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Ovaj blog je moj osobni osvrt na pojedine dionice, opcije i kretanja u ekonomiji općenito i kako ona utječu na tržišta kapitala.
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31.05.2007., četvrtak

Nasdaq chart

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Na chartu se vidi divergencija između RSI-a i cijene Nasdaq indexa. Situacija je slična kao pred pad u drugom mjesecu (28.2. Kineska kriza br.1).
Međutim, nešto je na burzi kompletno drugačije u konfiguraciji koja se na chartu ne vidi.
A to je: povijesno visoka količina shorteva na burzi (čak 3% svih dionica na burzi), a i
zaštita kupljena na putevima pokazuje da su ulagači vrlo oprezni.
U prijevodu to znači da potencijalno velika količina novca sjedi sa strane i ako krene pozitivno prema gore
nastupit će short-squeeze i dodatno potjerati dionice prema gore.

Isto tako, premija za put opcije koji su ulagači spremni platiti je na većim razinama nego u drugom mjesecu, što znači da su ulagači puno oprezniji:

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To bi u prijevodu značilo da su padovi mogući i da se u indexima vidi dosta distribucije (distribution days) i da u volumenu oni ipak prevladavaju, ali da je market puno otporniji na te padove.
- 12:35 - Komentari (5) - Isprintaj - #

24.05.2007., četvrtak

Kina će povući emerging markete (i US) dolje?

Greenspan spooks stocks
Futures point lower after former Fed chairman warns a big correction is due in Chinese stocks.
May 24 2007: 6:34 AM EDT

NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) -- Wall Street looks primed to fall at the open Thursday after former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan warned a big correction is due in Chinese stocks.

U.S. stock futures were lower on Greenspan's comments, pointing to a lower open for stocks here. Markets also fell in Asia and Europe, following those comments.

LINK


- 14:06 - Komentari (0) - Isprintaj - #

22.05.2007., utorak

Schaefferov besplatni komentar od prije par dana

Htio bi čitateljima istaknuti (jer ne stignem grafički potvrditi) da je Schaeffer u svom komentaru naglasio veliki pomak open interesta na Jun put opcije sa Mayskih.
To bi u prijevodu značilo da se i dalje kupuje puno zaštite na ovom marketu i da se opet svaka manja korekcija ne bi trebala produžiti. Optimizam svakako nije na vrhuncu i to je ono što ovaj market i dalje vuče prema gore, pored sve veće svjetske likvidnosti.
No svakako bi već bilo vrijeme za jedan manji pullback!
Kina - neki igrači kratkoročno ulaze u shorting marketa u Kini, iako dugoročno su bulllish.
Da li će, ako se to desi, povući i ostale emerging markete dolje, ostaje da se vidi...
- 00:15 - Komentari (3) - Isprintaj - #

13.05.2007., nedjelja

Preporuke sa CNBC-a

Evo tri tipa sa CNBC-a koja sam slučajno u petak čuo (kažem slučajno jer ga na žalost ne mogu redovito pratiti):
STI (Suntrust), jaka kupovina call-ova sa stikeom $90 i $95. Priča se o takeoveru.
LYO (Lyondell), deal talk
Najarian: jaka kupovina callova za TEVA (izraelski proizvođač generičkih lijekova).
To su tipovi u koje neću ulaziti, već samo pratiti.

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- 19:51 - Komentari (2) - Isprintaj - #

11.05.2007., petak

Distribucija? - Stocks Fall As Distribution Count Climbs

Sa Investors business daily.

The major stock indexes finished the day in the red amid disappointing retail data and earnings results.

According to preliminary data, the S&P 500 gave up 1.4%, while Dow dropped 1.1%. The Nasdaq fell 1.7%. Volume rose, which would mark its fourth distribution day. Other indexes losing ground included the NYSE composite which appeared to log its fifth distribution day. It fell 1.6% as NYSE volume rose.

Distribucijski dani na indeksima su po definiciji negativni dani u odnosu na prethodni na većem volumenu od prethodnog i više njih mogu najaviti korekciju. Uglavnom, slabost koja nastupa još dok traje rally, može biti najava veće korekcije na indexima.

Također, može se primjetiti da je MACD na DJIA opalio izlazni signal (za Sy Hardinga to bi značilo izlaz iz sezonskog portfelja!!!).

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Slična situacija je i na Nasdaq-u, s time da on pokazuje manju snagu, a RSI pokazuje padajući trend - negativna divergencija sa samim indexom - obično nije dobar signal.

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Sa druge strane, Schaeffer je prije par dana spominjao u svom newsletteru da ima dosta shortova i puteva na burzi, koji bi svaki pad trebali ublažiti. Današnji futuresi su prešli u negativu i preostaje da vidimo hoćemo li nakon ovoga (pad jučer i eventualno danas ili slijedećih par dana) imati još jedan "leg up" ili je ovo početak korekcije.



- 10:50 - Komentari (11) - Isprintaj - #

05.05.2007., subota

Zašto bi se ovaj rally ipak mogao nastaviti

Prvo treba pročitati donja dva članka Sy Hardinga, a onda ovaj sa Seeking Alpha. Dok je Sy Harding vjerojatno u pravu sa svojim donjim komentarima, 1 million dollar question je: SA KOJEG NIVOA ĆE STVARNO NASTUPITI KOREKCIJA?
Evo protuargumenta da bi se sadašnji rally mogao nastaviti bez korekcije još neko vrijeme u gornjem linku na članak. Naime, preko 50% ispitanjika je BEARISH, jako dobar signal da se rally NASTAVI. A nakon toga tko zna - možda korekcija 10-15%, a možda i pravi bear market. Ne znači da će market svaki dan nastaviti ići gore, ali moguć je danji porast:

AAII Poll Shows Widespread Bearishness: Time To Buy

Thursday morning’s Wall Street Journal market recap article called the recent rally a ‘Buying Panic’. But the part of the article we found most notable was the sentiment it portrayed. The story commented that even bullish investors were becoming more cautious and bracing for a short-term pullback. Among the concerns cited was that consumer stocks should be avoided as they rely too heavily on a strong economy and consumer spending.

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Sa contrarian pristupa, ovo je, naravno, vrlo bullish signal!

Sa druge strane, put & call ratio nije niti na jednu stranu - poprilično neutralno očitanje i bez obzira na to što investitori kupuju određenu zaštitu (puteve) ona nije na ekstremno visokom nivou, ali ni na ekstremno niskom:

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Ako tome dodamo prilično bullish sentiment blogera, situacija je još više zbunjujuća:

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Znači jedini bearish sentiment pokazuje AAII sa početka unosa.
Market je trenutno poprilično overbought, ali ono što pokušavamo ovdje predvidjeti je njegovo kretanje slijedećih nekoliko mjeseci, a ne dana.

Moje mišljenje o svemu je: short term (nekoliko dana) mogli bi imati manja posrtanja i negativne dane, ali ne i pravu korekciju, JER TO PUNO INVESTITORA OČEKUJE. Onda bi mogli još malo gore (na nove vrhunce??). Prava korekcija, sudeći po tome bi mogla biti odgođena, ali nekako sam uvjeren da će se ipak desiti. Dno korekcije ćemo prepoznati po izrazito bearish raspoloženju investitora, koje sada ipak nije ni blizu takvih nivoa, ali nije niti pretjerano bullish (što možda dodatno pokrene ovaj rally).
Market je kao opruga: što ćemo sada imati jači rally, korekcija će biti snažnija!

I dalje, očekujem dno u kasnijim ljetnim mjesecima, samo je pitanje SA KOJIH NIVOA i dokle će ovaj rally?
Ovo je, naravno, samo moje razmišljanje i svatko tko je 100% uvjeren u svoju nepogrešivost je osuđen na - gubitak.
- 19:57 - Komentari (65) - Isprintaj - #

SY HARDING: BEAR MARKET OVE GODINE?

Smatram ovo važnim upozoravajućim člancima, pa ih u cijelosti prenosim na svoj blog.
Naravno, sva ova upozorenja se ne moraju ostvariti, pa na svakome ostavljam da procijeni da
li će na neki način zaštititi svoj portfelj ili ne.

SY HARDING - link na članak
(pod ovim linkom će nakon nekog vremena biti drugi članak, ali ovaj na blogu ostaje)

NOTE: You are welcome to mail or e-mail the following article to friends and relatives who might be interested in its information, or e-mail them a link to it, or to post it on other websites as long as we are given full credit.



WHAT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A BEAR MARKET THIS YEAR? May 1, 2007.

For now we are expecting only a normal 15% correction in the blue chips (20% in the Nasdaq) in the market's unfavorable season, once we get the exit signal for our Seasonal Timing Strategy.

We've been asked about the odds of a bear market this year. Is it possible we'll experience one?

Yes, it is possible, especially if the odds increase much more that the economy will slow all the way into a recession. There has never been an economic recession that was not accompanied by a bear market.

Some other reasons that make it possible:

No one expects one.

And the market is notorious for doing whatever it takes to make the majority (the crowd) wrong. And right now hardly anyone is expecting a bear market. Those who are bullish don’t believe there will even be a 10% correction. Those who are bearish, including ourselves, expect only a correction of 15% or so and then a resumption of the bull market.

One of the factors keeping analysts from expecting a bear market is that the last two years of the Four-Year Presidential Cycle are almost always positive. There is a strong history of the economy and stock market experiencing difficulties in the first two years of each Presidential term, and then experiencing strong growth in the 3rd and 4th year of each Presidential term.

The driving force behind the cycle is the economic ‘pump-priming’ out of Washington beginning in the 2nd and 3rd year of each presidential term. Political parties learned many decades ago that the most important factor for voters at election time is the condition of the economy. Regardless of how positive other factors may be at the time, almost no incumbent party has ever been re-elected if the economy is struggling when voters go to the polls.

Therefore, it has been common since at least 1918 for the incumbent Administration to do whatever it takes in the last two years of each Presidential term to make sure a prosperous economy and stock market are in place in time for the next election. Such pump-priming traditionally includes increased government spending, cuts in interest rates, tax cuts, even tax rebates. The intent is to encourage businesses to increase their capital spending and hire more workers, and to encourage consumers to spend.

It does not always work to get the incumbent party re-elected, but it almost always works to create a strong economy and stock market by the time the next election rolls around.

The problem is that the stimulus efforts in the last two years of each Presidential term almost always result in the economy and stock market being pumped up too much. Excesses are created that need to be cooled off and corrected after the election. Those excesses include some combination of an overheated economy that is threatening to produce inflation, an overbought and over-priced stock market, perhaps a ‘bubble’ in one or more investment area, and excess government, consumer, or corporate debt.

So after the election, the Administration wants the correction of those excesses to take place in the first two years of the new term. If market forces are not producing the corrections, Washington often forces the issue by raising interest rates to cool off the economy, while backing off on government spending and job creation.

It makes sense that they want the economy and stock market to undergo any needed correction of excesses in the first two years of the new term. If they tried to keep the economy and stock market pumped up for another four years, all the way to the following election, they would run the risk of even greater excesses developing. That in turn might result in an even larger economic and stock market correction late in the term, when they might not have enough time to get the situation turned around in time for the next election.

The result has been that since at least 1918 there have almost always been problems in the first two years of each term, but then a substantial rally from the low in the 2nd year of each term to the high in the 3rd year, rallies in which the Dow and S&P 500 gained an average of 50%.

However, the pattern of a serious correction in the first two years of a presidential term did not take place in President Bush’s 2nd term. The Dow gained 1.6% in 2005, and 18.5% in 2006. That raises the question of whether the last two years of the term will be able to follow the historical pattern - of being positive.

Two previous times that the pattern (of weakness in the first two years and strength in the last two years) did not take place were also when a president had been elected for a second term.

The market did not have a serious correction in the first two years of either President Reagan’s or President Clinton’s second terms. And both times the normal pattern of strength in the last two years of those terms did not take place either. For Reagan, the 1987 crash took place in the 3rd year of his second term. And the 2000-2002 bear market began in the 4th year of Clinton’s second term.

For example, in the following chart we have marked the low in the 2nd year of each term with an A. Note that the market had no correction in the first two years of Reagan's second term. So there was no real low in the 2nd year. Even so, from that low marked A the Dow still began an impressive rally that continued into the third year. But part way through that third year the market ran into the 1987 crash in which the Dow lost 36% of its value.

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And as noted, the market also did not have a correction or a serious low in the first or second year of Clinton's second term. And sure enough the excesses were not corrected, and the market's severe 2000-2002 bear market began at the beginning of the 4th year of the term.

The BUSH second term has a similar look.

As shown in the following chart, President Bush's 1st term followed the historical pattern of problems in the first two years, and then a significant rally from the low in the 2nd year. In fact, the severe 2000-2002 bear market ended with that low.

However, President Bush's 2nd term has not followed the pattern. Just like Reagan's 2nd term and Clinton's, there was no serious market correction in 2005 or 2006, the first two years of the 2nd term. In fact, as has been noticed by most everyone, this bull market has not had even a 10% correction since 2003.

Yet, as called for by the Presidential Cycle, and just as also happened in Reagan's and Clinton's 2nd terms, from what low there was in the 2nd year of Bush's 2nd term, the low last July marked A, an impressive rally was launched that has continued on into this year, the 3rd year of the Bush 2nd term.

So the question is whether the 3rd and 4th year will be positive, as is called for by the Presidential Cycle, or will they have problems like in the Reagan and Clinton 2nd terms, because it is a president's 2nd term and there was no correction of the excesses in the 1st two years of the term?

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It does seem that the consistent pattern of the market suffering serious losses in the first or second year of a president’s term, and then being positive in the final two years, is not consistent when it is a president’s 2nd term.

And this time, as with the Reagan and Clinton 2nd terms, we are in the 3rd year of the Bush 2nd term without the excesses from the final two years of the first term having been corrected. So we have the typical excesses of inflationary presuures, an overbought and over-priced stock market, a ‘bubble’ bursting in an investment area, excessive government & consumer debt, etc. usually seen at market tops.

So, yes, although bear markets are rare in the 3rd year of presidential terms, it is possible. We do have the precedents of the Reagan and Clinton 2nd terms.



Additionally, we are in the 7th year of the decade.

The pattern for 120 years has been for the 7th and 10th years of the decade to be the most negative. In fact, they have averaged losses.

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It’s also interesting that not only did the 1987 crash, and the beginning of the 2000-2002 bear market take place in the last two years of the Reagan and Clinton second terms, but the first event was in the 7th year of the decade, and the other in the 10th year. And here we are in the 7th year of this decade, with similar situations and conditions.

We don’t want to mislead you. While the 7th year has averaged losses over the last 12 decades, it was down in only six of those decades and up in six. (Its long-term record is so negative because when it was down in a 7th year, it was usually down significantly).

So, the Four-Year Presidential Cycle cannot be depended on to save us from a bear market this year. And the Decennial Cycle supports the thought. As do signs that the economy is slowing possibly into recession, etc.

So we do not rule out a bear market, and will be watching closely once our Seasonal Timing Strategy (STS) receives its exit signal into its unfavorable season. Until then, the STS portfolio remains 100% invested in the S&P 500 Index (since the entry last October)
- 15:06 - Komentari (0) - Isprintaj - #

SY HARDING: DUG

DEBT. DEBT. EVERYWHERE DEBT! May 4, 2007.

Several weeks ago I predicted that the next bubble to burst will be the credit bubble. Nothing I have learned since has changed my mind.

We’re all aware that consumer debt is at an all-time record, and unfortunately at a time when unusually high food, gasoline, and housing costs are taking additional money out of pockets.

We’re aware that stock market investors have run margin debt (used to buy stocks with 50% down-payments), to a record high, higher in total dollars even than at the market peak in 2000.

We’re aware of how dramatically the government has been spending more than it takes in, creating record budget deficits where once there were budget surpluses. I am not ignoring the unusual events that brought them about, but merely pointing out that the record debt is there, regardless of the reason. The budget deficit for 2006 was $248 billion, raising the total U.S. national debt to $8.8 trillion at the end of 2006.

Several other areas of unusually high debt levels are contributing to the bubble.

For instance, let’s take a look at hedge funds. They have sprung up over recent years like dandelions on a rainy day, until there are now roughly 10,000 in existence. They manage total assets of approximately $1.4 trillion.

Hedge funds borrow heavily on their assets and then use the borrowed money to make massive leveraged bets in financial and currency markets, operating chiefly in derivatives markets, where the derivatives themselves are often leveraged. How much debt hedge funds owe to financial institutions is a big question mark since there is virtually no reporting required by hedge funds.

However enough is known that on Wednesday of this week the New York Federal Reserve issued what it termed its most serious warning regarding the risk to the financial system posed by hedge funds since the 1998 collapse of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management.

To refresh your memory of that event, HTCM had investor assets of $4.7 billion at the beginning of 1998, after making annual gains of 40% for its investors in its first couple of years of operation. How much leverage did it employ to produce those gains, and at how much risk? We know from the HTCM bankruptcy hearings that with only $4.7 billion in equity, HTCM was able to borrow $124.5 billion from major banks, and then used those borrowings to take leveraged derivative positions amounting to $1.2 trillion. To make a complicated story short, its positions collapsed, its losses were huge, the banks and brokerage firms it had borrowed from faced losses that threatened the entire U.S. financial system. So the Federal Reserve stepped in and organized a consortium of international financial institutions, pressuring them to provide a $3.6 billion bailout of the lenders.

As noted there are now 10,000 hedge funds, with somewhere around $1.4 trillion in assets, most borrowing heavily and then using the proceeds to take leveraged positions in derivatives. No one believes many of them are as foolishly in debt and leveraged as HTCM. Surely the banks and other lenders learned something from the HTCM experience. But concern regarding their highly leveraged debt has been growing. And now the New York Fed has issued a warning saying that “Recent high correlations among hedge fund returns could suggest concentrations of risk comparable to those preceding the hedge fund crisis of 1998.”

By high correlations among hedge fund returns they mean that many hedge funds appear to now be making the same high debt bets in the same markets. So if a problem arises it will not be just the leveraged losses created by one fund like HTCM with $4.7 billion in assets, but the risk of quite a number of much larger funds having similar problems at the same time.

More signs of a credit bubble?

How about the craze for leveraged buyouts that has dominated the financial news and markets of late? Some of the largest, publicly traded, multi-billion dollar, corporations in the world have been targeted over the last year by the relatively new phenomenon of ‘private equity funds’. It seems a major leveraged acquisition is announced almost daily. Where does the money come from?

Private equity funds issue bonds (debt), and take out loans and other financing to leverage what cash they put in, to pay for their acquisitions. According to Jim Jubak in an article on Money Central, even much of that borrowed money has first been borrowed by the lender, piling debt on top of debt. Jubak reports that Wall Street’s four largest securities companies financed $3.3 trillion in assets last year on which there was just $130 billion of shareholder equity.

Is it high risk debt? Well, 37% of the bonds sold for leveraged buyouts in 2007 were rated CCC by Standard & Poor’s. S&P’s definition of a triple-C rating? “In poor standing. Such issues may be in default or present elements of danger with respect to principal or interest.”

Then there are the debt problems related to the real estate industry, in the sub-prime mortgage market, mortgage-backed bonds, mortgage-backed securities, and the like.

There could hardly be more evidence that a credit bubble has formed across broad sections of the economy.
- 15:04 - Komentari (0) - Isprintaj - #

02.05.2007., srijeda

Update: put to call ratio

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- 09:43 - Komentari (14) - Isprintaj - #

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