muškaraca i za javni interes smirenja požude. Međutim, nastavi opat filozof, ženama ne odgovara slobodni snošaj, zbog opasnosti od začeća i od gubitka ugleda, te stoga one trebaju tražiti olakšanje svojih chatouillements excessifs u samomilovanju, ručno ili s pomoću ingeniozne sprave godemichis, no na sve to gospođa C. se pomalo buni zbog diskriminacije žena. Onda se opat T. i gospođa C. upuštaju u takve male obrede uzajamnih ručnih milovanja, za razliku od velikih obreda snošaja, pa će tako i voajerka Thér_se steći naviku da se barem jednom na dan usrećuje svojim petit exercise ordinaire. Potom, kad se Thér_se preselila u Pariz, jedan prosvijećeni plemić se žestoko zaljubio u nju i obećao joj vječnu vjernost i udoban život na svom posjedu, a uz jamstvo da je neće siliti na koitus sve dok se sama za to ne odluči. Nakon savjesnog proračuna koristi, djevojka na to pristane, te se neko vrijeme njih dvoje zabavljaju isključivo igrama ručnog maženja njene mace i njegova mačora. No, pošteni vitez, koji želio i nešto više, dosjetljivo ponudi Thér_si svoju zbirku libertinskih knjiga i slika te je izazove na okladu da blago prijeđe u njezino vlasništvo ako se tokom petnaest dana uspije suzdržati od manuelizma, ili će u protivnom on steći pravo da je potuca. Tada će Thér_se, čitajući Histoire de Dom Bougre i druge uzbudljive romane, a promatrajući lascivne slike, posljednjeg dana uistinu podleći divljoj žudnji i pozvati dragoga da je pokoka, te primiti strijelu koja joj je dotad izgledala tako strašna i sama je staviti u ušću kojemu je prijetila, ali zbog njezina straha od začeća dragi postupi po coitus interruptus – u navlaci njezine ruke dovršavajući svoj put do naslade. I tako su sretni ljubavnici nastavili činiti punih deset godina...” “Zaista strasna obrana jednog nepravedno osuđivanog ili ismijavanog zadovoljstva!”, prosudi Rita.

Kate Havnevik, Kaleidoscope



Pohvale masturbaciji

“Zatim će i Andrea de Nerciat finim riječima opisati”, nastavi erotolog, “kako se Felicija već u svojoj prvoj i bolnoj ljubavnoj noći poigrala sa svojim draganom: Jednom rukom osjetih kako mu srce tuče kao da će iskočiti, a drugom kako mu onaj razjareni dio tijela plamti i trza se... Ruka mi se toliko nježno preda određenim pokretima da je uskoro bila ispunjena..., i time je dragovoljno učinila ono što bi od nje bilo neukusno zahtijevati. A kad je dragi otišao, Feliciju nije napustila obijest, pa ona pribjegne starom iskušanom načinu i zadovoljivši sama svoje želje ponovno zaspe. I još jedan primjer ženskog samomilovanja: u Mémoires d’une demoiselle de bonne famille iz 1877., djelu koje se pripisuje Ernestu Feydeauu, čitamo kako se u samostanskom razredu, za vrijeme zajedničkog učenja, živahna djevojčica Carmen redala pod klupe svojih drugarica dijeleći im užitak prstićima, te se uskoro cijeli razred zdušno predao tom opakom zadovoljstvu.” “Slatke djevojčice Lewisa Carrolla!”

“I Markiz de Sade veliča masturbaciju”, nastavi Andrea, “ali tako što je kao društveni delikt svrstava u ponašanja koja izražavaju prirodni zakon razaranja: masturbator, ubojica, djecoubojica, palikuća, sodomist, to su ljudi po volji prirode i zato oni moraju biti naši uzori... Opsežnu pohvalu masturbacije iznosi istodobno grof Mirabeau u Erotika Biblion, objašnjavajući je kao prirodni užitak koji se odvaja od svog prvotnog cilja, postajući čista radost ili tuga mladih i starih – ovi posljednji uzdržljiviji, ali rijetko čedni. Stvar je započela tako, tvrdi Mirabeau, što se Merkur sažalio nad svojim sinom Panom kad je ovaj noću i danju jurcao po planinama izluđen od jedne škrte ljepojke i podučio mladića kako da se olakša – a što je zatim Pan prenio pastirima.” “Zgodna mitska slika”, zapazi Rita, “ali masturbacija je čin koji je Pan mogao vidjeti i kod životinja, jer se i one u nedostatku spolnog partnera češu o mekane predmete; to sam toliko puta vidjela kod svog pokojnog psića, koji je uživao na jednom jastuku i od čega je ovaj bio poprilično uštirkan...” “Mirabeau još tvrdi da su visokoj grčkoj kulturi neke djevojke usavršile umijeće da ispod stola i nogom daju muškarcima zadovoljstvo koje druge nespretnije izazivaju rukama.” “Baš zgodno! Razlog više da se dami ljube nožni prstići!” “I Apollinaire priča u Jedanaest tisuća batina kako jedna gospođa mazi s obje noge pod stolom vagon-restorana princa Monya. Ali, kako se muška žudnja gasi ili smanjuje s ispaljivanjem, Mirabeau se opravdano zalaže za takvo rukomilovanje falusa kojim se podržava i zadržava, a ne dovršava užitak, zbog čega ga treba izvoditi u beskonačnim istančanim prijelazima, bez žurbe i odgađajući kraj.” “Opet na djelu erotski princip odugovlačenja!” “Razvratni grof pritom shvaća i koliko su važni ne samo sposobnost suzdržanog milovanja, nego i neka svojstva milovanog mjesta – jer, primjerice, mnogo pažljivije rukovanje zahtijeva glavić koji je pokriven prepucijem, pa je zato profinjeno osjetljiv i sklon brzom klimaksu, od glavića koji je obrezan, gol, tvrd i izdržljiviji na duga trenja...” “Zaista? Andreica, baš bi voljela znati....”, ona se nasmiješi tako da se učitelj poboja nekog odviše osobnog pita?ja, no bila je riječ o nečemu manje bezobraznom: “Koliko se to može produžavati?” “To je zahtjevna disciplina! Užitak je toliko tiranski, i u stidnici i u falusu, da je teško s njim upravljati na način da dugo bude na visini...” “Slažem se”, znala je, nažalost... “Sada se sjetih i jedne scene iz prošlostoljetne knjige Odor de femina, gdje sobarica ispire picu svoje gospodarice prije nego što će je izlizuckati, a ova upozorava: Golicaš me, Graciosa, tako ću doći prije vremena!, Ne brinite, Madame, dobro znate da se uvijek zaustavljam u pravi čas!” “Eto što je francuska kultura!”

Na drugoj strani fronte...

“Na drugoj strani fronte oko masturbacije, s usponom europskog racionalizma i scijentizma nastaje najgrublja stigmatizacija tog milovanja – pri čemu se ne smije zaboraviti da je racionalizam 16. i 17. stoljeća također pridonio masovnom progonu vještica. Tu stigmatizaciju proizvodi jedan konzervativni dio medicinske znanosti, i to punih dvjesto godina, sve do sredine našeg stoljeća, kad se medicinska osuda konačno urušila i masturbacija se počela prihvaćati kao normalan spolni i erotski čin. Riječ je o tome da se u 18. stoljeću javljaju liječnici koji tvrde da je masturbacija ne samo moralno zlo i neutilitarno ponašanje nego ujedno i teška prijetnja zdravlju i životu. Tu kampanju je pokrenula anonimna knjižica objavljena 1710. u Londonu s naslovom Onania, or the Heinous Sin of Self Polution, and all its Frightful Consequences in Both Sexes..., no njezin glavni i najslavniji protagonist bio je doktor Simon-André Tissot, s mnogo puta objavljivanim i na desetke jezika prevedenim djelom L’Onanisme, iz 1760., gdje je na kliničkim slučajevima navodno dokazivao kako masturbacija uzrokuje opće propadanje organizma, tuberkulozu kičme, epilepsiju, ludilo, sljepilo i druga oboljenja, pa konačno i smrt. Tissot nalaže dva sredstva protiv tog zla: prvo, antimasturbacijsko odgojno zastrašivanje i nadzor maloljetnika, do toga da mlade nikada ne ostavljamo same sa sumnjivim učiteljima i da spriječimo njihovu bliskost sa slugama, i drugo, određene terapijske mjere nad onima koji su mu uvelike podlegli. Zatim će i dugo važeći autoritet Richard von Kraft-Ebing u svojoj Psychopatis sexualis iz 1886. prepoznavati masturbaciju kao simptom raznih psihopatskih stanja perverzije, dok će doktor Pierre Garnier u L’onanisme seul et ? deux iz 1885. tvrditi da je masturbacija ili simptom ili uzrok satirijaze, nimfomanije, idiotizma, ludila i drugih nevolja, a da su mu izvori višak dokolice, čitanje romana, dulje ležanje, jahanje, i slično; on posvećuje prilično morbidnu pažnju užasu i životinjskoj depravaciji homoseksualne i heteroseksualne oralne masturbacije, kao dovođenja u dodir finih organa usana, jezika i nosa s izlučnim kanalima nečisti kakvi su penis, vulva i vagina, prosuđujući pri tome da su osobito žene sklone oralnom draganju, te za teže slučajeve preporučuje operaciju rezanja klitorisa – to jest oksciziju, kakva se obavlja nad djevojčicama u nekim afričkim kulturama radi gašenja spolnog užitka.” “Pa taj je totalni idiot!” “E, koliko je takvih pod ugledom znanosti! Još i donedavno objavljivana knjiga Physiologie du vice doktora Jeana Fauconeya anatemizira samozadovoljavanje, pa čak plaši psihičkim orgazmom koji dolazi od nadražljivog razgovorom o seksu ili od dugog zaručništva. Koliko je generacija dječaka, djevojaka i odraslih, sve do naših roditelja, obiteljski, školski i javnim mnijenjem terorizirano i iskompleksirano tom pedagogijom – koja istovremeno nabija strah i liječi od homoseksualizma, od takozvane nimfomanije i nekih drugih tobožnjih spolnih psihopatologija! Njoj se izruguju stihovi već spomenute poeme Masturbomanie:

O, masturbacijo nebeska!

Naslada čista i slatka;

Tissot se na tebe žesti

Svojim djelom spretnim;

Ipak, i taj Eskulapov svećenik

Pokazuje mimo svojih pridika

Da drka kao svaki sretnik,

Kraj svih guzova i pičaka.”

U književnosti kao i u zbilji

“Razumije se”, nastavi Andrea, “uskoro će i neki liječnici prihvatiti normalnost masturbacije, poput Havellocka Ellisa s njegovim Studies on the Psycology of Sex ili Magnusa Hirschfelda, osnivača berlinskog Instituta za seksološka istraživanja i pokretača brojnih akcija za dekriminalizaciju spolnosti, te Wilhelma Reicha koji teorijski razobličuje cjelovitu ideologiju sputavanja spolnosti kao građanskom poretku opasne kreativne moći. Ujedno je anketa Alfreda Kinseya, objavljena 1948. s naslovom Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, razglasila istinu da barem 90 posto Amerikanaca masturbira, kao što i nekih desetak posto ima kraća ili dulja homoseksualna iskustva...” “A što kažu istraživanja za žene?” “Nedavno je u Francuskoj oko 20 posto žena priznalo dirkanje u samoći, no podatak je nevjerodostojan, jer je mnogim ženama zbog predrasuda i stida samozadovoljavanje još neispovjediva stvar; međutim, pouzdaniji je i porazan podatak iz tog istraživanja da samo 20 posto muškaraca maze klitoris svojih dragana pri tucanju! Na sreću, sada i?ak postaju sve glasniji medicinski i pedagoški stavovi iz danske Crvene knjižice za učenike od Andersena i Hansena, objavljene 1968. godine: Neke djevojke i rjeđe neki dječaci ne masturbiraju. Oni nisu nenormalni, štoviše, možda su normalniji od onih koji to rade. Neke djevojke i dječaci masturbiraju više puta dnevno, drugi samo više puta tjedno ili još rjeđe. To čine i odrasli, pa i tvoji roditelji i profesori. Ima ljudi koji kažu da je vrlo opasno masturbirati. To nije istina. Drugi će reći da ne treba pretjerivati. Ni to nije istina, iz prostog razloga što nije moguće pretjerivati! Pitajte ih koliko puta, po njihovom mišljenju, smijete to raditi dnevno ili tjedno. Iznenadilo bi me da na to odgovore.”

“Što je s tim milovanjem u novijoj erotskoj književnosti?” “Tu je masturbacija, faire une queue kažu Francuzi, postala standardni erotski topos, iako zapravo još podcijenjen ili podozrivo prihvaćen. Kao i u životu, masturbiraju i u književnosti homofili obaju spolova, pa stoga u Telenyju Oscara Wilda Telenyjev ljubavnik kaže ruka mi je nešto kolebljivo pošla primjerom njegove, i moram priznati da je užitak od rukovanja njegovom batinom bio deliciozan. Isto je i za André Gidea povlašteno muškoljubno draganje. Uzorna je epizoda iz Uliksa kad gospodin Bloom drka kroz džep promatrajući djevojku koja namjerno izlaže noge. A André Breton u jednom razgovoru s desetak nadrealista, objavljenom 1928. kao Recherches sur la sexualité, neobično oštro i protiv većine sugovornika odbacuje homoseksualnost, ali za takozvanu onaniju kaže da je opravdana ako ide uz predodžbe ženstva, kao legitimna nadoknada za neke životne tuge... Uz to, i u književnosti je masturbacija, kao u zbilji, vrijedan dio ljubavničkih igara. Tako u jednom poetskom tekstu iz 1926., koji se pripisuje slikaru Jean Lurçatu: Klotilde s uzdahom šapne: miluj se! Poslušao sam, i njene oči sijevnu, prateći u mojima stupnjeve užitka koje sam dobro poznavao od mladosti. Tjerala me jednim jedinim pitanjem, koji je poticao moj ritam: je li slatko?, je li slatko? I ruke su joj išle uz tijelo, preko rebara, po sisama... U Louysovoj knjizi Trois filles de leur m_re patetična Charlotte uživa samo kad se dirka dok je tucaju u guzu, pa njezin amateur kaže: drkala je tako polagano da joj je ruka izgledala nepokretna, a onda sam i ja, shvativši da voli mirne naslade, izvodio u njezinu vrućem crijevu iste neprimjetne kretnje. Dalje, Raymond Guérin je 1946. u romanu L’Apprenti pokazao, izazvavši ne mali skandal, kako voajer Herm_s masturbira za vrijeme ili nakon potajnog promatranja golotinje, zagrljaja, milovanja i ekstaza drugih, te kako potrbuške na krevetu zamišlja sebe u avanturama napaljene djevojke Lily i trlja se na plahtu do užitka. Ta knjiga je važna za razumijevanje povezanosti masturbacije i voajerizma, ali u zbiljskoj i književnoj erotici ipak je češće kombiniranje masturbacije s koitusom, u homoseksualnim i u heteroseksualnim odnosom: bilo ženskim samonadraživanjem klitorisa za vrijeme snošaja, ili tako da u analnom seksu pasivni sam sebe nadražuje odnosno da aktivni nadražuje falus ili stidnicu ljubljenoga. A kako se masturbacija može pretopiti u snošaj, kao coitus in ore vulvae, opisuje u svom Journal particulier pod 19. II. 1917. pedesetogodišnji književnik Paul Léautaud iz odnosa sa svojom nešto starijom draganom Mme Cayssac: Poslije ručka, sjela je u fotelju nasred blagovaonice, podigavši suknju, razmaknutih bedara, s p... dobro na zraku. Ja sam je najprije dr..., a zatim je htjela, kako je dolazio užitak, da završim tako da je dr... s k... U tome je svršila, a to trljanje je djelovalo i na mene, pa sam opalio po njoj. Ustao sam da dovedem u red svoju odjeću, ali ona, umirući od naslade, ostane koji trenutak tako, podignute suknje, razmaknutih bedara, s p... nakvašenom od užitka i oblivenom od s...” “Sve to je zapravo nježno!”, reče Rita. “Nema spolnog čina, pa i najrazuzdanijeg, kojeg ljubav ne može uzdići do najviše nježnosti! Sjetimo se najzad i likovnih prikaza samodirkanja: slike Egona Schilea Eros, one Christiana Shada s dvije djevojke i Dalijeve fantazmagorije u slici Veliki masturbator...”



Izgaranje od naslade

Sjeli su na štekati i ona se nalaktila, bradom na ukrštenim prstima, “znaš, Andreuška, nakon svih ovih spoznaja potreban mi je hladan tuš!”, a on odgovori, smiješeći se, stihovima Alfreda de Vignya

Njene velike oči, poluotvorene kao bajam kad se otvara,

Izgaraju od naslade što ga njen pogled zagovara

i pitao se je li mu ijedna djevojka bila toliko draga kao Rita ovog trenutka. “Daj, naručimo sladoled”, ona će, “tako je vruće!” On se okrene da pozove konobara. “Andrea, pričaj dalje...” “Zaista, mi rijetko pomišljamo”, udovolji joj on, radujući se toj verbalnoj okrutnosti, “da su masturbacija i oralni seks zapravo vrste polusnošaja, gdje se umjesto međusobnog trljanja spolovila događa trljanje spolovila rukom i ustima..., kao i kad se to radi među bedrima, s coitus inter femora, ili s krevetom gospodina Herm_sa, ili s pazuhom, ili s dojkama...” “Koje za to moraju biti poveće...” “Poželjno je, ali i trljanje po tvrdim sisicama i bradavicama usrećuje...” Ona spusti jednu ruku s oslonca za bradu i položi je preko njegove, ali on je odmah povuče, iskoristivši dolazak konobara sa sladoledima, te nastavi: “U romanu Portnoy Philipa Rotha je epizoda o mladiću koji se služi jednim lijepim komadom jetre iz hladnjaka: konzumirao sam je omatanjem oko kite u tri i po, te opet u pet i po na vrhu vilice zajedno sa članovima moje jadne i nevine obitelji. Tu su dakako i ona pomagala za dame, nazvana godemiché, didlo, olisbos ili consolateur, utješivač..., vrlo različitih oblika – glatki, naborani, krastavi, isprugani, duži i kraći, tanki i deblji i debeli, plastično kruti i gumeno gipki, u posljednje vrijeme i kao vibratori na baterije. Aretino u Raggionamenti stavlja u ruke kaluđerica staklene godemiché iz Murana, a u ženevskom etnografskom muzeju vidio sam jedan iz 18. stoljeća od najfinije kože i sa šupljinom za toplo mlijeko. Ta spravica postaje danas skoro uobičajena radost mlađih i zrelijih žena, neovisno imaju li ili nemaju muškarca...” “Čula sam da i nije samo sredstvo naslađivanja”, ona je bila povrijeđena odbijanjem ruke, ali se tješila pretpostavkom da je on i time namjerno izluđuje, “nego i relaksiranja...” “Istina, to je svojevrsni domaći fizioterapeut, maser i psihoanalitičar. Prvom prilikom ću Riti donijeti jedan lijepi iz Pariza, za dane njezina prevladanog djevičanstva...” Ona pocrveni, “tukac, lice mi gori kao u glupače!” “Ne brini, to je dražesno!”

Dirkanje iz nevolje

“Naravno”, pođe on dalje, “ima i mnogo jadnih masturbiranja, kod samaca, bolesnika, zatvorenika i vojnika..., kad je, reče jedan Millerov junak koji se liječio od venerične bolesti, masturbacija najbolji postupak zamjene. Havelock Ellis prenosi ispovijed jednog Rusa koji se prepuštao masturbiranju kako zbog bolnih iskustava veneričnih bolesti, tako i zbog toga što je u maštanjima zapravo nalazio više užitka nego u koitusu. Paul Bonnetain u romanu Charlot s’amuse, iz 1883., prikazuje jednog uspaljenog siromaha koji u pariškom raju seksa nalazi oduška žudnji samo u branlette sa svojom šakom. Manje poznati Stendhalov roman Armance govori o nesretnom odnosu mladih supružnika u kojemu je Olivier impotentan, pa stoga svoju nevinu, osjetljivu i zaljubljenu Armance može samo ustima i rukom zadovoljiti. Neko vrijeme je i to bilo dovoljno usrećujuće i uvjerljivo, ali na kraju jadnik odlazi na putovanje gdje će inscenirati samoubojstvo kao smrt od bolesti. Stendhal u pismu Prosperu Mériméeu jasno kaže ono što se iz knjige tek naslućuje:


Olivier je bio jak u pomoćnim sredstvima..., spretna ruka i vrijedan jezik davali su Armanci snažne užitke. Mnoge djevojke ne znaju točno što znači fizički brak... On joj je rukom davao dvije do tri ekstaze svake noći, a ona se zbog stidljivosti nije osuđivala ništa reći. Ljubav je dovoljna da se to objasni... Davati ekstazu rukom, kakva lijepa perifraza u izbjegavanju prljave riječi drkati!”


“Stvarno je to hrapava balkanska riječ”, pobuni se ona, “kao da se i s njom hoće ocrniti nešto što može biti milo!” “Iako vjerojatno dolazi od primjerene i pitome riječi dirkati... No, evo još jednog primjera samodirkanja iz nevolje, također u braku, kod žene onemoćalog supruga iz Sartreova djela Zid:


Ispružila bih se na leđa i mislila da popove, na čiste stvari, na žene, i mazila bih najprije trbuh, moj lijepi ravni trbuh, i spustila bih ruku, i to je bio užitak, užitak kakav sam samo ja sebi znala dati.”


Gledao je prijateljicu u oči, prvi put tako čvrsto, i to nju zbuni, pa stane vrludati pogledom. “Manustupratio se obično događa u samoći, ali neki ljubavnici uspijevaju posve svladati stid u igri uzajamnog milovanja, manustupratio mutualis, ili samomilovanja pred drugim, a đaci, zatvorenici i vojnici čak u skupnim takmičenjima tko će prije i dalje. U spomenutom razgovoru nadrealista čitamo:

Breton: Što misli Jacques Prévert o masturbiranju muškarca pred ženom i žene pred muškarcem?

Prévert: To je jako dobro.

Naville: Što misliš o uzajamnom masturbiranju?

Prévert: To je još bolje.”

DJ Krush ft. Esthero, Final Home



Verbalni peting

“Zapravo, manustupratio se na neki način događa”, sada i ona pođe u redefiniranje, “u svakoj ljubavnoj predigri!” “Istina, to u svom Dnevniku iz 1806. zapisuje i cinični Stendhal: Nabijam Rosu nakon što je nadrkam... Činim sve to dva puta, a njoj dođe šest puta... Ali, stvar može postati i posebna igra ili osnovni sadržaj spolnog odnosa – kako bilježi Havellock Ellis iz ispovijedi jednog svog kolege liječnika: Volio sam masturbirati svoju djevojku, pa čak više nego odnošaj s njom... Često sam to postizao sa ženama, no ponuda nikad nije bila ravna potražnji... Masturbirao sam i sa suprugom... Zatim sam to učinio, uz coitus inter femora, s jednim prijateljem, i tada otkrio da sam sretniji s njim nego u braku...” “Čovjek je otkrio da je homić...” “Ili je tako postajao homić, tko zna... Općenito, nema sumnje da je uzajamno dirkanje izvrsno za razvoj senzualnosti i afektivnost, jer s njim učimo, kao i sa svakim milovanjem, kako upoznati drugoga i kako davati i primati užitke...” “Osim toga, to može biti jedan sretan način ekshibicionizma i voajerizma...” “Zacijelo jedan od najboljih!” Rita je opet je došla rukom na njegovu, ali tako blago da nije imao srca povući je. “Ali, treba naglasiti”, upozori je, “samo s pristankom drugih, jer voajerizam i ekshibicionizam na silu i prijevaru uistinu su neprihvatljivi i ponekad patološki postupci.” “Opravdani ekshibicionizam je već i to”, ona će, “da ponekad i pred nekim uživamo pokazivanjem svoje polunagosti na plaži...” “Malo tko ne uživa u tome... Zar nije bilo divljenja punoj nagosti i u jednom nedavnom ženskom kupanju na Hvaru?” “Rekle su ti Laura i Roza?” “Da, i kako si bila zamamna morska nimfa... i po stijenama skupljala školjke pizdice...” Opet je pocrvenila, ali i izdržala drski pogled. “A ja sam čula da se vi u Firenzi krećete po kući i na balkonu sunčate goli...” “S iznimkom Vande i Franca!” “Je li se tada... uzrujaš?” “Sa Silvanom da...”, sada je bludio pogledom po moru, kao da nešto traži, a ona ga je mazila po zapešću... “S njom si se igrao na voajerstvo i ekshibicionizam s pristankom?” “Jesam...”, te joj ispriča ono njihovo s balkona, i ono pod tušem i ona dva literarna sijela o Aretinu i Rousseauu sa samodirkanjem u knjižnici. Rita je slušala otvorenih usta i prikovana na njegove hladno plave oči. Zaključivši, kad je došao do Silvanine otkrivene i njegove pokrivene ekstaze, “kakve pubertetske strasti!” “A ti s dečkima?” “Nisu me ni takli, a kamoli to...”

To je bio dobar verbalni peting, pa on odluči još zaoštriti, odjednom i iznenađen od njezina studenog i vlažnog dlana. “Topos masturbacije, vlastoručne ili drugoručne, sveprisutan je u suvremenoj erotici, ali istovremeno su vrlo rijetki njegovi detaljniji opisi, osim u pornografskim časopisima i filmu... Pitam se ponekad: tko će prvi režirati umjetnički film s tim plastičnim činom i s njegovim raznim načinima?” “Kakvim raznim načinima?” “Rita, ako si na Turskoj kuli onako dobro izvela klasifikaciju milovanja općenito, morala bi znati i za mnogo jednostavnije načine samomilovanja!” Zamislila se nekoliko trenutaka, u velikoj jezi i sa studeno ovlaženim dlanovima. “Ne snalazim se..., reci ti, a onda ja ću možda dopuniti...”



Učena lascivnost

On je potvrdio glavom i s guštom krenuo u učenu lascivnost. “Dakle, za muškarca je stvar dosta jednostavna. Treba poći od razlikovanja rada prstima i rada šakom, iako ni to nisu jedine ručne mogućnosti, jer, na primjer, Salvador Dalí u priči Ręverie kaže masturbiram udarajući se penisom u trbuh”. Napustio je njezin mokri dlan i izvadio iz džepa notes s olovkom, te na jednom listiću počeo crtati isukani falus. “Ovome bi još trebalo dodati jajca, ali nema prostora...” “Šteta... možeš crtati na dvije susjedne stranice!” “Imaš pravo”, i iskida listić, prešavši na druga dva, povezana, gdje je narisao ud s dodatkom. “Ja ću staviti pahuljice, htjede ona, ti samo reci gdje!” I kad to učine, a sve je bilo tako barokno zgodno, od osnovnih oblika, zavijutaka žilica, naboranosti povučene kožice i kudravih dlač?ca, da joj je morao obećati taj raritet na dar, on pristupi objašnjavanju. “To je donja strana, manje ravna i mekša od gornje, koja je estetski vrednija. Na njoj je ova izbočina mokraćne cijevi i ova sponica, frenulum, što vezuje kožicu prepucija za deblo kad se ona povuče otkrivajući mu gubicu...” “Koja je tako stožasta i srcolika?” “I baš kao srce crvena, puna krvi, osjetljiva i osjećajna!”, potvrdi on samoljubivo, “i sada, prvi način draganja je trljanje s dva ili tri prsta po tom prstenu s dna gubice”, pokazao je na crtežu oblu izbočenost, “i po tom prostoru ispod kojeg se prepucij spušta, jer je tu tkivo najviše opskrbljeno jako osjetljivim stanicama corpusculae genitaliae – jednako kao ženska dražica i bradavice...” “I gornje i donje usne!” “Tako je... I zato se sva ta tkiva najviše vole međusobno družiti... klitoris s glavićem, klitoris i usne, sve usne međusobno, bradavica s glavićem...” “Kakva orkestracija ljubavnih radosti!” “Drugi način draganja”, nastavi doktorant, “je stezanje i natezanje cijelog debla šakom, zbog čega Talijani kažu la pugnetta, od vrha do dna, šetajući i opnu po njemu...” “U Dalmaciji punjeta znači sperma.” “Tipičan primjer prijenosa izraza na srodne pojave! Inače, čudno je da u svim jezicima koje znam postoje brojni izrazi za spolne organe i za ševu, ali skoro ništa za spermu... To mi je neobjašnjivo..., i na hrvatskom i srpskom sam jedva naišao na neuobičajene izraze muzga, jeb, mlječak, mličce i prčina.” “Dobro, a koji je način bolji – dvojica/trojica ili petorica protiv jednoga?” “Stvar je osobnih sklonosti, no obično se primjenjuju oba..., pretpostavljam kao i kod ženskog dirkanja, u kojemu bi prvom muškom načinu odgovaralo draškanje dražice i usmina, a onom drugom prodor prstiju u vaginu... Za ono prvo, s prstima po najosjetljivijim mjestima, Francuzi duhovito kažu éplucher les lentilles – čistiti leću.” “Eto, sad znamo i za dva glavna načina ženskog draganja, tako da bih ja mogla samo nadodati poneki tehnički detalj... Ali, Andrea, jako je važno, a to se ne može nacrtati, da u samomilovanju uvijek intenzivno radi mašta...” “Nije baš da se to ne može nacrtati! U stripu se slikaju i erotska fantaziranja, a s oblačićima prenose riječi maštanja i tepanja... Imam jedan francuski strip koji od početka do kraja priča o masturbativnim maštanjima troje protagonista, jedne djevojke i dva momka, nasamo i zajedno, s izvrsnim tekstom i krasnim prizorima nabubrenih falusa i stidnica u svim izvedbama...”

Emiliana Torrini, Today Has Been Okay



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Okrenuo je stranicu notesa i počeo crtati stidnicu, govoreći “pred dvije godine je objavljena jedna knjiga Le Sexe de la femme od doktora Gérarda Zwanga, koja precizno objašnjava mnoge zanemarene biološke i društvene istine o pici. Autor kaže da su antička efebofilija i judeokršćanski asketizam odgovorni za to što je stidnica umjesto zasluženog posvećenja postala ljudski organ koji je podvrgnut najbrojnijim tabuima, koji je najslabije poznat, najslabije opisan, najviše podcijenjen i najviše vrijeđan...” Rita je preuzela olovku i dotjerivala crtež, a u svom Dnevniku je zabilježila da je tek tada shvatila koliko i žene slabo poznaju konfiguraciju tog njihova blaga i da je te noći prvi put promatrala svoju stidnicu s ogledalcem! “Zwang kaže da šire područje stidnice, od vrha brijega do perineuma, ima dužinu 18 do 20 centimetara, i da od toga polovina ide na pukotinu.” “To znači”, ona ni o tome nije nikad mislila, nekih devet do deset centimetara..., ali, u mirovanju, jer je pica jako rastezljiva!” “A riječ je o vanjskom otvoru, ne o vaginalnom, koji je još uži..., ali i on jednako rastezljiv. Pa onda Zwang opisuje kako se taj ispupčeni ovoidni kruščić s rumenim prorezom po sredini, gore pokriven i premašen gustom vegetacijom i dolje iskićen maljama, pokazuje u različitim položajima tijela: gotovo nevidljiv u stajaćem položaju i pri stisnutim bedrima, blago otvoren i pravo ispupčen pri srednje raširenim bedrima, više otvoren i spljošten pri jako raširenim bedrima, zjapeći svojim donjem dijelu u stavu četveronoške... Prednji ili gornji dio vulve je tvrđi i zaštićen brijegom, i tu su klitoris i izlaz uretre, dok je donji dio mekan i zaštićen bedrenom masom, i tu je vaginalni otvor kao glavni i najugroženiji dio stidnice. Stisnuta bedra su, kaže Zwang, čuvari djevičanstva i njihova je snažna okruglost ljudska zamjena zaštitničkog repa sisavaca. Otvorena bedra su biološko-kulturni znak spolne raspoloživosti i pristanka, gesta koju žena uči izbjegavati i koju naši običaji odijevanja zabranjuju u javnosti, a unutrašnje strane bedra su anatomski i psihološki produžeci vaginalnog otvora i svojom finom osjetljivošću jaka erogena zona, tako da, kaže dosjetljivo Zwang, tko dobije ono Niže, odmah iznad koljena, uskoro će dobiti i ono Više. Muškarčev stražnji pristup vagini je lakši, u sagnutom ili u četveronožnom položaju, more ferrarum, i taj ranjiviji položaj je dokaz intimnosti i povjerenja ljubavnika, ali također mogućnost nepoželjnih iznenađenja – kako to znaju, opet Zwangova dosjetljivost, pralje i žene u svim radovima koji traže saginjanje.” “Krasno”, uvjereno će ona, mazeći njegov prst, “a možda i važno za topos dirkanja!” “Naravno, zato izlažem ovaj dio Zwangovih razmatranja! Ženski užitak računa sa svim spomenutim elementima, jer se dobiva dirkanjem i gornjeg i donjeg dijela vulve, i to u svim navedenim položajima tijela, pa čak i samim stiskanjem i trenjem bedara, čime se, na primjer, može nezapaženo uživati i na javnom mjestu”, nasmiješi se on, a Rita opet lagano, ali zadovoljno porumeni, “i slično tome, razumije se, muško dirkanje također zahvaća susjednu osjetljivu kožu bedara, prepona, mošnji, guze...”



Tog časa ih prekinu dvoje mladih, student filozofije iz kruga Praxisa i njegova djevojka, s kojima se Andrea bio dogovorio za osam i pol. Oni su sjeli i predstavili se. Momak je Andrei donosio poseban svezak te publikacije Jun – lipanj 1968, Dokumenti o studentskim demonstracijama i sukobima sa Savezom komunista u nekim gradovima Jugoslavije.

Tumačenje poezije: Magdina fantazma

šimpragi (Zavodniku)

ARNAUT DANIEL

...he was lauded by Ezra Pound as the greatest poet to have ever lived...

IL MIGLIOR FABBRO

No one travels
Along this way but I,
This autumn evening.
Basho

Frank Sinatra, Autumn Leaves





Quan chai la fuelha
dels aussors entressims
el freg s'erguelha
don seca 'l vais e'l vims,
del dous refrims
vei sordezir la bruelha:
mais ieu sui prims
d'Amor qui que s'en tuelha.

Tot quan es gela,
mas ieu no puesc frezir
qu'amors novela
mi fa'l cor reverdir;
non dei fremir
qu'Amors mi cuebr'em cela
em fai tenir
ma valor em capdela

Bona es vida
pus Joia la mante
quei tals n'escrida
qui ges non vai tam be;
no sai de re
coreillar m'escarida
que per ma fe
de mielhs ai ma partida.

De drudaria
no'm sai de re blasmar,
qu'autrui paria
trastorn en reirazar;
geb as sa par
no sai doblar m'amia
q'una non par
que segonda no'l sia.

No vuelh s'asemble
mos cors ab autr'amor
si qu'eu ja'l m'emble
ni volva'l cap alhor:
no ai paor
que ja selh de Pontremble
n'aia gensor
de lieis ni que la semble.

Tant es per genta
selha que'm te joios
las gensors trenta
vens de belhas faisos:
ben es razos
doncas que mos chans senta
quar es tan pros
e de ric pretz manenta.

Vai t'en chanzos,
denan lei ti presenta,
que s'ill no fos
no'i meir'Arnautz s'ententa.



When the leaf sings
from the highest peaks
and the cold raises,
withering the kernel and willow,
of its sweet refrains
I see the wood grow dumb;
but I'm close to love,
whosoever might leave it.
Everything is iced,
but I cannot freeze
because a love affair
makes my heart lush again;
I should not shake,
because Love covers and hides me
and makes me preserve
my merit, and leads me.
Life is good,
if joy holds it,
though some, whose things
do not go well, complain;
I don't know how
to accuse my lot
since, by my troth,
I have my share of the best.
As of flirting,
I don't know what to blame,
and of the others
I spurn the togetherness;
since, of all her peers,
no one is like mine,
since there doesn't seem to be one
who comes not after her.
I don't want my heart
to join another love
lest she flees me
and turns her head elsewhere:
I have no fear
that even the one from Pontremoli
has one worthier
of her, or that so seems so.
She's so kind,
the one that keeps me in joy
that the kindest thirty
she wins by her fair look:
that's a good reason
for her to hear my songs,
because she's so noble
and so preciously deserving.
Go, then, song,
show before her:
if it were not so,
you wouldn't deserve Arnaut's toil.

Djivan Gasparyan



Arnaut Daniel


Arnaut Daniel was an Occitan troubadour of the 13th century, praised by Dante as "il miglior fabbro" (the best craftsman/creator, literally "the best smith") and called "Grand Master of Love" by Petrarch. In the 20th century he was lauded by Ezra Pound as the greatest poet to have ever lived in his work The Spirit of Romance (1910).

According to one vida, Daniel was born of a noble family at the castle of Ribérac in Périgord; however, the scant contemporary sources point to him being a jester with pernicious economic troubles. Raimon de Durfort calls him "a student, ruined by dice and shut-the-box". He was the inventor of the sestina, a song of six stanzas of six lines each, with the same end words repeated in every stanza, though arranged in a different and intricate order. Longfellow claims he was also the author of the metrical romance of Lancillotto, or Launcelot of the Lake, but this claim is completely unsubstantiated; Dante's reference to Daniel as the author of prose di romanzi ("proses of romance") remains, therefore, a mystery.

In Dante's The Divine Comedy, Arnaut Daniel appears as a character doing penance in Purgatory for lust. He responds in Occitan to the narrator's question about who he is:

«Tan m'abellis vostre cortes deman,
qu'ieu no me puesc ni voill a vos cobrire.
Ieu sui Arnaut, que plor e vau cantan;
consiros vei la passada folor,
e vei jausen lo joi qu'esper, denan.
Ara vos prec, per aquella valor
que vos guida al som de l'escalina,
sovenha vos a temps de ma dolor»
(Purg., XXVI, 140-147)
Translation:

"Your courteous question pleases me so,
that I cannot and will not hide from you.
I am Arnaut, who weeping and singing go;
Contrite I see the folly of the past,
And, joyous, I foresee the joy I hope for one day.
Therefore do I implore you, by that power
Which guides you to the summit of the stairs,
Remember my suffering, in the right time."
In homage to these lines which Dante gave to Daniel, the European edition of T.S. Eliot's second volume of poetry was titled Ara Vos Prec. Eliot's poem The Waste Land opens and closes with references to Dante and Daniel. The Waste Land is dedicated to Pound as "il miglior fabbro" which is what Dante had called Daniel. The poem also contains a reference to Canto XXVI in the line "Poi s'ascose nel foco che gli affina" ("Then hid him in the fire that purifies them"), which immediately follows them in to end Dante's Canto, and appears in Eliot's closing section of The Waste Land.

Edith Piaf, Autumn Leaves



Arnaut's Xth canto contains the lines that Pound claimed were "the three lines by which Daniel is most commonly known" (The Spirit of Romance, p. 36):

"leu sui Arnaut qu'amas l'aura
E chatz le lebre ab lo bou
E nadi contra suberna"
Translation:

"I am Arnaut who loves the wind,
And chases the hare with the ox,
And swims against the torrent."
There are sixteen extant lyrics of Arnaut Daniel; there is music for at least one of them, but it was composed at least a century after the poet's death by an anonymous author. No original melody has survived.

Bonustrack

Kad se bolje pogleda, ovaj Arnaut je lipov kurac. Nema to veze s poezijom. E moj Ezra, da nema onih sovolikih arhajskih Yeux Glauques, i tebe bih ja nabio na - križ!
Usporedimo daklem Arnaut Daniela s izistinskim il miglior fabbreom, pesnikom i humanistom s kraja XX. veka, Carem Nemanjom. Donosimo ovde sada već klasično delo zrele faze, čuvene 'Jagode':

PREDSJEDNIK I PREMIJER

KAPITALU NE TREBA DEMOKRATSKA DRŽAVA

Zoran Kurelić



Globalizacija novih ekonomskih aktivnosti stvaranjem moćnih nadnacionalnih organizacija podriva sposobnost država da kontroliraju tokove, zalihe i protok ovih roba, dakle njihovu sposobnost da provode efektivnu socijalnu politiku uključujući utjerivanje radničkih prava.

razgovarala Grozdana Cvitan


U sklopu projekta Ideja Europe, europska praksa života, smisao i cilj ujedinjenja europskih naroda i država Zoran Kurelić govorio je o temi Globalizacija i liberalna demokracija gradeći svoja razmišljanja na tekstu Charlesa Tillyja da bi pokazao neka pitanja krajnjih granica koja svijet postavlja u vezi s globalizacijom i posljedicama koje taj proces ostavlja na ljudski život i planet koji nastanjujemo.

Počinje li razgovor o globalizaciji ili završava pitanjem o sudbini države u sklopu tog procesa? Kako ste izabrali temu za skup koji u prvom planu ima neka pitanja ideje, identiteta i ujedinjenja Europe?

– S obzirom na to da je karakter skupa multidisciplinaran i da se na skupu nalaze sociolozi, politolozi i filozofi odlučio sam se za temu koja zadire u različita područja, a tiče se komparativne politike i suvremene političke teorije. Teza koju sam želio predstaviti studentima provokativna je i pripada poznatom njujorškom profesoru Charlesu Tillyju koju je formulirao 1994. u eseju Globalizacija ugrožava radnička prava. Pokušao je pokazati da globalizirani kapitalizam najprije uništava radnička prava, a s tim propada i država blagostanja. Propašću države blagostanja dovodi se u pitanje demokracija. To je jedna od najprovokativnijih teza, naročito ako se iznese u Americi, a cijela stvar se izvede iz perspektive radničkih prava koja u Americi nigdje baš i nisu najvažnija pa ni u političkoj teoriji. Dakle, riječ je o neomarksističkoj provokaciji koja radikalnim argumentom želi provjeriti određena pitanja. Odmah da pripomenem, Tillyjevo srce je na strani radnika i radničkih prava i njemu bi bilo drago da se radnici nekako preorganiziraju u uvjetima suvremenoga kapitalizma. Promišljajući o temi Globalizacija i liberalna demokracija "idem" iz Tillyja jer je njegova ideja provokativna zbog toga što dovodi u pitanje liberalne demokracije. Kod nas, naime, prevladava Fukuyamino mišljenje, ili je barem dominantno, a to je da je liberalna demokracija najbolji oblik političkog uređenja pa će sad, nakon konačne propasti istočnog bloka i kraja povijesti, pretpovijesni narodi prihvatiti liberalnu demokraciju kao svoj način političkog organiziranja i sve će glatko proći. To Tilly izravno napada.

Iz čega u što?

Vrijedi početi od riječi tranzicija, tranzicijske zemlje: prelazi se iz nečega u nešto. Ali zna se iz čega se prelazi: zemlje koje su bile socijalističke prelaze u liberalnu demokraciju. Tu je pretpostavljeno da se zna i cilj cijele operacije. Naravno, to pretpostavlja određeni tip razmišljanja. Tilly ide izrazito protiv te teze s drugom, radikalnom, koja kaže da propast istočnog bloka neće rezultirati tranzicijom istočnih zemalja u liberalne demokracije nego propašću liberalne demokracije.

Koji su Tillyjevi argumenti?

– Važne su dvije stvari. Prva je Tillyjeva definicija globalizacije. Pojednostavljeno glasi da je globalizacija geografsko širenje prostora na kojem međunarodne interkontinentalne i internacionalne interakcije snažno djeluju na lokalne društvene interakcije. Prema tome, ovo što se zbiva na međunarodnoj razini izravno utječe na ono što se zbiva u određenoj zemlji. Ako dođe do napada na WTC, onda će se sve u vezi s tim odraziti i kod nas vrlo brzo ukoliko smo globalizirana zemlja. Možemo reći da se već odražava, od sigurnosti letova s Plesa i pojačane kontrole nadalje. To smo osjetili već nakon dva dana. Ako smo i ekonomski globalni dio svijeta, odrazit će se i na cijenama nafte, jer cijene su pale i oni koji je sada kupuju za gotovinu mogu profitirati. Sve stvari koje se dogode u globaliziranom svijetu imaju brzi refleks na vrlo udaljena lokalna područja. Ali, ako netko živi na Papui Novoj Gvineji, onda je sasvim svejedno je li se što dogodilo WTC-u, nikakve se stvari na lokalnoj razini neće promijeniti. Zato Tilly govori o globalnom širenju prostora. Vrlo je malo onih dijelova planeta Zemlje na kojima ono što se dogodilo u New Yorku nema nikakve veze s lokalnim društvenim interakcijama. Teza koja pretpostavlja to globalno razumijevanje situacije (bez obzira na to što Tillyjevo razumijevanje nije usko ekonomističko, jer se ne misli samo o globalnoj ekonomskoj situaciji, Svjetskoj banci, MMF-u, nego se misli o svim interakcijama) ona je koja podrazumijeva sve interakcije, a to znači: međunarodni šverc droga, prenošenje virusa, ekološki problemi. Kad Tilly piše o radničkim pravima, on suzuje cijelu stvar i na kraju se koncentrira na ekonomsku globalizaciju iz perspektive globalnoga ekonomskog kapitalizma. Glavna mu je teza da je globalni kapitalizam doveo u pitanje važnost nacionalnih država i to ne bilo kojih nacionalnih država, nego liberalnih demokracija poput Velike Britanije, Francuske, Nizozemske ili SAD-a. U pitanje su dovedene liberalne demokracije i onaj tip uređenja države za koji se mislilo da je povijesno pobijedio i da bi trebao biti proširen po cijeloj Zemlji, a ne samo po tranzicijskim zemljama.

Ugrožena država blagostanja

Smatrajući da su radnička prava zaštićena na razini nacionalnih država, to znači da je važnost nacionalnih država smanjen u onoj mjeri u kojoj su smanjena prava koje te države osiguravaju. To je polazna misao njegova eseja, taj se prvi dio čini vrlo razumljivim i očitim. To da je ugrožena država blagostanja, moglo bi se dokazivati na tačerizmu, reganizmu itd. Iz toga proizlazi najprovokativniji dio Tillyjeve argumentacije u kojoj kaže da je demokracija Europe – dakle demokratski dio u liberalnim demokracijama – nastala u specifičnoj povijesnoj situaciji u kojoj je demokracija išla ruku pod ruku s organiziranjem proleterijata u partije i s nastojanjem tih partija da parlamentarnom (a ne revolucionarnom) borbom izmijene položaj radničke klase. Izbjegavanje građanskih ratova kao klasnih sukoba u 19. stoljeću izgradilo je liberalnu demokraciju. Zemlje po Tillyju ne bi postale demokratske da toga klasnog sukoba nije bilo. To, naravno, nije neka jako neobična ideja za nas koji živimo u postmarksističkom društvu, ali je argument "u čelo" kad se izgovori u Americi. I napokon, njegova najprovokativnija ideja: s obzirom na to da su borba za radnička prava i demokracija išle zajedno u 19. stoljeću, Europa je demokratizirana zahvaljujući pritisku proletarijata. Isto će se dogoditi i u silaznoj fazi: propast prava rada vodi urušavanju demokracije.

Na koji način?

– Tillyjeva argumentacija sadrži sedamnaest točaka, ali bih istaknuo samo tri. Jedna od njih kaže da generalna sposobnost država da provode socijalnu politiku uključujući utjerivanje radničkih prava pretpostavlja stvaranje obuhvatne efektivne kontrole nad zalihama i protokom osoba, bolesti, zagađivača, oružja, droga, novca, drugog kapitala, tehnologije, informacija, roba, političkih praksi i kulturnih formi u okvirima jasno razgraničenih teritorija. To znači da država koja garantira radnička prava i demokraciju mora imati kontrolu nad svim tim resursima na određenom teritoriju.

Izigravanje nacionalnih država

Globalizacija novih ekonomskih aktivnosti stvaranjem moćnih nadnacionalnih organizacija podriva sposobnost država da kontroliraju tokove, zalihe i protok ovih roba, dakle njihovu sposobnost da provode efektivnu socijalnu politiku uključujući utjerivanje radničkih prava. To je glavni uvid. Globalizacija razara mogućnost nacionalne države da ima monopol nad svim tim elementima. Ako nema tog monopola, države ne mogu garantirati prava te vezano s time ni to da će na kraju opstati kao demokratske države. Iz toga Tilly izvodi: u cjelini kapitalisti su prepoznali i iskoristili nove globalne uvjete koji su se stvorili i brzo su se i efektnije njima prilagodili od radnika. Prema tome, ova cijela ideja korporativnoga kapitalizma ustvari je prilagođavanje kapitalista globaliziranoj ekonomiji. Oni, naime, mogu izigravati nacionalne države: koriste ih dok im trebaju, a kad im ne trebaju mogu prebacivati kapital i kompanije, mijenjati zemlje, plaćati manje poreza u drugim zemljama, što uredno i rade. To nije Tillyjeva fantazija, to je činjenica globaliziranoga kapitalizma.

Mogu li radnici na to reagirati na odgovarajući način?

– Radnici to ne mogu jer je kapital mobilniji od rada. U cyber spaceu on se može seliti u petnaest minuta s jednog kraja planeta na drugi, a radnici ne mogu letjeti s jednog kraja na drugi i tražiti posao. Ono što je bilo moguće u 19. stoljeću da ljudi idu za poslom sad sigurno nije moguće. Mobilnost rada i kapitala neusporedivi su, iz čega Tilly zaključuje da dominantna klasa u dominantnom načinu proizvodnje (globaliziranoj ekonomiji) više ne treba nacionalnu državu onakvu kakva je ona bila određena u 19. i 20. stoljeću, tj. kao liberalna demokracija koja ima aspekt države blagostanja. Kapitalistima to više ne treba jer mogu uspješno djelovati i bez nacionalne države ili u nekakvoj "tankoj" državi koja nikako ne bi trebala biti demokratska država i sigurno ne bi trebala biti država blagostanja. Prema tome, ne kaže se da odumire država kao povijesna forma nego odumire država koja garantira pravo stanovništva i država koja je nužno demokratska. Kapitalu ne treba demokratska država. Možda mu treba država, ali ne demokratska. A socijalna država mu nikad ne treba. Tu se Tilly, bez obzira što misli kao lijevi mislilac u američkom kontekstu, dosta slaže s Jamesom Davidsonom i Lordom Reess Moggom koji su 1994. iznijeli prilično dramatičnu tezu. Ona nije daleko od Tillyjeve i u njoj su rekli da će u roku od dvadeset godina nestati većina nacionalnih država, odnosno da će nestati većina liberalnih demokracija na planetu Zemlji. Oni to vide kao trend koji upravo treba očekivati kao rezultat globalnoga kapitalizma. To su argumentirali iz distinkcije na kojoj inzistiraju, a to je da postoje različiti tipovi država i da se država može odnositi prema onima koji koriste usluge države na različite načine.

Države zaposlenika i države korisnika

Jesu li ti načini već prepoznatljivi u postojećim državama?

– Davidson i Mogg rade razlikovanje na države koje su države zaposlenika, dakle one gdje zaposlenici (employees) kontroliraju državu i države koje su pod kontrolom korisnika (customers). Employees države su one u kojima su stvarno zaposleni u državnim strukturama (profesori, liječnici, činovnici) oni kojima je stalo da što većim porezima namaknu novce za svoje plaće. Ta država ima još jedan tip zaposlenika, a to su oni koji su u bilo kojoj financijskoj vezi s državom (umirovljenici, primatelji socijalne pomoći itd.). Prema spomenutim autorima, to su neefikasne države zbog toga što tęže povećati količinu novaca što ih čini skupim i neefikasnim. Država korisnika je ona koja funkcionira onako kako žele oni koji je plaćaju – korisnici, a to znači oni koji daju najviše poreza. Oni očekuju i najviše utjecaja, a to je sasvim drukčiji oblik tj. govori iz perspektive posjednika, korporacija. Korporacije neće željeti plaćati velike poreze, i ako korisnici ne budu zadovoljni uslugama koje im pruža država tada će tražiti druge mogućnosti, a to su najprije seobe kapitala, koje će biti apsolutno nemilosrdne.

Thacher kao primjer

U međudržavnim globalnim organizacijama kapital će se šetati po svojim zakonima i to će nužno dovesti do kresanja države blagostanja. Po njihovu mišljenju, to se već moglo prepoznati u vladavini Margaret Thacher koja se hladno obračunala s nekim elementima države blagostanja, privatizirala sve što je mogla, uništila rudare i rudnike, obračunala se s dijelom sindikata itd. Nakon što se to dogodilo, a povezano s cijelom njezinom operacijom, dogodio se ulaz ogromnog japanskog kapitala, najprije u automobilsku industriju, čime je ipak spašen dio radnika, ali i Engleska, koja je u tom trenutku imala najveći ulaz stranoga kapitala. A nije teško argumentirati da je upravo razlog zbog kojeg se kapital odlučio za Englesku taj što se tamo osjećao najsigurniji (radnička prava bila su relativno niska, garantirani su uvjeti ponašanja koji su odgovarali kapitalu).

Što danas očekujete od Tillyjevih teza: potvrdu, opovrgavanje ili otklone? Koliko je Tilly doista pokazao ono što se događa i što bi se moglo dogoditi, s jedne strane, s globalizacijom, a s druge s nacionalnim državama, odnosno liberalnim demokracijama?

– Tillyjevu provokativnu tezu u okviru teme skupa jednostavno želim testirati, vidjeti kako funkcionira kad se primijeni na Europsku uniju. Odnosno, može li se u procesu formiranja EZ-a i kasnijem prijelazu na Europsku uniju i njezinom proširivanju prepoznati neke trendove pada demokracije ili dovođenja nacionalne države u krizu. Je li taj proces nešto što dovodi u pitanje liberalnu demokraciju ili je to nešto drugo? Kad cijelu stvar testiramo na Europskoj uniji pokazuje nam da su na djelu neki drugi fenomeni koje Tilly nema na umu kad s pozicija Amerike gleda cijelu Zemlju i ono što bi se moglo dogoditi sa svim državama. Primjer EU-a pokazuje da je Tillyjev argument provokativan, ali problematičan.

Europska zajednica

Što se događa s Europom?

– Stvaranjem Europske unije, europske zemlje su prenijele dio svog suvereniteta. To je neosporno. Ali njega ni ne brine je li, primjerice, Engleska više ili manje suverena. To nije njegov argument. Njega zanima hoće li se država blagostanja sačuvati. Europska zajednica garantira temeljna socijalna prava na razini unije. Englezi 1992. nisu potpisali socijalno poglavlje i to je bila jedina zemlja koja je u torijevskoj tradiciji izbjegla to potpisivanje, ali Tony Blaire, kao laburist, nema nikakvih problema sa socijalnom politikom EU-a i oni su se prilagodili. Dakle, tu se ništa nije dogodilo. Ničim se ne može argumentirati da je neka zemlja zato što je prenijela dio nacionalnih prava manje demokratska. Naime, izbori se održavaju, jednako su demokratski i ne osjećaju se tragovi globalnih trendova koji bi podrivali nacionalne države u nečem što je Tillyju važno. Ali dugoročno se sigurno može dogoditi da se EU formira kao jedna država (s petnaest i više članica), da počne solidno funkcionirati kao država, da dobije demokratski parlament (da postane parlamentarna zajednica a ne kao sada pseudoparlamentarna jer se sve odluke donose u Europskom vijeću) i sredi svoje odnose. Međutim, Tilly bi i tada mogao argumentirati da ona neće moći kontrolirati tokove kapitala i svega što se događa na tom području. Ako se tada Europa nađe u globalnom okršaju sa SAD-m i Japanom mogla bi se naći u situaciji da počne lagano kresati socijalne programe. Hoće li se oni kresati po pojedinim zemljama ili zajedno nije važno, važno je da bi taj fenomen mogao zahvatiti zajednicu.

Je li to objektivno moguće? I kada?

– Čini mi se kako teza da globalizirani kapitalizam globalno "pere" jedan način političkog organiziranja kratkoročno nikako ne funkcionira. Europa je najbolji dokaz da se nacionalni kapitalistički interesi prepoznaju. Čak i ako prihvatimo razinu na kojoj Tilly hoće razgovarati, čini se da Europska unija pokazuje veliki otpor. Moglo bi se argumentirati da je globalizacija u tranzicijskim zemljama prodemokratska.

Povijesna ironija

Koji bi bili konkretni primjeri? Što to znači u praksi?

– Na jednoj strani stvari se otvaraju nabolje, pa bi onda u Hrvatskoj trebalo biti više demokracije nego u vrijeme kad je bila realsocijalistička, a u Engleskoj će se neka prava izgubiti. To bi se do određene granice moglo argumentirati. Naime, sama propast socijalizma dogodila se, čini mi se, iz razloga koji bi se mogli nazvati globalno-kapitalističkim. Tu se potpuno slažem s Hobsbowmom koji je iznio tezu koju naziva povijesnom ironijom. On kaže da je u predglobalnom svijetu, tj. u svijetu prije Drugoga svjetskog rata, kad je puknula gospodarska kriza, Sovjetski Savez bio izvan globalnih ekonomija i ništa mu se nije dogodilo jer uopće nije imao veze s time. Kriza sedamdesetih godina, koja je bila kriza kapitalizma, uništila je socijalističke zemlje jer vidimo da su se kapitalističke oporavile od nje, a socijalističke nisu. Prema tome, globalna kriza kapitalizma je, paradoksalno, uništila socijalističke zemlje koje su već bile usisane u logiku kapitala i sve je već bilo zagušeno. Iako sve zvuči kao šala i paradoks povijesti, taj izvod čini se solidan i dobro argumentiran.

Ustav kao francuski

Što se dogodilo s državama koje su iz socijalizma prešle u liberalnu demokraciju?

– One su na papiru postale liberalne demokracije, ali naravno da ni jedna od tranzicijskih zemalja nije postala liberalno demokratska. One imaju ustave koji su prepisani od zemalja koje su izašle iz liberalne tradicije, ali kako nemaju građansku kulturu, koja je pretpostavka funkcioniranja tih demokracija, one su disfunkcionalne. Dakle, postoji liberalna demokracija i "liberalna demokracija". Dakle, imamo institucije koje ne funkcioniraju jer nismo Francuzi, a Ustav nam nalikuje francuskom. To bi bio fundamentalni problem. Javlja se još jedan paradoks koji ima izravne veze s Tillyjem. U svim tranzicijskim zemljama s demokratizacijom pala su radnička prava jer su u socijalizmu bila uzdignuta na visoku razinu. Sada naš izborni zakon liči na zapadne (možda je čak čišće napisan), češki ustav liči na zapadne itd. To još uvijek ne znači da su tranzicijske zemlje demokratske, nisu liberalne i te zemlje, s obzirom na situaciju u kojoj se nalaze, najlakše mogu ucjenjivati neke međunarodne institucije, kao što je MMF. Oni mogu doći predsjednicima vlada i uvjetovati kresanje javne potrošnje dobivanjem novca. Kod tranzicijskih zemalja dolazi do razaranja države blagostanja kao posljedica izravne ucjene globalnih institucija, a u zemljama koje njega brinu (Francuska, Engleska, Nizozemska, Belgija i Danska) doći će kao transformacija iz države zaposlenika u državu korisnika. Ono što bi bila prognoza iz mračne Tillyjeve perspektive jest to da će Europska unija morati amerikanizirati način na koji organizira socijalnu zaštitu, mirovinske fondove itd., a to znači da će građani morati sve više plaćati jer država neće osiguravati obrazovanje, zdravstvenu zaštitu i sve ono što su građani navikli. Taj proces će ići polako, pa će primjerice porodilje imati devet mjeseci, pa osam, pa sedam i tako će se smanjivati, mirovine će biti manje i nesigurnije itd. Ništa se neće oduzeti odjednom, ali sistem će se polako amerikanizirati.

Fenomen kulture

Kako vidite sve te paradokse i dramatične najave u odnosu na nacionalne kulture o kojima se često razgovara upravo u kontekstu razgovora o globalizaciji?

– Kod Tillyja postoje provokacije i problematične teze, ali i vrlo zanimljive stvari. Čini mi se da se ideja o dramatičnim, brzim promjenama, u nečem što se naziva nacionalna država i liberalna demokracija, neće dogoditi. Scenariji prema kojima će se za dvadeset godina kapital toliko korporacijski zaigrati da će se institucije morati dramatično mijenjati, što bi ugrozilo i nacionalne države, ne čini mi se sigurnim. Prema tome, globalizacija kratkoročno ne dovodi u pitanje nacionalnu državu, a pogotovo ne kad unutra uđe fenomen koji Tilly ne diskutira. To je upravo fenomen kulture, koji je nama najčešće povezan uz globalizaciju. Jer, kad se u javnosti govori o globalizaciji onda se najčešće misli na MMF i slične institucije s jedne strane, misli se i na zaštitu planeta kao biološkog organizma koji može biti uništen zbog nekontroliranog kapitalizma i zagađenja, i na trećoj razini uvijek se razmišlja o ideji kulturnog imperijalizma i ideji obrane nacionalnih kultura, manjih kultura ili prednacionalnih kultura (primjerice, ako se radi o Papuancima, dakle onima koji nisu nacije ali su nositelji tribalnih kultura). Tu postajemo izrazito osjetljivi. Kad bi cijeli Tillyjev izvod bio točan, pitanje je nema li ideja obrane vrijednosti nacionalne kulture, tradicije, jezika, duha francuskog, njemačkog, talijanskog itd. koji nisu utvare nego nešto što zbiljski određuje pojedine narode, dakle nije li taj element nešto što će državi dati smisao na drugi način. Država će možda biti prisiljena kresati određene programe, ali će uvijek naći smisao u obrani nacionalnih kultura. Naravno, tu će jače države imati bolje šanse pa ako se, primjerice, Francuzi odluče boriti protiv američkih filmova moći će to raditi s puno većim novcima nego Hrvati, koji u takvoj borbi nemaju šanse. Uglavnom, kad se razmišljanja okrenu kulturi svi reagiraju trenutačno i nema razloga da određeni tip bilo čega, pa u krajnjoj konzekvenci i slobode, bude apsolutno dominantan. Upravo ovih dana slušamo ono što govori Bush o američkom kao najboljem načinu života, što je dovelo u pitanje obranu same slobode. Zato kod jednog dijela ljudi to ne izaziva nikakvo uzbuđenje nego čak odbojnost. Stoga ne čudi da odjednom dio ljudi počne razumijevati nervozu Bin Landena iako ne razumije akt ubijanja civila. Ali razumije da se neka kultura može osjećati ugroženom.

Prigovori Tillyju

Rasprava u kojoj se pojavljuje element kulture uglavnom odmah izaziva pozornost i svi postaju oprezni. Najednom dolazi do poistovjećenja. S problemima radničke klase i njezinom propašću možda se može poistovjetiti radnička klasa, ali da bi nestalo kulture, da odjednom nestanu čitavi jezici, narodi, plemena na to su ljudi osjetljivi i to se globalno doživljava kao barbarizam. Na demonstracijama koje se u Americi organiziraju protiv prevladavajućeg diskursa vidio sam parolu Globalizacija policijske države! Imam nekoliko prigovora na Tillyjev argument. Kao prvo, nacionalne kapitalističke ekonomije još trebaju nacionalne države, bez obzira što bilo s radnicima. Ali ono što je važno jest da nacionalne kapitalističke ekonomije ne trebaju demokraciju, jer je nisu ni prije imale. I što će se s demokracijom dogoditi doista sad ne znamo i zato Tillyjev argument ima snagu iako je vjerojatno da se kratkoročno neće događati ništa dramatično. Drugi prigovor mogao bi glasiti da radikalne promjene u načinu proizvodnje ugrožavaju radnička prava, ali da se taj fenomen može odvojiti od globalizacije. Taj prigovor uputio je Ari Zolberg. On tvrdi da se dramatično promijenio način proizvodnje i da zbog toga radnička klasa u smislu 19. i 20. stoljeća nestaje. Za njom nema potrebe. Ona je u Zolbergovu rječniku ugrožena vrsta. A s obzirom da nestaje sa scene nije neobično da nestaju i prava te klase. Ali to ne znači da nestaje ideja prava kao takva nego čak dolazi do proliferacije drugih prava kao što su prava žena, homoseksualaca, etničkih manjina, dlakavih životinja da ih se ne ubija zbog krzna, prava Zemlje, univerzalna ljudska prava, prava različitih vrsta da opstanu... To je prilično ozbiljan prigovor jer kaže da su kod izvoda promašeni i uzroci i posljedice. Dakle, uzroci gubljenja radničkih prava nisu globalni kapitalizam nego promjena u karakteru načina proizvodnje bio on globalan ili ne.

Sedlati leptira

I završni prigovor bi bio da globalni procesi mogu biti prodemokratski i čak proradnički u jednom dijelu svijeta, a antidemokratski u drugom. Dakle, Tillyjev je argument bio pomalo usko određen iako s punim razlogom, jer je on uperen protiv Fukuyame i sličnih, koji smatraju da će liberalne demokracije poplaviti planet Zemlju i da je to dobro za nju. On je htio pokazati kako se to sigurno neće dogoditi i kako se ne mogu svi prilagoditi, da se ne može sedlati i kravu i ovcu i leptira i crva jer sedlo odgovara određenom tipu, a on je u zapadnom svijetu. Za razliku od toga razumljivog tipa argumenta, Tilly je jednostavno zaboravio da procesi koji na Zapadu mogu dovesti u pitanje državu u tranzicijskim zemljama mogu pomoći da dođu do oblika političke vladavine koji trenutačno ne funkcionira, ali bi dugoročno mogao biti demokratskiji od nekih gdje su to bili prije dvadeset godina. Ili da dođe do porasta radničkih prava sa stvaranjem radničke klase u Africi. Uglavnom, globalizacija bi u tom slučaju bila nešto što je neutralno: negdje bi procvala, negdje propala. Tilly je svjestan svih tih prigovora, ima ih i više, ali zaoštravanjem argumenata do krajnih granica on pokazuje da nitko više nije siguran u novonastaloj situaciji, da je to pravi problem i da dolazi do organizacije globalne ekonomije koja može imati dramatične posljedice po one koji misle da su apsolutno sigurni i koji misle da će njihovi načini političkog organiziranja biti globalizirani. Moglo bi im se dogoditi da se jako promijene: da nije došlo do kraja povijesti nego da se jednostavno otvorila nova epoha s dramatičnim posljedicama.

NATIONALISM

NENAD MIŠČEVIĆ



The term “nationalism” is generally used to describe two phenomena: (1) the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity and (2) the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination. (1) raises questions about the concept of nation (or national identity), which is often defined in terms of common origin, ethnicity, or cultural ties, and while an individual’s membership in a nation is often regarded as involuntary, it is sometimes regarded as voluntary. (2) raises questions about whether self-determination must be understood as involving having full statehood with complete authority over domestic and international affairs, or whether something less is required.
It is traditional, therefore, to distinguish nations from states — whereas a nation often consists of an ethnic or cultural community, a state is a political entity with a high degree of sovereignty. While many states are nations in some sense, there are many nations which are not fully sovereign states. As an example, the Native American Iroquois constitute a nation but not a state, since they do not possess the requisite political authority over their internal or external affairs. If the members of the Iroquois nation were to strive to form a sovereign state in the effort to preserve their identity as a people, they would be exhibiting a state-focused nationalism.
Nationalism has long been ignored as a topic in political philosophy, written off as a relic from bygone times. It has only recently come into the focus of philosophical debate, partly in consequence of rather spectacular and troubling nationalist clashes, like those in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet republics. The surge of nationalism usually presents a morally ambivalent and for this reason often fascinating picture. “National awakenings” and struggles for political independence are often both heroic and inhumanly cruel; the formation of a recognizably national state often responds to deep popular sentiment, but can and does sometimes bring in its wake inhuman consequences, including violent expulsion and “cleansing” of non-nationals, all the way to organized mass murder. The moral debate on nationalism reflects a deep moral tension between solidarity with oppressed national groups on the one hand and repulsion in the face of crimes perpetrated in the name of nationalism on the other. Moreover, the issue of nationalism points to a wider domain of problems having to do with the treatment of ethnic and cultural differences within a democratic polity, which are arguably among the most pressing problems of contemporary political theory.
In recent years the focus of the debate about nationalism has shifted towards issues in international justice, probably in response to changes on the international scene: bloody nationalist wars such as those in the former Yugoslavia have become less conspicuous, whereas the issues of terrorism, of “clash of civilizations” and of hegemony in the international order have come to occupy public attention. One important link with earlier debates is provided by the contrast between views of international justice based on the predominance of sovereign nation-states and more cosmopolitan views, that either insist upon limiting national sovereignty, or even envisage its disappearance.
In this entry we shall first present conceptual issues of definition and classification (Sections 1 and 2) and then the arguments put forward in the debate (Section 3), dedicating more space to the arguments in favor of nationalism than to those against it, in order to give the philosophical nationalist a proper hearing.

• 1. What is a Nation?
o 1.1 The Basic Concept of Nationalism
o 1.2 The Concept of a Nation

• 2. Varieties of Nationalism
o 2.1 Concepts of Nationalism: Strict and Wide
o 2.2 Moral Claims: The Centrality of Nation

• 3. The Moral Debate
o 3.1 Classical and liberal nationalisms
o 3.2 Arguments in favor of nationalism: the deep need for community
o 3.3 Arguments in favor of nationalism: issues of justice

• 4. Conclusion


1. What is a Nation?

1.1 The Basic Concept of Nationalism

Although the term “nationalism” has a variety of meanings, it centrally encompasses the two phenomena noted at the outset: (1) the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their identity as members of that nation and (2) the actions that the members of a nation take in seeking to achieve (or sustain) some form of political sovereignty. (See for example, Nielsen 1998-99: 9.) Each of these aspects requires elaboration. (1) raises questions about the concept of nation or national identity, about what it is to belong to a nation and about how much one ought to care about one's nation. Nations and national identity may be defined in terms of common origin, ethnicity, or cultural ties, and while an individual's membership in the nation is often regarded as involuntary, it is sometimes regarded as voluntary. The degree of care for one's nation that is required by nationalists is often, but not always, taken to be very high: according to such views, the claims of one's nation take precedence over rival contenders for authority and loyalty (see Berlin 1979, Smith 1991, Levy 2000, and the discussion in Gans 2003).
(2) raises questions about whether sovereignty entails the acquisition of full statehood with complete authority for domestic and international affairs, or whether something less than statehood would suffice. Although sovereignty is often taken to mean full statehood (Gellner 1983, ch. 1), more recently possible exceptions have been recognized (Miller 1992: 87, and Miller 2000).
Despite these definitional worries, there is a fair amount of agreement about what is historically the most typical, paradigmatic form of nationalism. It is the one which features the supremacy of the nation's claims over other claims to individual allegiance and which features full sovereignty as the persistent aim of its political program. The state as political unit is seen by nationalists as centrally ‘belonging’ to one ethno-cultural group and as charged with protecting and promulgating its traditions. This form is exemplified by the classical, “revivalist” nationalism, that was most prominent in the 19th century in Europe and Latin America. This classical nationalism later spread across the world and in present days still marks many contemporary nationalisms.

1.2 The Concept of a Nation

In its general form the issue of nationalism concerns the mapping between the ethno-cultural domain (featuring ethno-cultural groups or “nations”) and the domain of political organization. In breaking the issue into its components, we have mentioned the importance of the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity. This point raises two sorts of questions. First, the descriptive ones. (1a) What is a nation and national identity? (1b) What is it to belong to a nation? (1c) What is the nature of pro-national attitudes? (1d) Is membership in a nation voluntary or non-voluntary? Second, the normative ones: (1e) Is the attitude of caring about national identity always appropriate? (1f) How much should one care?
In this section the descriptive questions are to be discussed, starting with (1a) and (1b). (The normative questions are addressed in Section 3 on the moral debate.) If one wants to enjoin people to struggle for the national interest, one must have some idea about what a nation is and what it is to belong to a nation. So, in order to formulate and ground their evaluations, claims and directives for action, pro-nationalist thinkers have been elaborating theories of ethnicity, culture, nation and state. Their opponents have in their turn challenged these elaborations. Now, some presuppositions about ethnic groups and nations are essential for the nationalist, others are theoretical elaborations designed to support the essential ones. The former concern the definition and status of the target or social group, the beneficiary of the nationalist program, variously called “nation,” “ethno-nation” or “ethnic-group.” Since nationalism is particularly prominent with groups that do not yet have a state, a definition of nation and nationalism purely in terms of belonging to a state is a non-starter.
Indeed, purely “civic” loyalties are often put into a separate category under the title “patriotism,” or “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas 1996, see the discussion in Markell, P. (2000)). This leaves two extreme options and a lot of intermediate positions. The first extreme option has been put forward by a small but distinguished band of theorists, including E. Renan (1882) and M. Weber (1970); for a recent defense see Brubaker (2004). According to their purely voluntaristic definition, a nation is any group of people aspiring to a common political state-like organization. If such a group of people succeeds in forming a state, the loyalties of the group members might be “civic” (as opposed to “ethnic”) in nature. At the other extreme, and more typically, nationalist claims are focused upon the non-voluntary community of common origin, language, tradition and culture, so that in the classical view an ethno-nation is a community of origin and culture, including prominently a language and customs. The distinction is related (although not identical) to that drawn by older schools of social and political science between “civic” and “ethnic” nationalism, the former being allegedly Western European and the latter more Central and Eastern European originating in Germany (a very prominent proponent of the distinction is Hans Kohn 1965). Philosophical discussions of nationalism tend to concern its ethno-cultural variants only and this practice will be followed here. A group aspiring to nationhood on this basis will be called an ‘ethno-nation’ in order to underscore its ethno-cultural rather than purely civic underpinnings. For the ethno-cultural nationalist it is one's ethno-cultural background which determines one's membership in the community. One cannot chose to be a member; instead, membership depends on the accident of origin and early socialization. However, commonality of origin has turned out to be mythical for most contemporary candidate groups: ethnic groups have been mixing for millennia.
Therefore, sophisticated pro-nationalists tend to stress cultural membership only and to speak of “nationality,” omitting the “ethno-” part (Miller 1992 and 2000, Tamir 1993, and Gans 2003). Michel Seymour in his proposal of a “socio-cultural definition” adds a political dimension to the purely cultural one. A nation is a cultural group, possibly but not necessarily united by common descent, endowed with civic ties (Seymour 2000). This is the kind of definition that would be accepted by most parties in the debate today. So defined, nation is a somewhat mixed, both ethno-cultural and civic category, but still closer to the purely ethno-cultural than to the purely civic extreme.
The wider descriptive underpinnings of nationalist claims have varied over the last two centuries. The early German elaborations talk about “the spirit of a people,” while somewhat later ones, mainly of French extraction, talk about “collective mentality,” ascribing to it specific and significant causal powers. A later descendent of this notion is the idea of a “national character” peculiar to each nation, which partly survives today under the guise of national “forms of life” and of feeling (Margalit 1997, see below). For almost a century, up to the end of the Second World War, it was customary to link nationalist views to organic metaphors of society. Isaiah Berlin, writing as late as the early seventies, proposed within his definition that nationalism consists of the conviction that people belong to a particular human group and that “...the characters of the individuals who compose the group are shaped by, and cannot be understood apart from, those of the group ...” (first published in 1972, reprinted in Berlin 1979: 341). The nationalist claims, according to Berlin, that “the pattern of life in a society is similar to that of a biological organism” (ibid.) and that the needs of this ‘organism’ determine the supreme goal for all of its members. Most contemporary defenders of nationalism, especially philosophers, avoid such language. The organic metaphor and talk about character have been replaced by one master metaphor: that of national identity. It is centered upon cultural membership and used both for the identity of a group and for the socially based identity of its members, e.g., the national identity of George in so far as he is English or British. Various authors unpack the metaphor in various ways: some stress involuntary membership in the community, others the strength with which one identifies with the community, yet others link it to the personal identity of each member of the community. Addressing these issues, the nationally minded philosophers, like Alasdair MacIntyre (1994), Charles Taylor (1989), M. Seymour and others have significantly contributed to establishing important topics such as community, membership, tradition and social identity within the contemporary philosophical debate.
Let us now turn to the issue of the origin and “authenticity” of ethno-cultural groups or ethno-nations. In social and political science one usually distinguishes two kinds of views. The first can be called “primordialist” views. According to them, actual ethno-cultural nations have either existed “since times immemorial” (an extreme, somewhat caricaturistic version, corresponding to nineteenth century nationalist rhetoric), or at least for a long time during the pre-modern period (Hastings 1997: see the discussion of his views in Nations and Nationalism, v. 9, 2003). There is a very popular moderate version of this view championed by Anthony Smith (1991 and 2001) under the name “ethnosymbolism.” According to it, nations are like artichokes, in that they have a lot of “unimportant leaves” that can be chewed up one by one, but also have a heart, which remains after the leaves have been eaten (the metaphor stems from Stanley Hoffmann: for details and sources see a recent debate between Smith (2003) and Özkirimli (2003)). The second are the modernist views, placing the origin of nations in modern times. They can be further classified according to their answer to a further question: how real is the ethno-cultural nation? The modernist realist view is that nations are real but distinctly modern creations, instrumental in the genesis of capitalism (Gellner 1983, Hobsbawn 1990, and Breuilly 2001). On the same side of the fence but more in a radical direction one finds anti-realist views. According to one such view nations are merely “imagined” but somehow still powerful entities; what is meant is that belief in them holds sway over the believers (Anderson 1965). The extreme anti-realist view claims that they are pure “constructions” (see Walker 2001, for an overview and literature). These divergent views seem to support rather divergent moral claims about nations. For an overview of nationalism in political theory see Vincent (2001).
Indeed, older authors — from great thinkers like Herder and Otto Bauer, to the propagandists who followed their footsteps — have been at great pains to ground normative claims upon firm ontological realism about nations: nations are real, bona fide entities. However, the contemporary moral debate has tried to diminish the importance of the imagined/real divide. Prominent contemporary philosophers have claimed that normative-evaluative nationalist claims are compatible with the “imagined” nature of a nation. (See, for instance, MacCormick 1982, Miller 1992 and 2000, and Tamir 1993.) They point out that common imaginings can tie people together and that actual interaction resulting from togetherness can engender important moral obligations.
Let us now turn to question (1c), the nature of pro-national attitudes. The explanatory issue that has interested political and social scientists concerns ethno-nationalist sentiment, the paradigm case of a pro-national attitude. Is it as irrational, romantic and indifferent to self-interest as it might seem on the surface? The issue has divided authors who see nationalism as basically irrational and those who try to explain it as being at least in some sense rational. Authors in the first camp who see it as irrational, propose various explanations of why people assent to irrational views. Some say, critically, that nationalism is based on “false consciousness.” But where does such false consciousness come from? The most simplistic view is that it is a result of direct manipulation of “masses” by “elites.” On the opposite side, the famous critic of nationalism, Elie Kedourie (1960) sees this irrationality as being spontaneous. Michael Walzer(2002) has recently offered a sympathetic account of nationalist passion . Authors relying upon the Marxist tradition offer various deeper explanations. To mention one, the French structuralist Étienne Balibar sees it as a result of “production” of ideology effectuated by mechanisms which have nothing to do with spontaneous credulity of individuals, but with impersonal, structural social factors (Balibar and Wallerstein 1992).
Consider now the other camp, those who see nationalist sentiments as being rational, at least in a very wide sense. Some authors claim that it is often rational for individuals to become nationalists (Hardin 1985). Consider the two sides of the nationalist coin. First, identification and cohesion within a ethno-national group has to do with inter-group cooperation, and cooperation is easier for those who are part of the same ethno-national group. To take an example of ethnic ties in a multiethnic state, a Vietnamese newcomer to the States will do well to rely on his co-nationals: common language, customs and expectations might help him a lot in finding his way in new surroundings. Once the ties are established and he has become part of a network, it is rational to go on cooperating and ethnic sentiment does secure the trust and the firm bond needed for smooth cooperation. A further issue is when it is rational to switch sides; to stay with our example, when does it become profitable for our Vietnamese to develop an all-American patriotism? This has received a detailed elaboration in David Laitin (1998, summarized in 2001; applied to language rights in Laitin and Reich 2004), who uses material from the former Soviet Union. The other side of the nationalist coin has to do with conflict between various ethno-nations. It concerns non-cooperation with the outsiders, which can go very far indeed. Can one rationally explain the extremes of ethno-national conflict? Authors like Russell Hardin propose to do it in terms of a general view of when hostile behavior is rational: most typically, if you have no reason to trust someone, it is reasonable to take precautions against him. If both sides take precautions, however, each will tend to see the other as being seriously inimical. It then becomes rational to start treating the other as an enemy. Mere suspicion can thus lead by small, individually rational steps, to a situation of conflict. (Such negative development is often presented as a variant of the so-called Prisoner’s Dilemma.) Now, it is relatively easy to spot the circumstances in which this general pattern applies to national solidarities and conflicts. The line of thought just sketched is often called “rational choice approach.” It has enabled the application of conceptual tools from game-theoretic and economic theories of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior to an explanation of ethno-nationalism.
It is worth mentioning, however, that the individualist rational-choice approach, centered upon personal rationality, has serious competitors. A tradition in social psychology, initiated by Henri Tajfel (1981), shows that individuals may identify with a randomly selected group, even when membership in the group brings no tangible rewards. Does rationality of any kind underlie this tendency to identification? Some authors (Sober and Wilson 1998) answer in the affirmative. They propose that it is a non-personal, evolutionary rationality: individuals who develop a sentiment of identification and sense of belonging end up better off in the evolutionary race; hence we have inherited such propensities. The initial sentiments were reserved for one's own kin, thus supporting the spreading of one’s own genes. Cultural evolution has taken over the mechanisms of identification that initially developed within biological evolution. As a result, we project the sentiment originally reserved for kinship to our cultural group. Further, detailed explanations from such socio-biological perspective differ greatly among themselves and constitute a wide and rather promising research program (see an overview in Goetze 2001).
Finally, as for question (1d), the nation is typically seen as essentially a non-voluntary community to which one belongs by birth and early nurture through which the belonging is somehow enhanced and perhaps taken to a higher level, becoming more conscious and more complete by one's own endorsement. Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz express the common view when they write about belonging to a nation: “Qualification for membership is usually determined by non-voluntary criteria. One cannot choose to belong. One belongs because of who one is” (Margalit and Raz 1990: 447). And of course, this belonging brings crucial benefits: “Belonging to a national form of life means being within a frame that offers meaning to people's choice between alternatives, thus enabling them to acquire an identity” (Margalit 1997: 83). Why is national belonging taken to be involuntary? Very often it is described starting from linguistic belonging: a child does not decide which language will become her or his mother tongue, and it is often pointed out that one's mother tongue is the most important depository of concepts, knowledge, social and cultural significance. All these are embedded in the language and do not exist without it. Early socialization is seen as socialization into a specific culture, and very often the culture is just assumed to be a national one. “There are people who express themselves ‘Frenchly,’ while others have forms of life that are expressed ‘Koreanly’ or ‘Icelandicly,’” writes Margalit (1997: 80). The resulting belonging is then to a large extent non-voluntary. (There are exceptions to this basically non-voluntaristic view, for instance, theoretical nationalists who accept voluntary changes of nationality. (See also Ernst Renan's (1882: 19) famous definition of a nation as constituted by an “everyday plebiscite.”)

2. Varieties of Nationalism

2.1 Concepts of Nationalism: Strict and Wide

We began by pointing out that nationalism focuses upon (1) the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity and (2) the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) some form of political sovereignty. The politically central point is (2), the actions enjoined by the nationalist.
To these we now turn, beginning with sovereignty, the usual focus of a national struggle for independence. It raises an important issue, that I will call (2a): Does political sovereignty require statehood or something weaker? The classical answer is that a state is required. A more liberal answer is that some form of political autonomy suffices. Once this has been discussed, we can turn to the related normative issues: (2b) What actions are morally permitted to achieve sovereignty and to maintain it? and (2c) Under what conditions is it morally permitted to take actions of this kind?
Consider first the classical nationalist answer to (2a). Political sovereignty requires a state “rightfully owned” by the ethno-nation (Oldenquist 1997, who credits the expression to the writer Czeslaw Milosz). Those who develop this line of thought often state or imply specific answers to (2b) and (2c), i.e., that in a national independence struggle the use of force against the threatening central power is almost always a legitimate means for bringing about sovereignty. However, classical nationalism is not only concerned with the creation of a state but also with its maintenance and strengthening. So, once the state is there, further options are opened for nationalists. They sometimes promote claims for its expansion (even at the cost of wars) and sometimes opt for isolationist policies. The expansion is often justified by appeal to the unfinished business of bringing literally all members of the nation under one state, sometimes by the interest of the nation in gaining more territory and resources. As for maintenance of sovereignty by peaceful and merely ideological means, political nationalism is closely tied to nationalism in culture. The latter insists upon the preservation and transmission of a given culture, more accurately, of recognizably ethno-national traits of the culture in its pure form, dedicating artistic creation, education and research to this goal. Of course, the ethno-national traits can be actual or invented, partly or fully so. Again, in the classical variant the relevant norm claims that one has both a right and an obligation (“a sacred duty”) to promote such a tradition. Its force is that of a trump that wins over other interests and even over rights (which is often needed in order to carry on national independence struggle). In consequence, classical nationalism has something to say about the level of attitudes as well: as for (1e) it sees caring for one's nation a fundamental duty of each of its members and is prone to give to it, in its answer to (1f), an unlimited scope. Let me list its most important features for future reference:
Classical nationalism is the political program that sees creation and maintenance of a fully sovereign state owned by a given ethno-national group (“people” or “nation”) as a primary duty of each member of the group. Starting from the assumption that the appropriate (or “natural”) unit of culture is the ethno-nation, it claims that a primary duty of each member is to abide in cultural matters by one's recognizably ethno-national culture.
Classical nationalists are usually vigilant about the kind of culture they protect and promote and about the kind of attitude people have to their nation-state. This watchful attitude carries some potential dangers: many elements of a given culture that are universalist or simply not recognizably national might, and will sometimes, fall prey to such nationalist enthusiasms. Classical nationalism in everyday life puts various additional demands on individuals, from buying more expensive domestically produced goods in preference to the cheaper imported ones, to procreating as many future members of the nation as one can manage. (See Yuval-Davies 1997.)
Besides classical nationalism (and its more radical extremist cousins), various moderate views are also nowadays classified as nationalist. Indeed, the philosophical discussion has shifted to these moderate or even ultra-moderate forms, and most philosophers who describe themselves as nationalists propose very moderate nationalist programs. Let me characterize these briefly:
Nationalism in a wider sense is any complex of attitudes, claims and directives for action ascribing a fundamental political, moral and cultural value to nation and nationality and deriving special obligations and permissions (for individual members of the nation and for any involved third parties, individual or collective) from this ascribed value.
Nationalisms, in this larger sense, can vary somewhat in their conceptions of nation (which are often left implicit in their discourse), with respect to the ground and degree of its value and in the scope of claims and of prescribed obligations. (The term can also be applied to other cases not covered by classical nationalism, for instance, the hypothetical pre-state political forms that an ethnic identity might take). Moderate nationalism is a universalizing nationalism in the wider sense which is less demanding than classical nationalism. It sometimes goes under the name of “patriotism.” (A different usage, again, reserves “patriotism” for valuing of civic community and loyalty to one's state, in contrast to nationalism, centered around ethno-cultural communities). The variations of nationalism most relevant for philosophy are those that influence the moral standing of claims and of recommended nationalist practices. The elaborate philosophical views put forward in favor of nationalism will be referred to here to as “theoretical nationalist,” the adjective serving to distinguish such views from the less sophisticated and more practical nationalist discourse. The central theoretical nationalist evaluative claims can usefully be put on the map of possible positions within political theory in the following somewhat simplified and schematic way.
Nationalist claims featuring the centrality of nation for political action provide an answer to two crucial general questions. First, is there one kind of large social group (smaller than the whole of mankind) that is morally of central importance or not? The nationalist answer is that there is just one, namely, the nation. When an ultimate choice is to be made, nation has priority. (This answer is implied by rather standard definitions of nationalism offered by Berlin, discussed in Section 1, and Smith 2001) Second, what is the ground of obligation that the individual has to the morally central group? Is it voluntary or involuntary membership in the group? The typical contemporary nationalist thinker opts for the latter, while admitting that voluntary endorsement of one's national identity is a morally important achievement. On the philosophical map, the pro-nationalist normative tastes fit nicely with the communitarian stance in general: most pro-nationalist philosophers are communitarians who choose nation as the preferred community (in contrast to those of their fellow-communitarians who prefer more far-ranging communities, such as those defined by global religious traditions). However, some recent writers, e.g., Will Kymlicka (2001), who describe themselves as liberal nationalists, reject the communitarian underpinning.

2.2 Moral Claims: The Centrality of Nation

We now pass to the normative dimension of nationalism. We shall first describe the very heart of the nationalist program, i.e., sketch and classify the typical normative and evaluative nationalist claims. These claims can be seen as answers to the normative subset of our initial questions about (1) pro-national attitudes and (2) actions.
The claims thus recommend various courses of action, centrally those meant to secure and sustain the political organization — preferably a state — for the given ethno-cultural national community (thereby making more specific the answers to our normative questions (1e, 1f, 2b, 2c)). Further, they enjoin the members of the community to promulgate recognizably ethno-cultural contents as central features of the cultural life within such a state. Finally, we shall discuss various lines of pro-nationalist thought that have been put forward in defense of these claims. For starters, let us return to the claims concerning the furthering of the national state and culture. These are proposed by the nationalist as a guide and a norm of conduct. Philosophically the most important variations concern three aspects of such normative claims:
i. The normative nature and strength of the claim: does it promote merely a right (say, to have and maintain a form of political self-government, preferably and typically a state, or having cultural life centered upon a recognizably ethno-national culture), or a moral obligation (to get and maintain one), or a moral, legal and political obligation? The strongest claim is typical of classical nationalism: its typical norms are both moral and, once the nation-state is in place, legally enforceable obligations in regard to all parties concerned, including the individual members of the ethno-nation. A weaker, but still quite demanding version speaks only of moral obligation (“sacred duty”). A more liberal version is satisfied with a claim-right to having a state that would be “rightfully owned” by the ethno-nation.
ii. The strength of the nationalist claim in relation to various external interests and rights: to give a real example, is the use of the domestic language so important that even international conferences should be held in it, at the cost of losing the most interesting participants from abroad? The force of the nationalist claim is here being weighed against the force of other claims, those of individual or group interests, or rights. Variations in comparative strength of the claims take place on a continuum between two extremes. At one rather unpalatable extreme the nation-focused claims are seen as trumps that take precedence over any other claims, even over human rights. Further towards the center is the classical nationalism that gives nation-centered claims precedence over individual interest and many needs (including pragmatic collective utility), but not necessarily over general human rights. (See, for example, MacIntyre 1994 and Oldenquist 1997.) On the opposite end, which is mild, humane and liberal, the central nationalist claims are accorded prima facie status only (see Tamir 1993 and Gans 2003).
iii. For which groups are the nationalist claims meant to be valid? What is their scope? First, they can be valid for every ethno-nation and thereby universal. An example would be the claim “every ethno-nation should have its own state.” To put it more officially
Universalizing nationalism is the political program that claims that every ethno-nation should have its state, which it should rightfully own and whose interests it should promote.
Alternatively, a claim may be particularistic, such as the claim “Group X ought to have a state,” where this implies nothing about any other group:
Particularistic nationalism is the political program claiming that some ethno-nation should have its state, without extending the claim to all ethno-nations. It does it either
A. by omission (unreflective particularistic nationalism), or
B. by explicitly specifying who is excluded: “Group X ought to have a state, but group Y should not.” (invidious nationalism).
I have dubbed the most difficult and indeed chauvinistic sub-case of particularism, i.e. (B), “invidious” since it explicitly denies the privilege of having a state to some peoples. Thomas Pogge (1997) proposes a further division of (B) into the “high” stance, which denies it to some types of groups, and the “low” one, which denies it to some particular groups. Serious theoretical nationalists usually defend only the universalist variety, whereas the nationalist-in-the-street most often the egoistic indeterminate one (“Some nations should have a state, above all mine!”). Classical nationalism comes both in particularistic and universalistic varieties.
Although the three dimensions of variation — internal strength, comparative strength and scope — are logically independent, they are psychologically and politically intertwined. People who are radical in one respect on the nationality issue tend also to be radical in other respects. In other words, attitudes tend to cluster together in stable clusters, so that extreme (or moderate) attitudes on one dimension psychologically and politically belong with extreme (or moderate) ones on others. The hybrids of extreme attitude on one dimension with moderate on the others are psychologically and socially unstable.
The nationalist picture of morality has been traditionally quite close to the dominant view in theory of international relations, called “realism.” To put the point of classical realism starkly, morality ends at the boundaries of the nation-state; beyond the boundaries there is nothing but anarchy. The view is explicit in Friederich Meinecke (1965: Introduction) and Raymond Aron (1962), and it is very close to the surface in Hans Morgenthau (1946). It nicely complements the main classical nationalist claim that each ethno-nation or people should have a state of its own and suggests what happens next: nation-states enter into competition in the name of their constitutive peoples.

3. The Moral Debate

3.1 Classical and liberal nationalisms

Let us return to our initial normative question, centered around (1) attitudes and (2) actions. Is national partiality justified and to what extent? What actions are appropriate for bringing sovereignty about? In particular, are ethno-national states and institutionally protected (ethno-)national cultures goods independent from the individual will of the members, and how far may one go in protecting them? The philosophical debate for and against nationalism is a debate about the moral validity of its central claims. In particular, the ultimate moral issue is the following: is any form of nationalism morally permissible or justified and, if not, how bad are particular forms of it? (For a recent debate on partiality in general, see Chatterjee and Smith 2003.)
Why do nationalist claims require a defense? In some situations they seem plausible: for instance the plight of some stateless national groups — the history of Jews and Armenians, the misfortunes of Kurds — makes one spontaneously endorse the idea that having their own state would have solved the worst problems. Still, there are good reasons to examine the nationalist claims more carefully. The most general reason is that it should first be shown that the political form of a nation state has some value as such, that a national community has a particular, or even preeminent moral and political value and that claims in its favor have normative validity. Once this is established, a further defense is needed. Some classical nationalist claims appear to clash — at least under normal circumstances of contemporary life — with various values that people tend to accept. Some of these values are considered essential to liberal-democratic societies, while others are important specifically for the flourishing of culture and creativity. The main values in the first set are individual autonomy and benevolent impartiality (most prominently towards members of groups culturally different from one's own). The alleged special duties towards one's ethno-national culture can interfere, and often do interfere, with individuals’ right to autonomy. Also, if these duties are construed very strictly they can interfere with other individual rights, e.g., the right to privacy. Many feminist authors have noted that a suggestion typically offered by the nationalist, namely that women have a moral obligation to give birth to new members of the nation and to nurture them for the sake of the nation, clashes with both the autonomy and the privacy of these women (Yuval-Davis 1997 and Okin 1999, 2002 and 2005). Another endangered value is diversity within the ethno-national community, which can also be thwarted by the homogeneity of a central national culture.
Nation-oriented duties also interfere with the value of unconstrained creativity, e.g., telling writers or musicians or philosophers that they have a special duty to promote national heritage does interfere with the freedom of creation. The question here is not whether these individuals have the right to promote their national heritage, but whether they have a duty to do so.
In between these two sets of endangered values, the autonomy-centered and creativity-centered ones, are the values that seem to arise from ordinary needs of people living under ordinary circumstances (Barry 2001; and Barry 2003 in the Other Internet Resources section below). In many modern states, citizens of different ethnic backgrounds live together and very often value this kind of life. This very fact of cohabitation seems to be a good that should be upheld. Nationalism does not tend to foster this kind of multiculturalism and pluralism, judging from both theory (especially the classical nationalist one) and experience. But the problems get worse. In practice, a widespread variant of nationalism is the invidious particularistic form claiming rights for one's own people and denying them to others, for reasons that seem to be far from accidental. The source of the problem is the competition for scarce resources: as Ernst Gellner (1983) has famously pointed out, there is too little territory for all candidate ethnic groups to have a state and the same goes for other goods demanded by nationalists for the exclusive use of their co-nationals. According to some authors (McCabe 1997) the invidious variant is more coherent than any other form of nationalism: if one values highly one's own ethnic group the simplest way is to value it tout court. If one definitely prefers one's own culture in all respects to any foreign one, it is a waste of time and attention to bother about others. The universalist, non-invidious variant introduces enormous psychological and political complications. These arise from a tension between spontaneous attachment to one's own community and the demand to regard all communities with an equal eye. This tension might make the humane, non-invidious position psychologically unstable and difficult to uphold in situations of conflict and crisis. This psychological weakness renders it politically less efficient.
The philosophical authors sympathetic to nationalism are aware of the evils that historical nationalism has produced and usually distance themselves from these. They usually speak of “various accretions that have given nationalism a bad name,” and they are eager to “separate the idea of nationality itself from these excesses” (Miller 1992: 87 and Miller 2000). Such thoughtful pro-nationalist writers have put forward several lines of thought in defense of nationalism, thereby initiating an ongoing philosophical dialogue between the proponents and the opponents of the claim (see the anthologies McKim and McMahan 1997, Couture, Nielsen, and Seymour 1998, and Miscevic 2000). In order to help the reader find his or her way through the involved debate, we shall briefly summarize the considerations which are open to the ethno-nationalist to defend his or her case. (Compare the useful overview in Lichtenberg 1997.) The considerations and lines of thought built upon them can be used to defend very different varieties of nationalism, from radical to very moderate ones.
It is important to offer a warning concerning the key assumptions and premises which figure in each of the lines of thought summarized below, namely, that the assumptions often live an independent life in the philosophical literature. Some of them figure in the proposed defenses of various traditional views which have little to do with the concept of a nation in particular.
For brevity, I shall reduce each line of thought to a brief argument; the actual debate is, however, more involved than one can represent in a sketch. I shall indicate, in brackets, some prominent lines of criticism that have been put forward in the debate. (These are discussed in greater detail in Miscevic 2001.) The main arguments in favor of nationalism, which purport to establish its fundamental claims about state and culture, will be divided into two sets. The first set of arguments defends the claim that national communities have a high value, often seen as non-instrumental and independent of the wishes and choices of their individual members, and argues that they should therefore be protected by means of state and official statist policies. The second set is less deeply ‘philosophical’ (or ‘comprehensive’) and encompasses arguments from the requirements of justice, rather independent from substantial assumptions about culture and cultural values.
The first set will be presented here in more detail, since it has formed the center of the debate. It depicts the community as the deep source of value or as the unique transmission device that connects the members to some important values. In this sense, the arguments from this set are communitarian in a particularly “deep” sense, since they are grounded in basic features of the human condition. Here is a characterization.
The deep communitarian perspective is a theoretical perspective on political issues (here, to nationalism), that justifies a given political arrangement (here, a nation-state) by appeal to deep philosophical assumptions about human nature, language, community ties and identity (in a deeper, philosophical sense).
The general form of deep communitarian arguments is the following. First, the communitarian premise: there is some uncontroversial good (e.g. a person's identity), and some kind of community is essential for acquisition and preservation of it. Then comes the claim that the ethno-cultural nation is the kind of community ideally suited for this task. Unfortunately, this crucial claim is rarely defended in detail in the literature. But here is a sample from Margalit, whose last sentence has been already quoted above:
The idea is that people make use of different styles to express their humanity. The styles are generally determined by the communities to which they belong. There are people who express themselves ‘Frenchly’, while others have forms of life that are expressed ‘Koreanly’ or … ‘Icelandicly’ (Margalit 1997: 80).
Then follows the statist conclusion: in order that such a community should preserve its own identity and support the identity of its members, it has to assume (always or at least normally) the political form of a state. The conclusion of this type of argument is that the ethno-national community has the right, in respect to any third party and to its own members, to have an ethno-national state, and the citizens of the state have the right and obligation to favor their own ethnic culture in relation to any other.
Although the deeper philosophical assumptions in the arguments stem from the communitarian tradition, weakened forms have also been proposed by more liberally minded philosophers. The original communitarian lines of thought in favor of nationalism suggest that there is some value in preserving ethno-national cultural traditions, in feelings of belonging to a common nation and in solidarity between its members. A liberal nationalist might accept that these may not be the central values of political life, but claim that they are values nevertheless. Moreover, the diametrically opposite views, pure individualism and cosmopolitanism, do seem arid and abstract and seem unmotivated by comparison. By cosmopolitanism I shall understand a moral and political doctrine of the following sort:
Cosmopolitanism is the view that
a. one's primary moral obligations are directed to all human beings (regardless of geographical or cultural distance) and
b. political arrangements should faithfully reflect this universal moral obligation (in the form of supra-statist arrangements that take precedence over nation-states).
The critics of cosmopolitanism sometimes argue that these two claims are incoherent since human beings generally thrive best under some global institutional arrangement (like ours) that concentrates power and authority at the level of states.
Confronted with opposing forces of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, many philosophers opt for a mixture of liberalism-cosmopolitanism and patriotism-nationalism. In his writings Benjamin Barber glorifies “a remarkable mixture of cosmopolitanism and parochialism” which, in his view characterizes American national identity (in Cohen 1996: 31). Charles Taylor claims that “we have no choice but to be cosmopolitan and patriots” (ibid: 121). Hilary Putnam proposes loyalty to what is best in the multiple traditions that each of us participates in; apparently a middle way between a narrow-minded patriotism and a too abstract cosmopolitanism (ibid: 114). The compromise has been foreshadowed by Berlin (1979) and Taylor (1989 and 1993), and its various versions worked out in considerable detail by authors such as Yael Tamir (1993), David Miller (1995 and 2000), Kai Nielsen (1998), Michel Seymour (2000) and Chaim Gans (2003). In recent years it has occupied the center stage of the debate. Most liberal nationalist authors accept various weakened versions of the arguments we list below, taking them to support moderate or ultra-moderate nationalist claims.
Here are the main weakenings of classical ethno-nationalism that the liberal, limited-liberal and cosmopolitan nationalists propose. First, ethno-national claims have only prima facie strength and cannot trump individual rights. Second, legitimate ethno-national claims do not in themselves and automatically amount to the right to a state, but rather to the right to a certain level of cultural autonomy. Third, ethno-nationalism is subordinate to civic patriotism, and this has little or nothing to do with ethnic criteria. Fourth, ethno-national mythologies and similar “important falsehoods” are to be tolerated only if benign and inoffensive, in which case they are morally permissible in spite of their falsity. Finally, any legitimacy that ethno-national claims may have is to be derived from choices that concerned individuals should be free to make.

3.2 Arguments in favor of nationalism: the deep need for community

Consider now the particular arguments from the first set. The first argument depends on assumptions that also appear in the subsequent ones, only that it ascribes to the community an intrinsic value, while the following ones point more towards a nation's instrumental value derived from the value of individual flourishing, moral understanding, firm identity and the like.
(1) The Argument From Intrinsic Value. Each ethno-national community is valuable in and of itself since it is only within the natural encompassing framework of various cultural traditions that important meanings and values are produced and transmitted. The members of such communities share a special cultural proximity to each other. By speaking the same language and sharing customs and traditions, the members of these communities are typically closer to one another in various ways than they are to those who don’t share the culture. The community thereby becomes a network of morally connected agents, i.e., a moral community, with special, very strong ties of obligation. A prominent obligation of each individual concerns the underlying traits of the ethnic community, above all language and customs: they ought to be cherished, protected, preserved and reinforced. The general assumption that moral obligations increase with cultural proximity is often criticized as problematic. Moreover, even if we grant this general assumption in theory, it breaks down in practice. Nationalist activism is most often turned against close (and substantially similar) neighbors rather than against distant strangers, so that in many important contexts the appeal to proximity will not work. It might however retain its potential force against culturally distant groups.
(2) The Argument From Flourishing. The ethno-national community is essential for each of its members to flourish. In particular, it is only within such a community that an individual can acquire concepts and values crucial for understanding the community's cultural life in general and one's own life in particular. There has been much debate on the pro-nationalist side about whether divergence of values is essential for separateness of national groups. The Canadian liberal nationalists, Seymour (1999), Taylor, and Kymlicka, pointed out that the “divergences of value between different regions of Canada” that aspire to separate nationhood are “minimal.” Taylor (1993: 155) concluded that it is not separateness of value that matters. This result is still compatible with the argument from flourishing, if ‘concepts and values’ are not taken to be specifically national, as communitarian nationalists (MacIntyre 1994 and Margalit 1997) have claimed.
(3) The Argument from Identity. Communitarian philosophers emphasize nurture over nature as the principal force determining our identity as persons — we come to be the persons we are because of the social settings and contexts in which we mature. The claim certainly has some plausibility. The very identity of each person depends upon his/her participation in communal life (see MacIntyre 1994, Nielsen 1998, and Lagerspetz 2000). For example, Nielsen writes:
We are, to put it crudely, lost if we cannot identify ourselves with some part of an objective social reality: a nation, though not necessarily a state, with its distinctive traditions. What we find in people — and as deeply embedded as the need to develop their talents — is the need not only to be able to say what they can do but to say who they are. This is found, not created, and is found in the identification with others in a shared culture based on nationality or race or religion or some slice or amalgam thereof. ... Under modern conditions, this securing and nourishing of a national consciousness can only be achieved with a nation-state that corresponds to that national consciousness (1993: 32).
Given that an individual's morality depends upon their having a mature and stable personal identity, the communal conditions that foster the development of such personal identity have to be preserved and encouraged. The philosophical nationalists claim that the national format is the right format for preserving and encouraging such identity-providing communities. Therefore, communal life should be organized around particular national cultures. The classical nationalist proposes that cultures should be given their states, while the liberal nationalist proposes that cultures should get at least some form of political protection.
(4) The Argument From Moral Understanding. A particularly important variety of value is moral value. Some values are universal, e.g. freedom and equality, but these are too abstract and “thin.” The rich, “thick” moral values are discernible only within particular traditions, to those who have wholeheartedly endorsed the norms and standards of the given tradition. As Charles Taylor puts it, “the language we have come to accept articulates the issues of the good for us” (1989: 35). The nation offers a natural framework for moral traditions and thereby for moral understanding; it is the primary school of morals. (I note in fairness that Taylor himself is ambivalent about the national format of morality.) An often noticed problem with this line of thought is that particular nations do not each have a special morality of their own. Also, the detailed, “thick” morality may vary more across other divisions, such as class or gender divisions, than across ethno-national groups.
(5) The Argument from Diversity. Each national culture contributes in a unique way to the diversity of human cultures. The most famous twentieth century proponent of the idea, Isaiah Berlin (interpreting Herder, who first saw this idea as significant) writes:
The ‘physiognomies’ of cultures are unique: each presents a wonderful exfoliation of human potentialities in its own time and place and environment. We are forbidden to make judgments of comparative value, for that is measuring the incommensurable (1976: 206).
The carrier of basic value is thus the totality of cultures, from which each national culture and style of life that contributes to the totality derives its own value. The plurality of styles can be preserved and enhanced by tying the styles to ethno-national “forms of life.” The argument from diversity is therefore pluralistic: it ascribes value to each particular culture from the viewpoint of the totality of cultures available. Assuming that the (ethno-)nation is the natural unit of culture, the preservation of cultural diversity amounts to institutionally protecting the purity of (ethno-)national culture. A pragmatic inconsistency might threaten this argument. The issue is who can legitimately propose ethno-national diversity as ideal: the nationalist is much too tied to his or her own culture to do it, while the cosmopolitan is too eager to preserve intercultural links that go beyond the idea of having a single nation-state. Moreover, is diversity a value such that it deserves to be protected whenever it exists?
The line of thought (1) is not individualistic. And (5) can be presented without reference to individuals: Diversity may be good in its own right, or may be good for nations. But other lines of thought in the set just presented are all linked to the importance of community life in relation to the individual. They emerged from the perspective of “deep” communitarian thought, and a recurrent theme is the importance of the fact that membership in the community is not chosen but rather involuntary. In each argument, there is a general communitarian premise (a community, to which one belongs willy-nilly, is crucial for one's identity or for flourishing or for some other important good). This premise is coupled with the more narrow nation-centered descriptive claim that the ethno-nation is precisely the kind of community ideally suited for the task. However, liberal nationalists do not find these arguments completely persuasive. In their view, the premises of the arguments may not support the full package of nationalist ambitions and may not be unconditionally valid. Still, there is a lot to these arguments and they might support liberal nationalism and a more modest stance in favor of national cultures.
The liberal nationalist stance is mild and civil and there is much to be said in favor of it. It strives to reconcile our intuitions in favor of some sort of political protection of cultural communities with a liberal political morality. Of course, this raises issues of compatibility between liberal universal principles and the particular attachments to one's ethno-cultural nation. Very liberal nationalists such as Tamir divorce ethno-cultural nationhood from statehood. Also, the kind of love for country they suggest is tempered by all kinds of universalist considerations, which in the last instance trump national interest (Tamir 1993: 115, see also Moore 2001 and Gans 2003). There is an ongoing debate among philosophical nationalists about how much weakening and compromising is still compatible with a stance's being nationalist at all. (For example, Canovan 1996: ch. 10) presents Tamir as having abandoned the ideal of the nation-state and thereby nationhood as such; Seymour (1999) criticizes Taylor and Kymlicka for turning their backs on genuine nationalist programs and for proposing multiculturalism instead of nationalism.) There is also a streak of cosmopolitan interest present in the work of some liberal nationalists (Nielsen 1998-99).

3.3 Arguments in favor of nationalism: issues of justice

The arguments in the second set concern political justice and do not rely on metaphysical claims about identity, flourishing or cultural values. They appeal to (actual or alleged) circumstances that would make nationalist policies reasonable (or permissible or even mandatory), such as (a) the fact that a large part of the world is organized into nation states (so that each new group aspiring to create a nation-state just follows an established pattern), or (b) the circumstances of group self-defense or of redress of past injustice that might justify nationalist policies (to take a special case). Some of the arguments also present nationhood as conducive to important political goods, such as equality.
(1) The Argument From the Right to Collective Self-Determination. A sufficiently large group of people has a prima face right to govern itself and to decide its future membership, if the members of the group so wish. It is fundamentally the democratic will of the members themselves that grounds the right to an ethno-national state and to ethno-centric cultural institutions and practices. This argument presents the justification of (ethno-)national claims as deriving from the will of the members of the nation. It is therefore highly suitable for liberal nationalism but not appealing to a deep communitarian, who sees the demands of the nation as being independent from, and prior to, the choices of particular individuals. (For extended discussion of this argument, see Buchanan 1991, which has become a contemporary classic, Moore 1998, and Gans 2003.)
(2) The Argument from the Right to Self-defense and to Redress Past Injustices. Oppression and injustice give the victim group a just cause and the right to secede. If a minority group is oppressed by the majority, so that nearly all minority members are worse off than most majority members, then the nationalist minority claims are morally plausible and may even be compelling. The argument implies a restrictive answer to our questions (2b) and (2c): the use of force in order to achieve sovereignty is legitimate only in cases of self-defense and redress. Of course, there is a whole lot of work to be done specifying against whom force may legitimately be used and how much damage may be done to how many. It establishes a typical remedial right, which is acceptable from a liberal standpoint. (See the discussion in Kukathas and Poole 2000, also Buchanan 1991.)
(3) The Argument from Equality. Members of a minority group are often disadvantaged in relation to a dominant culture because they have to rely on those with the same language and culture to conduct the affairs of daily life. Since freedom to conduct one's daily life is a primary good and it is difficult to change or give up reliance on one's minority culture to attain that good, this reliance can lead to certain inequalities if special measures are not taken. Spontaneous nation building by the majority has to be moderated. Therefore, liberal neutrality itself requires that the majority provide certain basic cultural goods, i.e., granting differential rights (see Kymlicka 1995b, 2001 and 2003). Institutional protections and the right to the minority group's own institutional structure are remedies that restore equality and turn the resulting nation-state into a more moderate multicultural one (Kymlicka 2001 and 2003).
(4) The Argument from Success. The nation-state has been successful in the past, promoting equality and democracy. Ethno-national solidarity is a powerful motive for a more egalitarian distribution of goods (Miller 1995 and Canovan 1996). The nation-state also seems to be essential to safeguard the moral life of communities in the future since it is the only form of political institution capable of protecting communities from the threats of globalization and assimilationism. (For a detailed critical discussion of this argument see Mason 1999.)
These political arguments can be combined with deep communitarian ones. However, taken in isolation, they offer the more interesting perspective of a “liberal culturalism” that is more suitable for ethno-culturally plural societies. It is more remote from classical nationalism than the liberal nationalism of Tamir and Nielsen, since it eschews any communitarian philosophical underpinning (see the detailed presentation and defense in Kymlicka 2001, who still occasionally calls such culturalism ‘nationalist,’ and a short summary in Kymlicka 2003 and Gans 2003). The idea of moderate nation-building points to an open multi-culturalism, in which every group receives its share of remedial rights, but instead of walling itself up against others, participates in a common, overlapping civic culture and in open communication with other sub-communities. Given the variety of pluralistic societies and intense transnational interactions, such openness seems to many to be the only guarantee of stable social and political life (see the debate in Shapiro and Kymlicka 1997). This openness is important to avoid the trap called by Margaret Canovan “the paradox of the prowling cats” (2001). She warns that “new nationalist theories inadvertently contain perverse incentives to nationalists to do the exact opposite of what the theorist intends to authorize.” The only solution seems to be extreme moderation. The dialectics of moderating nationalist claims in the context of pluralistic societies might thus lead to a stance that is respectful of cultural differences, but liberal and potentially cosmopolitan in its ultimate goals.
In recent years the issues of nationalism have also been increasingly integrated into the debate on international order (see entries Globalization and Cosmopolitanism). The main conceptual link is the claim that nation-states are natural, stable and suitable units of international order. It is underpinned by the assumption that to each nation-state corresponds its “people,” culturally homogenous population whose members are prone to solidarity with their compatriots. The center-stage of the recent debate is John Rawls's view set out in his The Law of Peoples (1999), which ascribes a great deal of political promise and a high moral value to the international system composed of liberal and decent nation-states. More cosmopolitan critics of Rawls argue against such a high status for nation-states and against the assumption of homogenous “peoples” (Pogge 2001 and 2002, O’Neill 2000, Nussbaum 2002, and Barry 1999). A related debate concerns the role of minorities in the processes of globalization (see Kaldor 2004). The interest of philosophers in the morality of the international order has generated interesting proposals about alternative subnational and supranational units, which could play a role alongside nation-states and might even come to supplement them (for an interesting recent overview of alternatives see Walzer 2004: chapter 12).

4. Conclusion

The philosophy of nationalism nowadays does not concern itself much with the aggressive and dangerous form of invidious nationalism that often occupies center stage in the news and in sociological research. Although this pernicious form can be of significant instrumental value mobilizing oppressed people and giving them a sense of dignity, its moral costs are usually taken by philosophers to outweigh its benefits. Nationalist-minded philosophers distance themselves from such aggressive nationalisms and mainly seek to construct and defend very moderate versions; these have therefore come to be the main focus of recent philosophical debate.
In presenting the claims that nationalists defend, we have started from more radical ones and have moved towards liberal nationalist alternatives. In examining the argument for these claims, we have first presented metaphysically demanding communitarian arguments, resting upon deep communitarian assumptions about culture, such as the premise that the ethno-cultural nation is universally the central and most important community for each human individual. This is an interesting and respectable claim, but its plausibility has not yet been established. The moral debate about nationalism has resulted in various weakenings of the cultural arguments, proposed by liberal nationalists, which render the arguments less ambitious but much more plausible. Having abandoned the old nationalist ideal of a state owned by its dominant ethno-cultural group, liberal nationalists have become receptive to the idea that identification with a plurality of cultures and communities is important for a person's social identity. They have equally become sensitive to transnational issues and more willing to embrace a partly cosmopolitan perspective.
Liberal nationalism has also brought to the fore more modest, less philosophically or metaphysically charged arguments grounded in the concerns of justice. These stress the practical importance of ethno-cultural membership, various rights to redress injustice, democratic rights of political association and the role that ethno-cultural ties and associations can play in promoting just social arrangements. Liberal culturalists such as Kymlicka have proposed minimal and pluralistic versions of nationalism built around such arguments. In these minimal versions, the project of building classical nation-states is moderated or abandoned and replaced by a more sensitive form of national identity which can thrive in a multicultural society. This new project, however, might demand a further widening of moral perspectives. Given the experiences of the twentieth century, one can safely assume that culturally plural states divided into isolated and closed sub-communities glued together only by arrangements of mere modus vivendi are inherently unstable. Stability might therefore require that the plural society envisioned by liberal culturalists promote quite intense interaction between cultural groups in order to forestall mistrust, to reduce prejudice and to create a solid basis for cohabitation. On the other hand, once membership in multiple cultures and communities is admitted as legitimate, social groups will spread beyond the borders of a single state (e.g. groups bound by religious or racial ties) as well as within them, thus creating an opening for at least a minimal cosmopolitan perspective. The internal dialectic of the concern for ethno-cultural identity might thus lead to pluralistic and potentially cosmopolitan political arrangements that are rather distant from what was classically understood as nationalism.

From "Hitchcock's films revisited", 1989 F&F (written before 1965)

... function

Is smother'd in surmise, and nothing is

But what is not. – "Macbeth"




By Robin Wood



But if you look at the matter from a theoretical point of view and ignore this question of degree you can very well say that we are all ill, i.e. neurotic; for the conditions required for symptom-formation are demonstrable also in normal persons. – Freud, "Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis"

You have to remember that "Psycho" is a film made with quite a sense of amusement on my part. To me it's a fun picture. The processes through which we take the audience, you see, it's rather like taking them through the haunted house at the fairground... – Hitchcock, interview in "Movie 6"

***


"Psycho" opens with a view of a city. The name of the city appears, followed by a precise date and a precise time, as the camera swings over the rooftops and apartment blocks. It hesitates, seems to select, tracks in toward one particular block, hesitates again before all the windows, seems to select again, then takes us through one slightly open window into a darkened room. Arbitrary place, date, and time, and now an apparently arbitrary window: the effect is of random selection: this could be any place, any date, any time, any room: it could be us. The forward track into darkness inaugurates the progress of perhaps the most terrifying film ever made: we are to be taken forward and downward into the darkness of ourselves.

"Psycho" begins with the normal and draws us steadily deeper and deeper into the abnormal; it opens by making us aware of time, and ends (except for the releasing final image) with a situation in which time (i.e., development) has ceased to exist. The scene we witness between Marion Crane (Janet Leigh) and Sam Loomis (John Gavin), while carefully and convincingly particularized in terms of character and situation, is ordinary enough for us to accept it as representative of "normal" human behavior. A leading theme emerges, unexceptional both in itself and in the way in which it is presented, though it subtly pervades the whole scene: the dominance of the past over the present. The lovers cannot marry because Sam has to pay his dead father's debts and his ex-wife's alimony; "respectable" meetings in Marion's home will be presided over by her (presumably) dead mother's portrait. From this "normal" hold of past on present, with its limiting, cramping effect on life (the essence of life being development), we shall be led gradually to a situation where present is entirely swallowed up by past, and life finally paralyzed. That the lovers are meeting surreptitiously, doing things that must be concealed from the outer world, provides a further link (still within the bounds of normality) with Norman Bates. And in both cases the "secrets," normal and abnormal, are sexual in nature. Everything is done to encourage the spectator to identify with Marion. In the dispute between the lovers we naturally side with her: Sam's insistence on waiting until he can give her financial security annoys us, because it is the sort of boring mundane consideration we expect the romantic hero of a film to sweep aside, and we are very much drawn to Marion's readiness to accept things as they are for the sake of the relationship.

This is in fact the first step in our complicity in the theft of the $40,000. It is Sam's fault that Marion steals the money, which has no importance for her. It is simply the means to an end: sex, not money, is the root of all evil. Indeed, the spectator's lust for money, played upon considerably in the early stages of the film, is aroused only to be swiftly and definitively "placed": the fate of the money, after the shower murder, becomes an entirely trivial matter, and Hitchcock by insisting on it evokes in us a strong revulsion. Our moral resistance is skillfully undermined during the office scene. The man with the money – Cassidy – is a vulgar, drunken oaf; he has plenty more; his boast that he "buys off unhappiness," that his about-to-be-married "baby" has "never had an unhappy day," fills us with a sense of unfairness even as we realize how far his boast probably is from the truth: whatever he is, Cassidy does not strike us as a happy man. The whole fabric of the film is interwoven with these parent-child references: even Marion's fellow office girl has a prying mother, and Marion's room is decorated with family photographs which look down on her as she packs. Cassidy's relationship with his "baby" takes us a step into the abnormal, because it is highly suspect: she will probably be better without the $40.000 house, which is clearly a symbol of her father's power over her. That Marion will also be better without it is a reflection we do not allow ourselves, any more than she does. By minimizing our moral opposition to the notion of stealing $40.0000, Hitchcock makes it possible for us to continue to identify with Marion, involving ourselves in her guilt as easily and unthinkingly as she herself becomes involved.

There is no clear-cut moment of decision: she takes the money home, changes, packs her suitcase, but the money lies on the bed and she constantly hesitates over it: her actions tell us that she has committed herself, but she doesn't consciously accept that commitment. We are able to commit acts we know to be immoral only if we inhibit our conscious processes: Macbeth never really knows why he "yields to that suggestion whose horrid image does unfix his hair..." but the yielding itself involves the paralysis of his conscious moral faculties. So it is with Marion: the decision having gripped her (rather than been taken), she necessarily forfeits her powers of conscious will. She drifts helplessly, and we drift with her. Her inability to control her actions rationally is illustrated in numerous incidents. As she drives, she imagines voices, conversations: Sam, her boss, Cassidy. She knows Sam will be horrified, will reject the money (she cannot finish the imaginary conversation with him); yet she drives on. Her boss notices her as her car is held up by traffic lights, and she sees him notice her; yet she drives on. Everything she imagines stresses the impossibility of getting away with it and the uselessness of it anyway; yet she drives on. A suspicious policeman sees her changing cars, and she knows that he knows what her new car looks like, and what its number is, and that she is throwing away an irretrievable $700 quite pointlessly; yet she goes through with the exchange.

Throughout the journey Hitchcock uses every means to enforce audience identification – the staging of each scene, the use of subjective technique, the way in which each subsidiary character is presented to us through Marion's eyes, Bernard Herrmann's music and Hitchcock's use of it, all serve to involve us in Marion's condition. With her, we lose all power of rational control, and discover how easily a "normal" person can lapse into a condition usually associated with neurosis. Like her we resent, with fear and impatience, everything (the policeman, the car salesman) that impedes or interferes with her obsessive flight, despite the fact that only interference can help her; just as, two films later, Marnie will be helped only by events that are entirely contrary to her wishes, everything she wants being harmful to her. As Marion drives on (after the exchange of cars) we share her hopelessness and her weariness. The film conveys a sense of endless journey leading nowhere, or into darkness: as the imagined voices become more menacing, darkness gathers. Driving through darkness, she imagines Cassidy learning of the theft of the money: "I'll replace it with her fine soft flesh": Marion's verdict on herself, hideously disproportionate to the crime, will find its hideous enactment.

Rain begins to fall on the windscreen before Marion – before us. She pulls up at the Bates Motel, which seems to materialize abruptly out of the darkness in front of her. She has by her actions penetrated the shell of order, and like Macbeth plunged herself into the chaos world, which finds here its most terrifying definition. The confrontation of Marion and Norman Bates (Anthony Perkins) is in some ways the core of the film: the parallel made between them provides the continuity that underlies the brutal disruption when Marion is murdered. It is part of the essence of the film to make us feel the continuity between the normal and the abnormal: between the compulsive behavior of Marion and the psychotic behavior of Norman Bates. In the "parlor" behind his office, surrounded by Norman's stuffed birds and paintings of classical rapes, they talk about "traps." Marion is brought face to face with the logical extension of her present condition. Norman tells her, "We're all in our private trap. We scratch and claw, but only at the air, only at each other, and for all of it we never budge an inch": he is defining the psychotic state, the condition of permanent anguish whence development becomes impossible, a psychological hell. The parallel between the two is clinched when Norman says to her, "We all go a little mad sometimes. Haven't you?" It is her perception of Norman's condition that gives Marion her chance of salvation, which she takes. In answer to his question, she says, "Sometimes just one time can be enough. Thank you." She decides to return the money the next morning. The decision this time is clearly made: she has regained her freedom of will, her power of rationality.

The scene prepares us for the transference of our interest from Marion to Norman. We see Marion under the shower, and her movements have an almost ritualistic quality; her face expresses the relief of washing away her guilt. It is not merely its incomparable physical impact that makes the shower bath murder probably the most horrific incident in any fiction film. The meaninglessness of it (from Marion's point of view) completely undermines our recently restored sense of security. The murder is as irrational and as useless as the theft of the money. It also constitutes an alienation effect so shattering that (at a first viewing of the film) we scarcely recover from it. Never – not even in "Vertigo" – has identification been broken off so brutally. At the time, so engrossed are we in Marion, so secure in her potential salvation, that we can scarcely believe it is happening; when it is over, and she is dead, we are left shocked, with nothing to cling to, the apparent center of the film entirely dissolved.

Needing a new center, we attach ourselves to Norman Bates, the only other character (at this point) available. We have been carefully prepared for this shift of sympathies. For one thing, Norman is an intensely sympathetic character, sensitive, vulnerable, trapped by his devotion to his mother – a devotion, a self-sacrifice, which our society tends to regard as highly laudable. That he is very unbalanced merely serves to evoke our protective instincts: he is also so helpless. Beyond this, the whole film hitherto has led us to Norman, by making us identify with a condition in many ways analogous to his: the transition is easy. After the murder, Hitchcock uses all the resources of identification technique to make us "become" Norman. He is a likeable human being in an intolerable situation, desperately in need of help and protection yet by the very nature of the case unable to obtain it. As he cleans up after his mother's hideous crime, the camera becomes subjective; they are our hands mopping away the blood. At the same time we cannot forget Marion; the intense anguish aroused in the spectator arises, as usual, from a conflict of response. Our attention is directed repeatedly to the last lingering trace of Marion which Norman almost overlooks: the money becomes now a mere squalid bundle of paper, an ironic reminder of her life, her desires, her relationship with Sam.

"Psycho" is Hitchcock's ultimate achievement to date in the technique of audience participation. In a sense, the spectator becomes the chief protagonist, uniting in himself all the characters. The remainder of the film is an inquiry into the sources of the psychological hell state represented by Norman Bates: a descent into the chaos world. The other characters (Sam, Lila, Arbogast), perfunctorily sketched, are merely projections of the spectators into the film, our instruments for the search, the easier to identify with as they have no detailed individual existence. Each stage in the descent adds to the tension within us: we want to know, and we dread knowing, we want the investigators to find the truth and put an end to the horrors, yet we have involved ourselves in those horrors through our identification with Norman. One is struck (bearing in mind the care with which Hitchcock always selects his players) by close physical resemblances between certain characters. That between Vera Miles and Janet Leigh can be easily explained: they are sisters; but what of that, still more striking, between Anthony Perkins and John Gavin? As they face each other across the counter of Norman's office, we have the uncanny feeling that we are looking at two sides of the same coin; and the scene in question, which seemed at first mere suspense, useful only in its plot context, becomes one of the most moving of the film. The two men look at one another, and we look at them, and we realize suddenly that they are interchangeable: each seems the reflection of the other (though a reflection in a distorting mirror), the one healthy, balanced, the other gnawed and rotted within by poisoned sex. Similarly, Vera Miles is the extension of Janet Leigh, and what she sees and that character, is, potentially, inside herself.

The characters of "Psycho" are one character, thanks to the identifications the film evokes, is us. Lila's exploration of the house is an exploration of Norman's psychotic personality. The whole sequence, with its discoveries in bedroom, attic, and cellar, has clear Freudian overtones. The Victorian decor, crammed with invention, intensifies the atmosphere of sexual repression. The statue of a black cupid in the hall, the painting of an idealized maiden disporting herself at the top of the stairs, a nude goddess statuette in the bedroom, are juxtaposed with the bed permanently indented with the shape of Mrs. Bates' body (the bed in which, we learn later, she and her lover were murdered by Norman), the macabre cast of crossed hands on her dressing table, the stifling atmosphere of stagnation: one can almost smell it. The attic, Norman's own bedroom, represents the sick man's conscious mental development: strange confusion of the childish and the adult, cuddly toys, grubby unmade bed, a record of the "Eroica" symphony; the unexplained nature of all this carries the suggestion that what we see are mere superficial hints of underlying mysteries, a suggestion confirmed by the clasped, untitled book that Lila never actually opens (a Bates family album?).

Consequently we accept Norman more than ever as a human being, with all the human being's complex potentialities. The cellar gives us the hidden, sexual springs of his behavior: there Lila finds Mrs. Bates. It is a fruit cellar – the fruit is insisted upon in the mother's macabre joke about being "fruity": the source of fruition and fertility become rotten. Our discovery of the truth, of course, partly changes our attitude to what has gone before. It adds, for example, many complexities to our understanding of the shower murder, which we see now as primarily a sexual act, a violent substitute for the rape that Norman dare not carry out, and secondarily as the trapped being's desire to destroy a woman who has achieved the freedom he will never achieve: a point that gives added irony to the fact that it is her awareness of Norman that gives Marion that freedom. What it cannot do is remove our sense of complicity. We have been led to accept Norman Bates as a potential extension of ourselves. That we all carry within us somewhere every human potentiality, for good or evil, so that we all share in a common guilt, may be, intellectually, a truism; the greatness of "Psycho" lies in its ability, not merely to tell us this, but to make us experience it.

It is this that makes a satisfactory analysis of a Hitchcock film on paper so difficult; it also ensures that no analysis, however detailed, can ever become a substitute for the film itself, since the direct emotional experience survives any amount of explanatory justification. The effect of forward tracking shots in the film (from the opening right through to Lila's exploration of the house) is to carry us always further inside or into darkness. All the time we are being made to see, to see more, to see deeper: often, to see things we are afraid to see. Hence the insistence on eyes, into which the camera, our own eyes, makes us look, to see the dark places of the human soul beyond. And hence the dark glasses of the policeman: he is the only character whose eyes we never see, because it is he who is watching Marion, and hence ourselves. By the end of the film, Hitchcock has placed us in the policeman's position: we watch Norman Bates as the policeman watched Marion, and he is as conscious of our gaze as Marion was of the policeman’s. On the other side of the cinema screen, we are as inscrutable, hence as pitiless, as the policeman behind his dark glasses. We may recall Norman's remark about "institutions" in the dialogue with Marion: "... the cruel eyes studying you." Norman is finally beyond our help.

Much of the film's significance is summed up in a single visual metaphor, making use again of eyes, occurring at the film's focal point (the murder of Marion): the astonishing cut from the close-up of the water and blood spiraling down the drain, to the close-up of the eye of the dead girl, with the camera spiraling outward from it. It is as if we have emerged from the depths behind the eye, the round hole of the drain leading down into an apparently bottomless darkness, the potentialities for horror that lie in the depths of us all, and which have their source in sex, which the remainder of the film is devoted to sounding. The sensation of vertigo inspired by this cut and the spiraling movement itself, are echoed later as we, from high above, watch Norman carry his mother down to the fruit cellar. The cellar is another clear sex symbol. And what Vera Miles finds there at the end of the quest are once again eyes: the mocking "eyes" of a long-dead corpse as a light bulb swings before its face: the eyes of living death, eyes that move without seeing, the true eyes of Norman.

The psychiatrist's "explanation" has been much criticized, but it has its function. It crystallizes for us our tendency to evade the implications of the film, by converting Norman into a mere "case," hence something we can easily put from us. The psychiatrist, glib and complacent, reassures us. But Hitchcock crystallizes this for us merely to force us to reject it. We shall see on reflection that the "explanation" ignores as much as it explains (the murder as symbolic rape, for example). But we are not allowed to wait for a chance to reflect: our vague feelings of dissatisfaction are promptly brought to consciousness by our final confrontation with Norman, and this scene in the cell, entirely static after the extremes of violence that have preceded it, is the most unbearably horrible in the film. What we see is Norman, his identity finally dissolved in the illusory identity of his mother, denounce all the positive side of his personality. "Mother" is innocent: "she" spares the fly crawling on Norman's hand: it is Norman who was the savage butcher. Thus we witness the irretrievable annihilation of a human being. The fly reminds us of Marion, who wasn't spared: the act constitutes a pathetic attempt at expiation before the pitiless eyes of a cruel and uncomprehending society. For a split second, almost subliminally, the features of the mother's ten-year-dead face are superimposed on Norman's as it fixes in a skull-like grimace.

The sense of finality is intolerable, yet it is this that makes our release possible: we have been made to see the dark potentialities within all of us, to face the worst thing in the world: eternal damnation. We can now be set free, be saved for life. The last image, of the car withdrawing from the dark depths of the bog, returns us to Marion, to ourselves, and to the idea of psychological liberty. "Psycho" is one of the key works of our age. Its themes are of course not new – obvious forerunners include "Macbeth" and Conrad's "Heart of Darkness" – but the intensity and horror of their treatment and the fact that they are here grounded in sex belong to the age that has witnessed on the one hand the discoveries of Freudian psychology and on the other the Nazi concentration camps. I do not think I am being callous in citing the camps in relation to a work of popular entertainment. Hitchcock himself in fact accepted a commission to make a compilation film of captured Nazi material about the camps. The project reached the rough-cut stage, and was abandoned there, for reasons I have not been able to discover: the rough-cut now lies, inaccessibly, along with vast quantities of similar raw material, in the vaults of the Imperial War Museum. But one cannot contemplate the camps without confronting two aspects of this horror: the utter helplessness and innocence of the victims, and the fact that human beings, whose potentialities all of us in some measure share, were their tormentors and butchers. We can no longer be under the slightest illusion about human nature, and about the abysses around us and within us; and "Psycho" is founded on, precisely, these twin horrors.

For Hitchcock it was a "fun" picture, and a streak of macabre humor ("Mother ... what is the phrase? ... isn't quite herself today") certainly runs through it. Is it, then, some monstrous perversion? Many have found it so, and their reaction seems to be more defensible than that of those (must we include Hitchcock himself?) who are merely amused by it ("… make us think twice about stopping at any building looking remotely like the Bates motel …"). David Holbrook, for example, remarks (presumably with "Psycho" in mind, since his book appeared in 1962), "Of course, if we lived in the world of detective stories and Hitchcock films we may take all this sordidness in a light-hearted spirit as a snuff-like piece of stimulation. But if we are responding to poetry and drama our senses should be sharpened …" ("Llareggub Revisited"). Yet this seems to be a short-sighted and insensitive verdict: if one is responding to "Psycho", one's senses should be sharpened too. No film conveys – to those not afraid to expose themselves fully to it – a greater sense of desolation, yet it does so from an exceptionally mature and secure emotional viewpoint. And an essential part of this viewpoint is the detached sardonic humor. It enables the film to contemplate the ultimate horrors without hysteria, with a poised, almost serene detachment. This is probably not what Hitchcock meant when he said that one cannot appreciate "Psycho" without a sense of humor, but it is what he should have meant. He himself – if his interviews are to be trusted – has not really faced up to what he was doing when he made the film. This, needless to say, must not affect one's estimate of the film itself. For the maker of "Psycho" to regard it as a "fun" picture can be taken as his means of preserving his sanity; for the critic to do so – and to give it his approval on these grounds – is quite unpardonable. Hitchcock (again, if his interviews are to be trusted) is a much greater artist than he knows.

LOVRO ARTUKOVIĆ

Lovro Artuković uči nas da je umjetnina jedino biće ovoga svijeta koje možemo vidjeti očima drugog: ne samo da na slikama ili skulpturama možemo vidjeti nešto što vidi netko drugi, nego umjetnine jesu svijet viđen očima drugog.
Lovro Artuković jedan je od rijetkih umjetnika koji znaju o svojoj umjetnosti razgovjetno i jasno progovoriti izvan njenog medija: njegove su refleksije o slikarstvu začudno precizne.
Pokazuju tu već popratni tekstovi Spremišta.
Dvije slike koje donosim u ovom postu moj su osobni izbor iz Artukovićeva opusa: kao što postoje knjige za uzglavlje, ona najprisnija štiva koja pretpostavljamo neospornim klasicima, tako su i ove dvije slike, unatoč nekolicini neosporno veličanstvenih djela, onaj dio svijeta koji bih htio prisvojiti samo za sebe. Mislim da sam sa Spavačicom to već uspio učiniti.
O Djevojčici sa žigicama za sada sam samo pisao: Artukovićev tekst koji sljedi tek sam danas dobio na uvid, no čini mi se neumjesnim sada objaviti i vlastitu analizu Djevojčice...izgledalo bi kao da je pisana ne prije, nego nakon čitanja Lovrinoga teksta.
U svakom slučaju, svijet viđen očima Lovre Artukovića od našega svijeta čini Kuću koja je veća iznutra nego izvana, poput House of leaves ili genijalne slike Remedios Varo, Bordando el Manto Terrestre, o kojoj piše Pynchon (negdje je dolje post naslovljen po toj slici); na toj kući otvorio bih window u svijet Lovre Artukovića, pogledom na Djevojčicu i Spavačicu. Pogledom drugog.

On 9/11, New Yorkers faced the fire in the minds of men



Hollywood's attempts to mark the 2001 attacks ignore their political context and the return to history they symbolise

Slavoj Žižek
Monday September 11, 2006

The Guardian

Two Hollywood films mark 9/11's fifth anniversary: Paul Greengrass's United 93 and Oliver Stone's World Trade Center. Both adopt a terse, realistic depiction of ordinary people in extraordinary circumstances. There is undoubtedly a touch of authenticity to them and most critics have praised their sober styles and avoidance of sensationalism. But it is the touch of authenticity that raises some disturbing questions.
The realism means that both films are restrained from taking a political stance and depicting the wider context of the events. Neither the passengers on United 93 nor the policemen in WTC grasp the full picture. All of a sudden they find themselves in a terrifying situation and have to make the best out of it.
This lack of "cognitive mapping" is crucial. All we see are the disastrous effects, with their cause so abstract that, in the case of WTC, one can easily imagine exactly the same film in which the twin towers would have collapsed as the result of an earthquake. What if the same film took place in a bombed high-rise building in Beirut? That's the point: it cannot take place there. Such a film would have been dismissed as "subtle pro-Hizbullah terrorist propaganda". The result is that the political message of the two films resides in their abstention from delivering a direct political message. It is the message of an implicit trust in one's government: when under attack, one just has to do one's duty.
This is where the problem begins. The omnipresent invisible threat of terror legitimises the all-too-visible protective measures of defence. The difference of the war on terror from previous 20th-century struggles, such as the cold war, is that while the enemy was once clearly identified as the actually existing communist system, the terrorist threat is spectral. It is like the characterisation of Linda Fiorentino in The Last Seduction: most people have a dark side, she had nothing else. Most regimes have a dark oppressive spectral side, the terrorist threat has nothing else.
The power that presents itself as being constantly under threat and thus merely defending itself against an invisible enemy is in danger of becoming a manipulative one. Can we really trust those in power, or are they evoking the threat to discipline and control us? Thus, the lesson is that, in combating terror, it is more crucial than ever for state politics to be democratically transparent. Unfortunately, we are now paying the price for the cobweb of lies and manipulations by the US and UK governments in the past decade that reached a climax in the tragicomedy of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
Recall August's alert and the thwarted attempt to blow up a dozen planes on their way from London to the US. No doubt the alert was not a fake; to claim otherwise would be paranoiac. But a suspicion remains that it was a self-serving spectacle to accustom us to a permanent state of emergency. What space for manipulation do such events - where all that is publicly visible are the anti-terrorist measures themselves - open up? Is it not that they simply demand too much from us, the ordinary citizen: a degree of trust that those in power lost long ago? This is the sin for which Bush and Blair should never be forgiven.
What, then, is the historical meaning of 9/11? Twelve years earlier, on November 9, 1989, the Berlin wall fell. The collapse of communism was perceived as the collapse of political utopias. Today, we live in a post-utopian period of pragmatic administration, since we have learned the hard lesson of how noble political utopias can end in totalitarian terror. But this collapse of utopias was followed by 10 years of the big utopia of global capitalist liberal democracy. November 9 thus announced the "happy 90s", the Francis Fukuyama dream of the "end of history", the belief that liberal democracy had, in principle, won, that the search was over, that the advent of a global, liberal community was around the corner, that the obstacles to this Hollywood happy ending are merely local pockets of resistance where the leaders have not yet grasped that their time is over.
September 11 is the symbol of the end of this utopia, a return to real history. A new era is here with new walls everywhere, between Israel and Palestine, around the EU, on the US-Mexico and Spain-Morocco borders. It is an era with new forms of apartheid and legalised torture. As President Bush said after September 11, America is in a state of war. But the problem is that the US is not in a state of war. For the large majority, daily life goes on and war remains the business of state agencies. The distinction between the state of war and peace is blurred. We are entering a time in which a state of peace itself can be at the same time a state of emergency.
When Bush celebrated the thirst for freedom in post-communist countries as a "fire in the minds of men", the unintended irony was that he used a phrase from Dostoevsky's The Possessed, where it designates the ruthless activity of radical anarchists who burned a village: "The fire is in the minds of men, not on the roofs of houses." What Bush didn't grasp is that on September 11, five years ago, New Yorkers saw and smelled the smoke from this fire.

Glineni vojnici i...

...PUT SVILE



Bilo je to ovako...
Prvo sam pola dana proučavao lončarsko umijeće Miure Koheija, koji je prvi seiji (celadon) keramičar s titulom Ningen Kokuho, živuće nacionalno blago.



Potom sam - pročitavši rečenicu "And Miura's crackled celadon wares with their soft blue glaze are the closest to perfection since China's Sung dynasty Kuan wares." - dobar dio popodneva posvetio povijesti, zemljopisu i kulturi Kine dvanaestog stoljeća, Južnom Sungu i vrtoglavoj ljepoti elaboriranih oblika i pucketavih glazura Kuan grnčarije.



Odjednom sam osvanuo na stranici posvećenoj Wang Xizhiju, Mudracu Kaligrafije: do njega me je dovela opaska o anonimnosti, nepotpisanosti artefakata Kuana. U korak ili dva, krug se zatvorio u drugoj polovini jedanaestog stoljeća: za vladavine dinastije Sung, jedan od njenih vodećih pjesnika, bio je kaligraf i pisac, farmakolog i državnik Su Shi, znan i kao Zizhan ili Dongpo Jushi. Da ne duljim, nakon smrti supruge, Su Shi je napisao pjesmu Jiang zhenzi. Pročitajmo je u engleskom prijevodu:



Jiang zhenzi

Ten years living and dead have drawn apart
I do nothing to remember
But I can not forget
Your lonely grave a thousand miles away ...
Nowhere can I talk of my sorrow --
Even if we met, how would you know me
My face full of dust
My hair like snow?
In the dark of night, a dream: suddenly, I am home
You by the window
Doing your hair
I look at you and can not speak
Your face is streaked by endless tears
Year after year must they break my heart
These moonlit nights?
That low pine grave?



Su Shi, kaligrafija

Pročitao sam pjesmu i ostao sam osupnut.
Naravno, poezijom, ali ne njenom teksturom, njenim tekstom: ostao sam zgranut mišlju izrečenom u prva dva stiha: Ten years living and dead have drawn apart/ I do nothing to remember!

Iznenada, obuzeo me je intenzivan, posve tjelesan osjećaj povezanosti sa Su Shijem, onkraj stoljeća i zemalja koje nas dijele. Pokušati ću opisati taj osjećaj: recimo, kao da je Su Shi, napisavši te retke, zastao i podigao glavu, te sasvim odsutan pogledao u prazno - imao sam dojam da hvatam taj pogled, ali da me on ne vidi, da nikog ne vidi. I look at you and can not speak.

A možda je Su Shi zastao nakon prva dva stiha, podigao glavu i sasvim odustno pogledao u prazno, osvjetivši iznenada neko neodređeno prisustvo?
Tek je tada mogao sročiti stih, dva niže:

Even if we met, how would you know me?

Post No 300

Rođendan Ivana Aralice



Na sam dan prevencije samoubojica,
rodio se Ivan Aralica;
njemu je dakle danas rođendan!
E pa sretan vam rođendan, književniče Aralica!
Piše li se štogod?
Vidite, zanimljivo, i sam tu i tamo nešto napišem,
ali meni je rođendan kasnije, u studenom,
na manje neveseo datum.
Kako ste, krepki starino, kako zdravlje?
Ružna su vremena otkako je Vranjo otišao iz crvene Hrvatske u bijelu,
- vi ste bili jako bliski, je li -
znao je pokojni diktator govoriti da se možete nevidjeti tjednima i mjesecima
a svejedno biste pisali kako on misli,
kao da ste se netom čuli u svezi nekog važnog državnog pitanja,
za koje više nitko ne haje, jer
djevojke nose kratke haljine,
mladići samo misle na brza kola i zaradu,
sve je danas run & gun,
i nitko ne jebe ni pol %
svehrvatsku pomirbu.
A šta ćete, moj dobri Aralica, tako to ide u životu,
u ovim krajevima gdje se nitko nije rodio i umro u istoj državi,
a očevi sahranjuju sinove,
oboljele od karcinoma povijesti:
ovdje vrijeme napreduje unazad,
razjedajući sebe sama,
i ne da je out of joint,
nego je ovdje teži dop u pitanju.
Još jednom, da po(d)vučem na kraju svog izlaganja,
sretan vam rođendan književniče Aralica,
a što se svijeta tiče,
ha čujte,
ja ne pamtim kad sam o njemu išta dobrog mislio!
Živjeli!

SVJETSKI DAN PREVENCIJE SUICIDA

Biathanatos

Izvanjska svrha Biathanatosa jest ublažavanje samoubistva; dubinska: pokazati da se Krist sâm ubio.
Ideja o bogu koji stvara svijet da bi stvorio vlastito gubilište.

J.L.Borges

Nisam siguran, ali mislim da je Feuerbach rekao da si samoubojice ne oduzimaju život, već samo razgrću privid da su ga ikad imali.

Nemanja feat. Feuerbach

Right to Shoes

iReality Show

PRAYING MANTIS

Dakle, ne radi se samo o tome da Holivud inscenira privid realnog života kojem je oduzeta težina tela i snaga tela – u poznokapitalističkom potrošačkom društvu sam "realni socijalni život" dobija osobine inscenirane prevare pošto se naši realni susedi ponašaju kao glumci i statisti. Apsolutna istina kapitalističkog, utilitarističkog i obezduhovljenog univerzuma je obeztelovljenje samog "realnog života", njegovo pretvaranje u sablasni šou. Kristofer Išervud irealnost američke svakodnevice opisuje na primeru sobe u motelu: "Američko moteli su nestvarni! (...) Oni su svesno napravljeni tako da budu nestvarni. (...) Evropljani nas mrze zato što smo se povukli u život u reklamama, kao što pustinjaci odlaze u pećine da bi mogli da razmišljaju".



Ivan Slamnig

MAČKA U ČIZMAMA

U dvorac njegov uđoh ja
sa namjerama zlima
"Ja obdaren sam", reče on,
sposobnostima svima.

Ljudožder nato posta zmaj,
pa papiga, pa barka,
pa klavir, deva, pa Linne,
pa Dante i Petrarca.

"A da li možeš biti miš?"
upitah sve po planu.
"Još pitaš! Ajde da vidiš!"
Sad držim ga na dlanu.

Sad držim ga na dlanu ja,
a on me tužno gleda.
"O mišu, budi zmaj i lav."
Njemu se više ne da.

Alejandro (Alexandro) Jodorowsky Prullansky alias Jodo



Josip Sever

BOREALNI KONJ

Kad klonu moje misli o konju
Na nebosklonu tad se javi
Taj konj u propnju
Kad tonu potezi njegvi
U širno polje u pijesak

Kad mu griva lebdi
U izmaglici mora
Što se brušeno pjeni
Ko češka čaša
Na tvrdu hrastovu stolu

I kad ga jaši knez
I kad ga jaši biskup
Kada ga jaši rudar
I kad ga jaši Wagner

Tu je njegov norvegijski nerv
Njegov tirkizni mač
I taj pješčani Negev
I ta pusta madžarska
Bez jahača

Kolike li gizde u konja
Kad se propne i stane
I ostane
U bijeloj boji
Bijeli konj

Interpol - "The Heinrich Maneuver"

CLOSURE

2 POIJEZIJE: ŠUVAREV ĐAK & SAVILE RAW



I ja sam Šuvarov đak

Sjedi Šuvar u mojoj emisiji, početkom devedesetih, i
jebu mu mater komunističku, a najviše što nam je mladost
uništio
reformom školstva.
I sjedi Šuvar tako i sluša, hladan k'o Škegro par godina kasnije, sluša
jednog, pa drugog, pa entog gledatelja koje sam u međuvremenu ukinuo
jer javnost treba ponekad cenzurirati u njenom/javnom interesu
i u korist općega dobra,
(a samo se o tome radi, u toj mojoj emisiji i politici, per definitionem)
i cool je kao Joža Manolić, par mjeseci ranije,
i čeka da se seljaci istutnje, kako je jednom rekao Jajo nedočekavši ta vremena,
pa će ti konačno Šuvar:
Ja ne znam što vi to meni prigovarate? Pa evo, i on je moj đak!, mirno objasni drug Stipe Šuvar, okrenuvši se prema meni, heroju potlačenih.
Jebiga, kud će šta će sad Hrvateki, ispada da Šuvar ima pravo,
stvarno sam i ja učio reformirane škole a opet nekako ispao učen,
a i ne može svjetina sada protiv sebe, jer, eto, ja sam oni, ja u njihovo ime pitam njihova životna pitanja one koji su za te živote odgovorni,
i nasmije se drug Šuvar nakon što se ja do sita nasmijah,
jer meni nikada ništa nije draže nego se smijati budalama kad ih ismije pametan čovjek,
čovjek poput druga i komuniste Stipe Šuvara.
Da je on danas na vlasti, ne bi majci Dule častio Radu po Breonima,
a djeca bi opet bila učena poput mene, kako je u svom kratkom izlaganju
gledatelje zajebao drug Stipe Šuvar.
Pametan čovjek, zapravo vrlo drag i pošten čovjek, koji je cijelom prvom sazivu Sabora bacio foru desetljeća:
Evo, sad imate historijsku priliku da smijenite Stipu Šuvara.
Poslje smo se rado družili i pričali o učenim stvarima, a Stipe Šuvar je znao kazati da mu je žao što je napustio znanost i posvetio se politici, jer da je bio izuzetno nadaren sociolog, i tako dalje i u tome smislu.
Drugi put opet, završim ti ja u bolnici, mislim da me bolio kurac, i od svih mogućih prijatelja evo ti na sabajle Stipe Šuvara: nosi neku čokoladu i pita, kao pravi drug i komunista: Kako si?
Jebiga, ispada da su ti komunisti bili bolji ljudi od ovih kretena.
(Da mi je netko u to vrijeme kazao da ću jednom napisati ovu rečenicu ne bih mu vjerovao.)
Svi mi imamo neku uspomenu na druga i komunistu Stipu Šuvara.
Zar već to nije dovoljno?
I, zar to nije dovoljno za jedan smislen ljudski život!?
(Posljednja su dva pitanja retorička.)

NEMANJA 05.09.2007. 00:43

Rekli su:
• Da nije Stipe nikada ja ne bih kuhala kavu u Lipa Millu. (skaska 05.09.2007. 08:22)
• Skaska, predlažem da to ovako kažemo:
Da ni Stipe ne bi bilo ne mene u Lipe!
OK? (NEMANJA 05.09.2007. 15:29)
• Nemanja! Ti si moj tip feler!
Jel iskaš i voditeljicu? (skaska 05.09.2007. 17:03)
• Nemanja je ipak najbolji hrvatski stvarnosno-narativni pjesnik. Volio bih držati (kao uvelu kitu (cvijeća))čitavu ovakvu jegovu zbirku pjesama u ruci. (IZGNANIK 05.09.2007. 17:28)
• …nemoj tako dragi IZGNANIČE,
pojezija našega Nemanje
nikada uvenut neće,
to je takve sorte
cvijeće…
P.S. …vrlo mi se svidjela ova oda Stipi Šuvaru… (grga čvorak 05.09.2007. 18:04)



• Kakav pripovjedački dar, kakav smisao za closure, pa taj ispovijedni ton. Stvarno(sno) uzbudljivo. Oh, Nemanja... (njetocka 05.09.2007. 18:44)
• Upravo sam skužila da sam ponovila izgnanikove kvalifikacije nemanjinih zanosnih stihova. My bad. (njetocka 05.09.2007. 18:50)
• njetocka, za takvo osviješćenje ste zaslužili kiticu cvijeća iz izgnanikovog komentara. (ka ono 05.09.2007. 20:13)
• Čarobno je to što je Šuvar u obje pjesme isti, što se lik šuvara gradi na isti način, pripovjedanjem o susretima sa šuvarom i iskoracima iz tog pripovjedanja u društveno povijesni trenutak te u osobnu povijest, što, opet, određuje pjesnika, ali ne i ono o čemu pjeva, tj. šuvara. Frapantnim sličnostima tehnike unatoč, pjesme su posve različite jer je pjesma liječenog, kao i druge njegove pjesme, (izdaleka)gorko -slatka( izbliza), dok je nemanjina pjesma, također kao i njegove druge pjesme carski velebna i drska. Jesen je nepobitno stigla u naš kraj. (njetocka 05.09.2007. 22:08)

NEVERMORE

EDGAR ALLEN POE’S “THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMPOSITION”



Charles Dickens is now lying before me, alluding to an examination I once made of the mechanism of “Barnaby Rudge,”—says “By the way, are you aware that Godwin wrote his ‘Caleb Williams’ backwards? He first involved his hero in a web of difficulties, forming the second volume, and then, for the first, cast about him for some mode of accounting for what had been done.” I cannot think this the precise mode of procedure on the part of Godwin—and indeed what he himself acknowledges, is not altogether in accordance with Mr. Dickens’ idea—but the author of “Caleb Williams” was too good an artist not to perceive the advantage derivable from at least a somewhat similar process. Nothing is more clear than thaCharles Dickens is now lying before me, alluding to an examination I once made of the mechanism of “Barnaby Rudge,”—says “By the way, are you aware that Godwin wrote his ‘Caleb Williams’ backwards? He first involved his hero in a web of difficulties, forming the second volume, and then, for the first, cast about him for some mode of accounting for what had been done.” I cannot think this the precise mode of procedure on the part of Godwin—and indeed what he himself acknowledges, is not altogether in accordance with Mr. Dickens’ idea—but the author of “Caleb Williams” was too good an artist not to perceive the advantage derivable from at least a somewhat similar process. Nothing is more clear than that every plot, worth the name, must be elaborated to its denouement before anything be attempted with the pen. It is only with the denouement constantly in view that we can give a plot its indispensable air of consequence, or causation, by making the incidents, and especially the tone at all points, tend to the development of the intention.

There is a radical error, I think, in the usual mode of constructing a story. Either history affords a thesis—or one is suggested by an incident of the day—or, at best, the author sets himself to work in the combination of striking events to form merely the basis of his narrative—designing, generally, to fill in with description, dialogue, or autorial comment, whatever crevices of fact, or action, may, from page to page, render themselves apparent.



I prefer commencing with the consideration of an effect. Keeping originality always in view—for he is false to himself who ventures to dispense with so obvious and so easily attainable a source of interest—I say to myself, in the first place, “Of the innumerable effects, or impressions, of which the heart, the intellect, or (more generally) the soul is susceptible, what one shall I, on the present occasion, select?” Having chosen a novel, first, and secondly a vivid effect, I consider whether it can be best wrought by incident or tone—whether by ordinary incidents and peculiar tone, or the converse, or by peculiarity both of incident and tone—afterward looking about me (or rather within) for such combinations of event, or tone, as shall best aid me in the construction of the effect.

I have often thought how interesting a magazine paper might be written by any author who would—that is to say who could—detail, step by step, the processes by which any one of his compositions attained its ultimate point of completion. Why such a paper has never been given to the world, I am much at a loss to say—but, perhaps, the autorial vanity has had more to do with the omission than any one other cause. Most writers—poets in especial—prefer having it understood that they compose by a species of fine frenzy—an ecstatic intuition—and would positively shudder at letting the public take a peep behind the scenes, at the elaborate and vacillating crudities of thought—at the true purposes seized only at the last moment---at the innumerable glimpses of idea that arrived not at the maturity of full view—at the fully matured fancies discarded in despair as unmanagable—at the cautious selections and rejections—at the painful erasures and interpolations—in a word, at the wheels and pinions—the tackle for scene-shifting—the step-ladders and demon-traps—the cock’s feathers, the red paint and the black patches, which, in ninety-nine cases out of the hundred, constitute the properties of the literary histrio.

I am aware, on the other hand, that the case is by no means common, in which an author is at all in condition to retrace the steps by which his conclusions have been attained. In general, suggestions, having arisen pell-mell, are pursued and forgotten in a similar manner.

For my own part, I have neither sympathy with the repugnance alluded to, nor, at any time the least difficulty in recalling to mind the progressive steps of any of my compositions; and, since the interest of an analysis, of reconstruction, such as I have considered a desideratum, is quite independent of any real or fancied interest in the thing analyzed, it will not be regarded as a breach of decorum on my part to show the modus operandi by which some one of my own works was put together. I select “The Raven,” as most generally known. It is my design to render it manifest that no one particular point in its composition is referable either to accident or intuition—that the work proceeded, step by step, to its completion with the precision and rigid consequence of a mathematical problem.

Let us dismiss, as irrelevant to the poem, per se, the circumstance—or say the necessity—which, in the first place, gave rise to the intention of composing a poem that should suit at once the popular and the critical taste.

We commence, then, with this intention.



The initial consideration was that of extent. If any literary work is too long to be read at one sitting, we must be content to dispense with the immensely important effect derivable from unity of impression—for, if two settings be required, the affairs of the world interfere, and every thing like totality is at once destroyed. But since, ceteris paribus, no poet can afford to dispense with any thing that may advance his design, it but remains to be seen whether there is, in extent, any advantage to counterbalance the loss of unity which attends it. Here I say no, at once. What we term a long poem is, in fact, merely a succession of brief ones—that is to say, of brief poetical effects. It is needless to demonstrate that a poem is such, only inasmuch as it intensely excites, by elevating, the soul; and all intense excitements are, through a physical necessity, brief. For this reason, at least one half of the “Paradise Lost” is essentially prose—a succession of poetical excitements interspersed, inevitably, with corresponding depressions—the whole being derived, through the extremeness of its length, of the vastly important artistic element, totality, or unity, of effect.

It appears evident, then, that there is a distinct limit, as regards length, to all works of literary art—the limit of a single sitting—and that, although in certain classes of prose composition, such as “Robinson Crusoe,” (demanding no unity,) this limit may be advantageously overpassed, it can never properly be overpassed in a poem. Within this limit, the extent of a poem may be made to bear mathematical relation to its merit—in other words, to the excitement or elevation—again in other words, to the degree of the true poetical effect which it is capable of inducing; for it is clear that the brevity must be in direct ratio of the intensity of the intended effect;--this, with one proviso—that a certain degree of duration is absolutely requisite for the production of any effect at all.

Holding in view these considerations, as well as that degree of excitement which I deemed not above the popular, while not below the critical, taste, I reached at once what I conceived the proper length for my intended poem—a length of about one hundred lines. It is, in fact, a hundred and eight.

My next thought concerned the choice of an impression, or effect, to be conveyed; and here I may as well observe that, throughout the construction, I kept steadily in view the design of rendering the work universally appreciable. I should be carried too far out of my immediate topic were I to demonstrate a point upon which I have repeatedly insisted, and which, with the poetical, stands not in the slightest need of demonstration—the point, I mean, that Beauty is the sole legitimate province of the poem. A few words, however, in elucidation of my real meaning, which some of my friends have evinced a disposition to misrepresent. That pleasure which is at once the most intense, the most elevating, and most pure, is, I believe, found in the contemplation of the beautiful. When, indeed, men speak of Beauty, they mean, precisely, not a quality, as is supposed, but an effect—they refer in short, just to that intense and pure elevation of soul—not of intellect, or of heart—upon which I have commented, and which is experienced in consequence of contemplating “the beautiful.” Now I designate Beauty as the province of the poem, merely because it is an obvious rule of Art that effects should be made to spring from direct causes—that objects should be attained through means best adapted for their attainment—no one as yet having been weak enough to deny that the peculiar elevation alluded to is most readily attained in the poem. Now the object, Truth, or the satisfaction of the intellect, and the object Passion, or the excitement of the heart, are, although attainable, to a certain extent, in poetry, far more readily attainable in prose. Truth, in fact, demands a precision, and Passion a homeliness (the truly passionate will comprehend me) which are absolutely antagonistic to that Beauty which is the atmosphere and the essence of the poem.

Regarding, then, Beauty as my province, my next question referred to the tone of its highest manifestation—and all experience has shown that this tone is one of sadness. Beauty of whatever kind, in its supreme development, invariably excites the sensitive soul to tears. Melancholy is thus the most legitimate of all the poetical tones.

The length, the province, and the tone, being thus determined, I betook myself to ordinary induction, with the view of obtaining some artistic piquancy which might serve me as a key-note in the construction of the poem—some pivot upon which the whole structure might turn. In carefully thinking over all the usual artistic effects—or more properly points, in the theatrical sense—I did not fail to perceive immediately that no one had been so universally as that of the refrain. The universality of its employment sufficed to assure me of its intrinsic value, and spared me the necessity of submitting it to analysis. I considered it, however, with regard to its susceptibility of improvement, and soon saw it to be in a primitive condition. As commonly used, the refrain, or burden, not only is limited to lyric verse, but depends for its impression upon the force of monotone—both in sound and thought. The pleasure is induced solely from the sense of identity—of repetition. I resolved to diversify, and so heighten, the effect, by adhering, in general, to the monotone of sound, while I continually varied that of thought: that is to say, I determined to produce continually novel effects, by the variation of the application of the refrain—the refrain itself remaining, for the most part, unvaried.

These points being settled, I next bethought me of the nature of my refrain. Since its application was to be repeatedly varied, it was clear that the refrain itself must be brief, for there would have been an insurmountable difficulty in frequent variations of application in any sentence of length. In proportion to the brevity of the sentence, would, of course, be the facility of the variation. This led me at once to a single word as the best refrain.

The question now arose as the character of the word. Having made up my mind to a refrain, the division of the poem into stanzas was, of course, a corollary: the refrain forming the close of each stanza. That such a close, to have force, must be sonorous and susceptible of protracted emphasis, admitted no doubt: and these considerations inevitably led me to the long o as the most sonorous vowel, in connection with r as the most producible consonant.

The sound of the refrain being thus determined, it became necessary to select a word embodying this sound, and at the same in the fullest possible keeping with that melancholy which I had predetermined as the tone of the poem. In such a search it would have been absolutely impossible to overlook the word “Nevermore.” In fact, it was the very first which presented itself.

The next desideratum was a pretext for the continuous use of the one word “nevermore.” In observing the difficulty which I at once found in inventing a sufficiently plausible reason for its continuous repetition, I did not fail to perceive that this difficulty arose solely from the pre-assumption that the word was to be so continuously or monotonously spoken by a human being—I did not fail to perceive, in short, that the difficulty lay in the reconciliation of this monotony with the exercise of reason on the part of the creature repeating the word. Here, then, immediately arose the idea of a non-reasoning creature capable of speech; and, very naturally, a parrot, in the first instance, suggested itself, but was superceded forthwith by a Raven, as equally capable of speech, and infinitely more in keeping with the intended tone.

I had now gone so far as the conception of a Raven—the bird of ill omen—monotonously repeating the word, “Nevermore,” at the conclusion of each stanza, in a poem of melancholy tone, and in length about one hundred lines. Now, never losing sight of the object supremeness, or perfection, at all points, I asked myself—“Of all melancholy topics, what, according to the universal understanding of mankind, is the most melancholy?” Death was the obvious reply. “And when,” I asked, “is this most melancholy topic most poetical?” From what I have already explained at some length, the answer, here also, is obvious—“When it most closely allies itself to Beauty: the death, then, of a beautiful woman is, unquestionably, the most poetical topic in the world—and equally is it beyond doubt that the lips best suited for such topics are those of a bereaved lover.”



I had now to combine the two ideas, of a lover lamenting his deceased mistress and a Raven continuously repeating the word “Nevermore.”—I had t combine these, bearing in mind my design of varying, at every turn, the application of the word repeated; but the only intelligible mode of such combination is that of imagining the Raven employing the word in answer to the queries of the lover. And here it was that I saw at once the opportunity afforded for the effect on which I had been depending—that is to say, the effect of the variation of application. I saw that I could make the first query propounded by the lover—the first query to which the Raven should reply “Nevermore”—that I could make this first query a commonplace one—the second less so—the third still less, and so on—until at length the lover, startled from his original nonchalance by the melancholy character of the word itself—by its frequent repetition—and by a consideration of the ominous reputation of the fowl that uttered it—is at length excited to superstition, and wildly propounds queries of a far different character—queries whose solution he has passionately at heart—propounds them half in superstition and half in that species of despair which delights in self-torture—propounds them not altogether because he believes in the prophetic or demoniac character of the bird (which, reason assures him, is merely repeating a lesson learned by rote) but because he experiences a phrenzied pleasure in so modeling his questions as to receive from the expected “Nevermore” the most delicious because the most intolerable of sorrow. Perceiving the opportunity thus afforded me—or, more strictly, thus forced upon me in the progress of the construction—I first established in mind the climax, or concluding query—that query to which “Nevermore” should be in the last place an answer—that in reply to which this word “Nevermore” should involve the utmost conceivable amount of sorrow and despair.

Here then the poem may be said to have its beginning—at the end, where all works of art should begin—for it was here, at this point of my preconsideration, tha I first put pen to paper in the composition of the stanza:

“Prophet,” said I, “think of evil! Prophet still if bird or devil!

By that heaven that bends above us—by that God we both adore,

Tell this soul with sorrow laden, if within the distant Aidenn,

It shall clasp a sainted maiden whom the angels name Lenore.”

Quoth the Raven “Nevermore.”

I composed this stanza, at this point, first that, by establishing the climax, I might the better vary and graduate, as regards seriousness and importance, the preceding queries of the lover—and, secondly, that I might definitely settle the rhythm, the metre, and the length and general arrangement of the stanza—as well as graduate the stanzas which were to precede, so that none of them might surpass this in rhythmical effect. Had I been able, in the subsequent composition, to construct more vigorous stanzas, I should, without scruple, have purposely enfeebled them, so as not to interfere with the climacteric effect.

And here I may as well say a few words of the versification. My first object (as usual) was originality. The extent to which this has been neglected, in versification, is one of the most unaccountable things in the world. Admitting that there is little possibility of variety in mere rhythm, it is still clear that the possible varieties of metre and stanza are absolutely infinite—and yet, for centuries, no man, in verse, has ever done, or ever seemed to think of doing, an original thing. The fact is, that originality (unless in minds of very unusual force) is by no means a matter, as some suppose, of impulse or intuition. In general, to be found, it must be elaborately sought, and although a positive merit of the highest class, demands in its attainment less of invention than negation.

Of course, I pretend to no originality in either the rhythm or metre of “The Raven.” The former is trochaic—the latter is octameter acatalectic, alternating with heptameter catalectic repeated in the refrain of the fifth verse, and terminating with tetrameter catalectic. Less pedanically—the feet employed throughout (trochees) consist of a long syllable followed by a short: the first line of the stanza consists of eight of these feet—the second of seven and a half (in effect, two-thirds)—the third of eight—the fourth of seven and a half—the fifth the same—the sixth three and a half. Now, each of these lines, taken individually, has been employed before, and what originality the “Raven” has, is in their combination into stanza; nothing even remotely approaching this combination has ever been attempted. The effect of this originality of combination is aided by other unusual, and some altogether novel effects, arising from an extension of the application of the principles of rhyme and alliteration.

The next point to be considered was the mode of bringing together the lover and the Raven—and the first branch of this consideration was the locale. For this the most natural suggestion might seem to be a forest, or the fields—but it has always appeared to me that a close circumscription of space is absolutely necessary to the effect of insulated incident:--it has the force of a frame to a picture. It has an indisputable moral power in keeping concentrated the attention, and, of course, must not be confounded with mere unity of place.



I determined, then, to place the lover in his chamber—in a chamber rendered sacred to him by memories of her who had frequented it. The room is represented as richly furnished—this in mere pursuance of the ideas I have already explained on the subject of Beauty, as the sole true poetical thesis.

The locale being thus determined, I had now to introduce the bird—and the thought of introducing him through the window, was inevitable. The idea of making the lover suppose, in the first instance, that the flapping of the wings of the bird against the shutter, is a “tapping” at the door, originated in a wish to increase, by prolonging, the reader’s curiosity, and in a desire to admit the incidental effect arising from the lover’s throwing open the door, finding all dark, and thence adopting the half-fancy that it was the spirit of his mistress that knocked.

I made the night tempestuous, first, to account for the Raven’s seeking admission, and secondly, for the effect of contrast with the (physical) serenity within the chamber.

I made the bird alight on the bust of Pallas, also for the effect of contrast between the marble and the plumage—it being understood that the bust was absolutely suggested by the bird—the bust of Pallas being chosen, first, as most in keeping with the scholarship of the lover, and, secondly, for the sonorousness of the word, Pallas, itself.

About the middle of the poem, also, I have availed myself of the force of contrast, with a view of deepening the ultimate impression. For example, an air of the fantastic—approaching as nearly to the ludicrous as was admissable—is given to the Raven’s entrance. He comes in “with many a flirt and flutter”

Not the least obeisance made he—not a moment stopped or stayed he,

But with mien of lord or lady, perched above my chamber door.

In the two stanzas which follow, the design is more obviously carried out:--

Then this ebony bird beguiling my sad fancy into smiling

By the grave and stern decorum of the countenance it wore,

‘Though thy crest be shorn and shaven thou,” I said, “art sure no

craven,

Ghastly grim and ancient Raven wandering from the nightly shore—

Tell me what thy lordly name is on the Night’s Plutonian shore?”

Quoth the Raven “Nevermore.”

Much I marveled this ungainly fowl to hear discourse so plainly

Though its answer little meaning—little relevancy bore;

But we cannot help agreeing that no living human being

Ever yet was blessed with seeing bird above his chamber door—

Bird or beast upon the sculptured bust above his chamber door,

With such name as “Nevermore.”

The effect of the denouement being thus provided for, I immediately drop the fantastic for a tone of the most profound seriousness:--this tone commencing in the stanza directly following the one last quoted, with the line,

But the Raven, sitting lonely on that placid bust, spoke only, etc.

From this epoch the lover no longer jests—no longer sees any thing even of the fantastic in the Raven’s demeanor. He speaks of him as a “grim, ungainly, ghastly, gaunt, and ominous bird of yore,” and feels the “fiery eyes” burning into his “bosom’s core.” This revolution of thought, or fancy, on the lover’s part, is intended to induce a similar one on the part of the reader—to bring the mind into a proper frame for the denouement—which is now brought about as rapidly and as directly as possible.

With the denouement proper—with the Raven’s reply, “Nevermore,” to the lover’s final demand if he shall meet his mistress in another world—the poem, it its obvious phase, that of a simple narrative, may be said to have its completion. So far, every thing is within the limits of the accountable—of the real. A raven, having learned by rote the single word “Nevermore,” and having escaped from the custody of its owner, is driven at midnight, through the violence of a storm, to seek admission at a window from which a light still gleams—the chamber-window of a student, occupied half in poring over a volume, half in dreaming of a beloved mistress deceased. The casement being thrown open at the fluttering of the bird’s wings, the bird itself perches on the most convenient seat out of the immediate reach of the student, who, amused by the incident and the oddity of the visitor’s demeanor, demands of it, in jest and without looking for a reply, its name. The raven addressed, answers with its customary word, “Nevermore”—a word which finds immediate echo in the melancholy heart of the student, who giving utterance aloud to certain thoughts suggested by the occasion, is again startled by the fowl’s repetition of “Nevermore.” The student now guesses the state of the case, but is impelled, as I have before explained, by the human thirst for self-torture, and in part by superstition, to propound such queries to the bird as will bring him, the lover, the most of the luxury of sorrow, through the anticipated answer “Never-more.” With the indulgence, to the extreme, of this self-torture, the narration, in what I have termed its first or obvious phase, has a natural termination, and so far there has been no overstepping of the limits of the real.

But in subjects so handled, however skillfully, or with however vivid an array of incident, there is always a certain hardness or nakedness, which repels the artistical eye. Two things are invariably required—first, some amount of complexity, or more properly, adaptation; and, secondly, some amount of suggestiveness—some under-current, however indefinite, of meaning. It is this latter, in especial, which imparts to a work of art so much of that richness (to borrow from colloquy a forcible term) which we are too fond of confounding with the ideal. It is the excess of the suggested meaning—it is the rendering this the upper instead of the under current of the theme—which turns into prose (and that of the very flattest kind) the so called poetry of the so called transcendentalists.



Holding these opinions, I added the two concluding stanzas of the poem—their suggestiveness being thus made to pervade all the narrative which has preceded them. The under-current of meaning is rendered first apparent in the lines—

“Take thy beak from out my heart, and take thy form from off my

door!”

Quoth the Raven “Nevermore!”

It will be observed from the words, “from out my heart,” involve the first metaphorical expression in the poem. They, with the answer, “Nevermore,” dispose the mind to seek a moral in all that has been previously narrated. The reader begins now to regard the Raven as emblematical—but it is not until the very last line of the very last stanza, that the intention of making him emblematical of Mournful and Never-Ending Remembrance is permitted directly to be seen:

And the Raven, never flitting, still is sitting, still is sitting,

On the pallid bust of Pallas, just above my chamber door;

And his eyes have all the seeming of a demon’s that is dreaming,

And the lamplight o’er him streaming throws his shadow on the floor;

And my soul from out that shadow that lies floating on the floor

Shall be lifted—nevermore.

Fjodor Ivanovič Tjučev

tusklyj ogn' zhelan'ya



Dull Flame Of Desire*

I love your eyes, my dear
their splendid, sparkling fire
when suddenly you raise them so
to cast a swift embracing glance

like lightning flashing in the sky
but there's a charm that is greater still:
when my love's eyes are lowered
when all is fired by passions kiss

and through the downcast lashes
I see the dull flame of desire
and through the downcast lashes
I see the dull flame of desire

"Stalker", Poem by Fyodor Tyutchev,

Trepverter* i drugo

Neprevodive riječi iz 254 jezika

Adam Phillips



Budući da je danas osvanuo prvi tipičan zagrebački ohkullanockanocka, pada mi na pamet - vraga mi pada na pamet, sve je ovo Bakino maslo - nova knjiga Adama Jacota de Boinoda.

"Adam Jacot de Boinod objavio je knjigu u kojoj je prikupio svoje omiljene neprevodive riječi iz 254 jezika.

Knjiga je naslovljena "Značenje riječi Tingo" i čitava posvećena – kako kaže autor – 'najneobičnijim, krajnje izražajnim i kulturološki informativnim riječima, jednako kao i onim bizarnima i smiješnima'. Sama riječ 'Tingo' dolazi s Uskršnjih otoka i znači: 'posuđivati predmete iz prijateljevog doma, jedan po jedan, dok više ništa ne preostane'. (U riječniku je uz tu riječ Kizina slika.)

Jacot de Boinodova fascinacija egzotičnim riječima počela je relativno nedužno dok je radio za jednu BBC-jevu kviz emisiju. Posao mu je bio da nađe čudne i neobične riječi.

"Iz čiste znatiželje, pogledao sam albansko-engleski rječnik od 1100 stranica, i za samo nekoliko minuta otkrio da postoji 27 albanskih riječi za 'brkove' i isto toliko za 'obrve'. Pomislio sam: pa ovo je prava riznica! Ustvari, danas bih rekao da, ako se bacite u proučavanje stvarno debelog rječnika nekog egzotičnog kraja svijeta, možete saznati više o tim ljudima i njihovoj kulturi nego da proučite većinu turističkih vodiča."

Jacot de Boinod kaže da je proučio oko 220 stranih rječnika kako bi prikupio riječi koje su se našle u njegovoj knjizi "Tingo". Među desecima tisuća vrlo zanimljivih riječi nije bilo uopće teško otkriti prave 'dragulje', kaže on.

"Recimo, perzijska riječ 'nakhur' znači 'deva koja neće dati mlijeko sve dok joj se ne poškakljaju nozdrve'. Ili, gurfur, jedna vrlo izražajna arapska riječ. Ona označava 'količinu vode koja se može zagrabiti šakom'. Naravno, tu je havajski jezik s rječju 'ohkullanockanocka', što znači 'dan koji se provede u nervoznom iščekivanju napada kašlja'."

Neke od riječi prikupljenih u knjizi "Značenje riječi Tingo" specifične su za određene kulture. Većini Amerikanaca, primjerice, ne treba 108 riječi koje koriste Havajci za različite tipove slatkog krumpira, ili 29 riječi kojima brazilsko pleme Banuit naziva mrave. Neke od tih riječi dobro bi došle i drugim narodima, jer se radi o prilično univerzalnoj primjeni: recimo, indonežanska riječ 'neko-neko' odnosi se na 'osobu koja ima kreativnu ideju koja samo učini stvari još gorima'. Ili, 'baku-shan', japanska riječ koja opisuje ženu koja izgleda sjajno kad ju se gleda odostraga, ali ne i sprijeda. Tu su i riječi iz jidiša – 'shmugeggeshnorrer', 'paskudnik' ili 'yold' – koje sve znače 'gubitnik'.

No, Jacot de Boinod je posebice vezan uz riječi koje opisuju vrlo specifične lokalne običaje ili zanimanja.

"Vrlo mi je draga inuitska riječ 'areodjarekput', koja znači 'zamijeniti žene samo na nekoliko dana'. Ili turska 'cigerci' koja znači 'prodavač jetri i plućica'. Sve to nam govori koliko raznolikosti postoji u svijetu i kako bismo trebali biti sretni i zahvalni za to. Jezici danas odumiru iznimno brzo – po jedan svaka dva tjedna! – i stvarno bismo trebali učiniti sve što možemo da se oni održe, očuvaju i koriste u svom svojem bogatstvu."

Neke riječi iz različitih jezika američkih Indijanaca daju uvid u to kako su njihove kulture gledale na druge kulture i njihove proizvode. Recimo, u jeziku Hopija, jedna jedina riječ označava i insekte i avione i pilote, ustvari 'sve što leti, a nije ptica'. U jeziku Apaša, dijelovi automobila označavaju se nazivima dijelova tijela: prednji branik se naziva isto kao i čeljust, šasija kao leđa, akumulator kao jetra, a spremnik za gorivo kao želudac, i tako dalje. Knjigu Adama Jacot de Boinoda "Značenje riječi Tingo i druge iznimne i neprevodive riječi sa svih strana svijeta" objavio je Penguin Press."


___________________

Trepverter
Jidiš riječ za riječi koje dolaze prekasno, 'kad smo već na stepenicama': doslovno dakle 'riječi sa stepeništa', odgovor koji nam pada na pamet samo kad smo već na odlasku. Spominje je Bellow u na početku Herzoga. Navodno da im je ekvivalent francuski izraz ''l'esprit d'escalier'.

Dodajem i jednu rusku: dobar do životopisa Nikolaja Gogolja Nabokov je napisao na nemilosrdnoj riječi pošlost; na kraj mi pameti ne pada pokušati je prevesti na hrvatski, jer sve i da znam ruski - Njetočka, pozivam te za svjedoka - ništa mi ne bi koristilo; nije Nabokovu, pa kako bi meni!?

O njemačkoj unheimlich dolje sam napisao čitav post. Užasna riječ.

U Dubrovniku se skrila vjerojatno talijanska mideca, koja je istovremeno stanje duha i vremena. Cveba i ja dobar smo dio vikenda gonetali njenu turobnu memljivost.

Ne bi bilo pravedno prešutjeti riječ za koju neki nagađaju da je slavenskog, neki pak tvrde da je germanskog porijekla: Kafka je naziva odradek. Pronađite je na Wikipediji.

Pisao sam već i o ichi-go ichi-e što na japanskom doslovno - tvrde mi - znači "jedna prigoda, jedan susret', a često se prevodi kao samo ovaj put, nikad više ili jedna prilika u životu; taj je kulturni koncept povezan sa slavnim majstorom čajne ceremonije Sen no Rikyuom.

Ne vjerujem da je Zagrepčanima potrebno, ali ni moguće prevesti gemutlich.

Navodno da ako na kineskom čovjeku kažete 'dai Lu maozi', što znači 'nosi zeleni šešir', zapravo ste mu kazali da njegova žena spava s drugim.

Negdje mi je na policama knjiga koju je izvjesni isusovac dvadesetak godina pisao pabirčeći naprevodive japanske riječi: neprevodive su naprosto stoga jer ne postoje fenomeni koje bi u našim zapadnim kulturama imenovale; iznimka je recimo, amakudari, doslovno otpadnik od neba, koja opisuje fenomen zapošljavanja od strane tvrke u industriji koju je, kao državni službenik, novozaposleni donedavna regulirao.

Navodno da handschuhschneeballwerfer na njemačkom označava nekoga tko nosi rukavice da bi se grudvao: općenito, dakle, upotrebljava se kao naziv za kukavicu.

Fuegians, koji nastavaju Vatrenu Zemlju, imaju zanimljivu riječ mamihlapinatapai koja ozančava 'dva čovjeka koji se netrimično gledaju nadajući da će drugi učiniti ono što obojica žele ali niti jedan nije voljan započeti'! Engleski prevoditelji pokušali su riječ prevesti ovako: 'this could perhaps be translated more succinctly as "eye-contact implying 'after you...'". A more literal approximation is "ending up mutually at a loss as to what to do about each other".'

Na Islandu postoji fantastičan izraz setja upp gestaspjot, koji je povezan s praznovjerjem svojstvenim i našim krajevima: izgleda da i islandske mačke pouzdano najvaljuje skorašnje goste. Da bi to učinila, neophodno je da se mačka, blago sklupčana, počne 'umivati' s jednom stražnjom nogom u zraku, što je otprilike prijevod spomenute fraze.

Na Ubykh jeziku riječ qaamch'ip'q'i znači filigranski metalni ornament na dršci biča, ali i nekoga čija je uglađena vanjština (moralno) varljiva.

Austrijanci geisterfahrer nazivaju vozača koji autoputem vozi u suprotnom smjeru.

Zanimljivo je da i Flamanci poznaju izraz 'progledati kroz prste', što za njih znači svjesno dopustiti nešto ilegalno ili nekorektno.

Saudade je portugalski izraz za osjećaj žaljenja za nekim koga imamo rad, koji je otišao, ali se može vratiti u dalekoj budućnosti.

Pri svi ovim prevođenjima moguće je da se u prijevodu izgubi i više no što smo mislisli - kredibilitet, recimo: BBC je 22. lipnja 2004. kao najneprevediviju riječ apostrofirao izraz ilunga, navodno kongoanski izraz za osobu koja je spremena oprostiti bilo kakvo zlostavljanje prvi put, tolerirati ga drugi put, ali nikako treći put! Nažalost, vlada Konga suhoparno je konstatirala da je riječ o običnom imenu, bez ikakvih dodatnih konotacija. Shit happens, što je u osnovi ipak neprevedivo!

Peisithanatos

Hegesias of Cyrene (ca. 320 - ca. 280 B.C.)

The “Death Persuader”



A late philosopher of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy, Hegesias of Cyrene was history’s most pessimistic hedonist. The philosophy of hedonism is, of course, founded upon the principle that it is wisest to act in such a way as to maximize pleasure and to minimize suffering; indeed, the ancient hedonists maintained that the goodness of pleasure is denied only by those whose minds are perverted. In ancient times there were two varieties of hedonism. The first of these was the egoistic hedonism of the Cyrenaic school, in which unbridled pleasure-seeking was the chief goal in life. Although the Cyrenaics admitted that the immediate sensual gratification of physical desires may yield only momentary pleasures, nevertheless they maintained that these are the most intense types of pleasures — and what are our lives if they are not the sum total of all such moments? Pleasure can only be experienced in the present moment and so it would be foolish to forego present pleasures for the sake of future ones because the future never really arrives — for it is always right now — and if one spends one’s life sacrificing present enjoyment for the sake of possible future enjoyment, then one’s life (being the sum total of all such moments) would on balance end up being a joyless one. Furthermore, the Cyrenaics maintained that you aren’t even really the same person from one year to the next (are you really the same person that you were when you were a five-year-old?) so to forego present pleasures for possible future ones in essence amounts to giving your own pleasure and joy to someone else who doesn’t even exist yet, and may never exist, if you should happen to die before you get the chance to metamorphose into that person. This was the line of reasoning that motivated the Cyrenaic hedonists to strive always to do all they could to enjoy the “here and now,” because, after all, no matter where we go, or how long we wait, it is always “here and now.” This carpe diem “live for today” approach to life is the mode favored by children, who live in the present moment better than anyone else, and it may even be a serviceable approach to life for wealthy and privileged adults who also happen to be blessed with youth, good looks, and good health, but what about those who are not so fortunate? What about the sick, the poor, the lame, or the old, whom nobody wants to have sex with, and who have nothing to look forward to in their lives but suffering? Cyrenaic hedonism is not a workable philosophy for such people because there is nothing more pathetic than a person who lives solely for pleasure who suddenly finds himself condemned to living without pleasure! Few people are fortunate enough to be able to make a lifestyle out of enjoying a continuous succession of pleasures — even those that are so blessed cannot usually keep an uninterrupted stream of pleasures coming for long, for if the pains and infirmities of advancing years do not stanch the flow of pleasures, then the physical unattractiveness of old age will at least put an end to the greatest pleasure — one’s sex life. Where carnal pleasures are hard to come by, and suffering plentiful, Cyrenaic hedonism is simply not a workable way of life, for the only thing such a hedonist has to keep him going in life — pleasure — is unattainable to him. A second variety of hedonism arose in order to address this shortcoming of egoistic hedonism, and that variety is the kind we call “rational hedonism.” Epicurus was the most famous exponent of this philosophy. Like the Cyrenaic hedonists, the Epicureans also considered pleasure to be the supreme good, but their concept of pleasure differed substantially from that of the Cyrenaics. Unlike the egoistic hedonists, the Epicureans (or rational hedonists) contended that true pleasure is attainable only by Reason, and that happiness comes not of passionate cycles of ecstasy (followed by agony), but is rather the result of equanimity of the soul — and this, even the old, the sick, the poor, and those too ugly to get any sex, have at least a chance of attaining. Therefore, they stressed the virtues of self-control and prudence in all things. The Epicureans recommended not abstinence, mind you, but moderation, for total abstinence is even more destructive to our ability to enjoy than is over-indulgence. Nevertheless, the self-restraint advocated by the Epicureans smacked of repression to the shamelessly carnal Cyrenaics, and, perhaps when pleasure had finally become unavailable to him, the Cyrenaic hedonist, Hegesias was forced to conclude that life has in it more pain than pleasure, more grief than joy; that happiness is impossible to achieve because the mind and body are subject to much suffering that is the result of fortune beyond our control; that friendship does not really exist, for everything that anyone ever does is for egoistic reasons — to please himself, or for his own advantage — and friendship thereby really amounts to no more than people using each other. Because pleasure is good and suffering is evil, and because to live is to suffer, the only recourse left is to end one’s life without delay, so as to minimize one’s suffering. It is said that he argued the point so eloquently that a wave of suicides arose in Alexandria, he became known as Peisithanatos (“the Death-Persuader”), and King Ptolemy II “Philadelphus” (who reigned from 285 to 246 B.C.) found it necessary to banish him from Egypt [Source: Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, i,34.83 , Loeb Library]. It is not known whether or not Hegesias took his own advice, but in any event, his career of advocating suicide was not a long one for it is estimated that he did not have to endure this vale of tears for more than two-score years. Today the name of Hegesias is almost unknown, his philosophy all but forgotten. Why? Because philosophies are subject to a kind of natural selection: any philosophy that kills off those that subscribe to it, is itself slated for extinction. It can only survive as long as people only pay lip service to it, but do not act in accordance with its tenets. And so it is with anti-hedonistic religions, too. A pleasure-hating religion, such as Christianity, which demands chastity of its members, can only survive as long as its members are hypocrites. If they ever start practicing what they preach, and give up fucking, there will be no “next generation” of Christians, and the religion will become extinct just as the philosophy of Hegesias did.
Although its historical influence was not profound, the philosophy of Hegesias marked the beginning of the end of the shameless, orgiastic, life-loving pagan Greek way of life. The pursuit of carnal pleasures can only be a viable raison d'ętre where pleasure is readily and dependably attainable, and suffering is avoidable and scarce. Such a state of affairs can only come about in an enlightened society which is understanding and tolerant of human nature, and which recognizes that peace does not come from the harsh repression of human needs, but in providing justice to all, by allowing all to meet their human needs without resorting to crime or violence. Needless to say, there have not been many such enlightened societies in history. Usually, those few wealthy fortunates who are in a position of power maintain their lives of pleasure and luxury at the expense of those less fortunate than they, while ignoring the suffering of the downtrodden wretches that they are standing upon to hold their heads above the rest. Although ancient culture was not harshly intolerant of human needs, as today’s culture is, and legal prostitution, love cults, and orgiastic festivals provided a way for all to meet their human needs at least occasionally, still there was a vast gulf between the wealthy freemen who could afford lavish pleasures on a regular basis, and the many poor slaves who could barely afford to eat occasionally. Lest we get too self-righteous about the fact the slavery is abolished in our time, we should bear in mind that the ancient injustice of the disparity between the “haves” and the “have-nots” persists to this day. Today, in the United States, wealthy capitalists amass obscene amounts of un-labored-for wealth by paying illegal immigrants or the people of impoverished nations a meager subsistence wage for doing things that the privileged class would never deign to do — such as scrubbing toilets — and the minimum-wage-earning lower-class drudges have to struggle to eke out a subsistence which is little better than the slaves had it in the Roman Empire. Without a system for ensuring that anyone could get pleasure who was willing to work for it (such as the system outlined in the cult of Aphrodite scenes in Khan Amore’s controversial novel, HYPATIA), Cyrenaic hedonism was a philosophy for the privileged and the fortunate, not for the poor and the downtrodden, and the poor and the downtrodden have always greatly out-numbered the Hugh Hefners of the world. In a world without a system of societal support for such a way of life — a way which dependably makes pleasure available and suffering avoidable for all — the pessimistic philosophy of Hegesias was the philosophy of hedonism taken to its logical conclusion. It was the philosophy of the friend who has been hurt, betrayed, or taken advantage of too many times; that of the idealist who has been slapped in the face by reality too often; that of the hedonist who finds himself living without pleasure.

Pitanje za Lolinu

The People's Princess

Queen of the Hearts



Di si ti meni?

Mi smo tu, a di si ti,
o Lejdi Di, Lejdi di?
Svi smi mi Lejdi Di,
nemoj se nikaj čuditi
jeboga ti!

Ljudi su samo svijeća na vjetru
koji jako puše kroz prozor.
Krhki smo kao kristalna Severova češka čaša
i ti i mi i Lijepa naša!

Prošlo je brzo ovo desetljeće
otkako te nema Lejdi Di.
Već je uvelo na grobu cvijeće
koje smo donjeli mi (svi).

Svi bumo tako jednog dana, prije ili kasnije,
kaj ćeš, čovjek je samo svijeća na noćnom vjetru
u Hramu Sudbine.
Blago si ga tebi, ipak, da nisi živjela u SFRJ
i bila izložena Udbi, ne!



Royal Blood

Once upon a time
In a kingdom not far away
Lived a princess so sublime
As the sun that lights our day
To the needed she gave love and care
Always heeded those in despair
Children, young or old
Never left them out in the cold

Goodbye Lady Di
Watch for us up in the sky
The way you did when you were here
Goodbye Lady Di
We still keep our hopes up high
And for us you're always near

She died in a high speed chase
Moved by those whom she fed
A truly tragic case
Which made the world so sad

They say that this fair princess
Never found true happiness
To the homeless she showed happier times
Helped fight Aids, Cancer and landmines

Goodbye Lady Di
Watch for us up in the sky
The way you did when you were here
Goodbye Lady Di
We still keep our hopes up high
And for us you're always near

Goodbye Lady Di
Watch for us up in the sky
The way you did when you were here
Goodbye Lady Di
We still keep our hopes up high
And for us you're always near

Lyrics by Joaquim Lé

EKSKLUZIVNO: LO & HARLAN ZA VASELJENU!

SAMODOL U HRVATSKOJ POŠTANSKOJ BANCI!



Lolina

Da se mene pita došla bi blb uz uvjet sa angelom merkel pod ruku
nedavno je samodol posjetio hpb,ali nema smisla da država hanfa oduzima licencu državi u hpb,a u sve su sad slučajno upali i mali ulagači,a mali ulagači su namlatili love zadnjih godina.nekima od tih autsajdera sad se i prijeti -navodno. svi zarađuju ,zarađuje država,banke, brokeri, fondovi, isprepleteni ulagači,veliki i mali osim onih zadnjih.zadnji su magarci.

evo telefona ; Tko bi rekao da će ti prognanički pifovi tako daleko dogurati ;))))
TRANSADRIA D.D. RIJEKA/REDOVNA TNSA-R-A

Vlasnik računa Stanje [%] Vrsta računa
1. HRVATSKI FOND ZA PRIVATIZACIJU 8.071 28,07 Osnovni račun
2. HPB D.D. 1.238 4,31 Skrb. račun ekipa?
3. ERSTE & STEIERMARKISCHE BANK D.D. 1.153 4,01 Skrb. račun
4. FILIPOVIĆ MARIJAN 1.029 3,58 Osnovni račun-Linić?
5. JOZIĆ TOMO 857 2,98 Osnovni račun
6. ERSTE & STEIERMARKISCHE BANK D.D. 603 2,10 Skrb. račun
7. EIG D.D. 477 1,66 Osnovni račun
8. HOMAN MOIRA 444 1,54 Osnovni račun t-com
9. NAVA BANKA D.D. ZAGREB 338 1,18 Osnovni računAgram os?
10. MITROVIĆ MILIVOJ 328 1,14 Osnovni račun
Ukupno: 50,56

PROFICIO D.D./REDOVNA PRFC-R-A

Vlasnik računa Stanje [%] Vrsta računa
1. AIM D.O.O. 1.749.360 44,71 Osnovni račun
2. RAIFFEISENBANK AUSTRIA D.D. ZAGREB 382.725 9,78 Skrb. račun
3. ERSTE & STEIERMARKISCHE BANK D.D. 368.533 9,42 Skrb. račun
4. RAIFFEISENBANK AUSTRIA D.D. ZAGREB 37.843 0,97 Skrb. račun
5. ZAGREBAČKA BANKA D.D. 25.002 0,64 Skrb. račun
6. RAIFFEISENBANK AUSTRIA D.D. ZAGREB 23.311 0,60 Skrb. račun
7. HOMAN MOIRA 18.000 0,46 Osnovni račun
8. NAVA BANKA D.D. ZAGREB 14.600 0,37 Osnovni račun
9. BASTION UPRAVLJANJE D.D. 12.939 0,33 Osnovni račun
10. ZUBAK PAVO 12.251 0,31 Osnovni račun
Ukupno: 67,59



Sve se otelo kontroli na polju nekretnina, pa pune su novine...državi odgovara da susmann angažira vrijedne nekretnine iz polupropalih tvrtki "neprijateljskim preuzimanjem"(razlika između temeljnog kapitala i stvarnog stanja=profit),ali ne i da im se hypo upisuje na drž. zemljišta kod hipotekarnih kredita zbog nereda među papirima.
svi rade istu stvar ,ali država bira one koji imaju "bolji" motiv.ovo s kimom i alan hotelom je nula od skandala.dogodilo se da su sada svi navalili na istu kost i glođu.
sva trgovina ide putem dionica i to prati hpb, ne etičnim manipulacijama cijena ,ovisi o potrebi da sada opisujem proceduru trebalo bi mi par stranica teksta. kužiš? kroz brokeraj se izvode svinjarije

tek sad vidim koliko je ono gore naivno , pa ti su samo prvi dio priče.
kako bilo da bilo složila sam cijelu slagalicu likova
maestro škvadra , od hfp-pif,zif,holding,doo-brokeri-fondovi-hpb-haab(strašna je ta hypo,nije ni čudo da se blb toliko bori da uđe ;)))
odlično i sve po zakonu;)))
samo, čemu politika služi osim za ovce šišat ;))) ?
kakav kim , alan hoteli, kakvi bakrači , to ide od ine , ht-a , dioki,brodari, hoteli od istre do kvarnera , eto ostao još onaj jadan vis.dd ;))) i par pikova.
sve po koracima; 1.istisni-male
2.očerupaj-što vrijedi
3. prodaj -kupac xy ili uprava sa nagradnim dionicama